Sanna Kopra
Senior Researcher
The Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
Finland
Although the northernmost part of China is far from the Arctic Circle, China has become an increasingly active stakeholder in the Arctic over the past decade. In 2013, China was accepted as an observer of the Arctic Council, the key regional intergovernmental platform promoting collaboration on environmental protection and sustainable development among eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) and six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations (Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council). In January 2018, the Chinese government published the first-ever Arctic strategy, which describes China as a “near-Arctic state” with interests and rights in the Arctic region. Yet, the political dynamics in the Arctic have changed dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine started, and the work of the Arctic Council has been paused. This also affects China’s chances to advance its interests and visions in the Arctic.
In addition to climate change, China is interested in new Arctic shipping lines and lucrative natural resources, especially in the Russian Arctic. It has invested in Arctic scientific research and established the first Arctic research station on Svalbard in 2004. In addition, China–Iceland Arctic Science Observatory was launched in 2018. Currently, China operates two research icebreakers: Xuelong and Xuelong II, the latter being the first domestically built polar research vessel. China plans to build several other ice-class ships in the foreseeable future as it is eager to develop Arctic shipping with and without Russia. China has also invested in liquid natural gas projects in the Russian Arctic. Since Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, the energy imports from Russia to China have increased significantly.
Although Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not escalated to the Arctic region, the security dynamics of the northernmost part of the globe have changed significantly since February 2022. Noteworthy, Finland joined NATO in early April. After Türkiye and Hungary ratify Sweden’s application for NATO membership, all Arctic states apart from Russia will be NATO allies. From the perspective of China, NATO’s Arctic expansion is not a favourable development: It will limit China’s room for manoeuvre in the region as NATO members will likely share the United States’ critical approach to China.
While the potential security impacts of China’s growing Arctic role started to be speculated among regional states and stakeholders in the late 2010s, China’s unwillingness to criticise Russia’s war of aggression has severely impacted the other seven Arctic states’ attitude towards it. Only a few days before Russia attacked Ukraine, Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, met in Beijing and made new energy and wheat deals. In their joint declaration, two authoritarian leaders pledged to increase collaboration in the Arctic and underlined that their friendship has no limits. In practice, however, the Sino-Russian relationship is complex due to the historical mistrust, and China has sought to balance between Russia and the West. It seems China does not want to sacrifice its trade relations with the United States and the European Union. Undoubtedly, China does not accept Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons.
As Russia’s isolation from international society increases, China’s leverage on it also increases. Noteworthy, when meeting Xi in Moscow at the end of March 2023, Putin announced that Russia was ready to establish a joint Russian-Chinese organ to develop the Northern Sea Route. Although their joint declaration did not mention a planned new major infrastructure project, Power-of-Siberia 2, to deliver Russian gas to China, Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic can be expected to increase. Whether this will lead to an increased Arctic presence of the Chinese military forces remains to be seen.
In light of growing great power tensions, international collaboration on global heating – the most pressing security risk in the Arctic and beyond – seems increasingly challenging. Given China’s status as the world's largest carbon dioxide emission emitter, it is crucial to continue and foster ambitious climate collaboration between China and the West, especially the United States. For the time being, however, it seems that the Arctic is becoming, once again, an arena for armament and great power rivalry, and environmental risks continue to increase.