Tom Ellison
Deputy Director
Center for Climate and Security
USA
Compared to most of the world, the EU’s Baltic states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden have enviable resources to cope with climate change, despite the challenges they face. Indeed, indices that measure vulnerability to climate hazards like extreme heat and storms rank EU Baltic states among the best prepared. However, these indices focus mostly on financial resources and physical and economic resilience, rather than societal fault lines that could pose liabilities. One such fault line revolves around mis- and disinformation. In addition to floods and heatwaves, climate change is likely to worsen vulnerabilities to mis- and disinformation, which could pose a heightened threat to the EU’s Baltic states.
To begin with, climate change and the energy transition are likely to contribute to increased migration, more volatile energy markets, and economic strains that provide tempting disinformation targets for neighbors like Russia. Predicting climate-driven migration is difficult, but in 2021, weather-related disasters internally displaced 22.3 million people - more than any current conflict. The UN’s IPCC, which is conservative by design, avoids forecasting future climate migration but expects climate change to increasingly drive migration in the coming decades as harms intensify in vulnerable countries and communities. This suggests Europe will continue to be a destination for a portion of the growing number of those displaced, even while facing potential internal climate migration. Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency and other experts warn that the transition to low-carbon energy may be chaotic, as fossil fuel supply and demand decline out of step with one another, risking price spikes like those prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Finally, on economics, the latest scientific analysis forecasts that climate change could cause as much as 3.6-4.1% GDP loss through 2050, spiking as high as 18-22% by 2100. These numbers do not even account for health impacts, biodiversity loss, or climate tipping points, but nevertheless dwarf the GDP impact of the 2007-2008 recession. Meanwhile, specific economic sectors and communities are likely to face strain from the energy transition, whether that’s Polish coal miners or German auto workers.
In addition to their direct harms, these trends risk worsening social divisions and grievances that provide fertile ground for misinformation–whether organic or maliciously spread. Xenophobic actors’ efforts to exploit migration would likely worsen societal polarization, as previewed by the impact of the 2015-16 refugee crisis in Europe, or migrants could be unfairly scapegoated for causing climate hazards, as happened in 2021 to minorities in Turkey and Greece after wildfires. Energy price spikes are a sure recipe for discontent, as seen by their role driving protests across Europe in the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Further, the global and local economic costs of climate change could prompt additional strains on cost of living and social benefits, the tightening of which have prompted protests and violent crackdowns in France.
Moreover, neighboring Russia, its allies, and likeminded nonstate actors will probably seek to exploit these fissures, given their record of stoking European discord around such topics, as documented by civil society and government investigations. Since the 2015-16 European refugee crisis, Russia and European far-right activists have spread disinformation to demonize refugees and bolster sympathetic far-right European allies. In 2021, in retaliation for EU sanctions, Belarus manipulated visa rules and spread disinformation to encourage migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe, before working with Russia to amplify reports of abused migrants at the Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian borders. Russia-aligned actors have tried to stoke worries of Baltic economic collapse from COVID-19, capitalize on economic grievances during 2018’s Yellow Vest protests in France, and entrench Russian trade and natural gas interests in Europe. Today, Russian propaganda seeks to demonize Ukrainian refugees as the cause of Europe’s energy security struggles, a ploy to undermine European solidarity with Kyiv.
Because of these vulnerabilities, the EU’s Baltic states would do well to prioritize long-term resilience to such strains.
For example, leaders in combating misinformation like the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats can share best practices. More broadly, these threats speak to the security value of programs aimed at economic equality and societal cohesion, to accommodate migration and economic shocks with solidarity. They also underscore the benefits of investments in climate resilience in vulnerable countries, which can reduce pressures to migrate. While the war in Ukraine and past crises have offered practice countering similar misinformation, climate change is likely to present a unique and ongoing challenge, given that it is projected to worsen for 20-30 years even in the best-case emissions scenarios. This climate-misinformation nexus will be with the EU for a long time, and Baltic states must prepare for the long haul.
To begin with, climate change and the energy transition are likely to contribute to increased migration, more volatile energy markets, and economic strains that provide tempting disinformation targets for neighbors like Russia. Predicting climate-driven migration is difficult, but in 2021, weather-related disasters internally displaced 22.3 million people - more than any current conflict. The UN’s IPCC, which is conservative by design, avoids forecasting future climate migration but expects climate change to increasingly drive migration in the coming decades as harms intensify in vulnerable countries and communities. This suggests Europe will continue to be a destination for a portion of the growing number of those displaced, even while facing potential internal climate migration. Meanwhile, the International Energy Agency and other experts warn that the transition to low-carbon energy may be chaotic, as fossil fuel supply and demand decline out of step with one another, risking price spikes like those prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Finally, on economics, the latest scientific analysis forecasts that climate change could cause as much as 3.6-4.1% GDP loss through 2050, spiking as high as 18-22% by 2100. These numbers do not even account for health impacts, biodiversity loss, or climate tipping points, but nevertheless dwarf the GDP impact of the 2007-2008 recession. Meanwhile, specific economic sectors and communities are likely to face strain from the energy transition, whether that’s Polish coal miners or German auto workers.
In addition to their direct harms, these trends risk worsening social divisions and grievances that provide fertile ground for misinformation–whether organic or maliciously spread. Xenophobic actors’ efforts to exploit migration would likely worsen societal polarization, as previewed by the impact of the 2015-16 refugee crisis in Europe, or migrants could be unfairly scapegoated for causing climate hazards, as happened in 2021 to minorities in Turkey and Greece after wildfires. Energy price spikes are a sure recipe for discontent, as seen by their role driving protests across Europe in the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Further, the global and local economic costs of climate change could prompt additional strains on cost of living and social benefits, the tightening of which have prompted protests and violent crackdowns in France.
Moreover, neighboring Russia, its allies, and likeminded nonstate actors will probably seek to exploit these fissures, given their record of stoking European discord around such topics, as documented by civil society and government investigations. Since the 2015-16 European refugee crisis, Russia and European far-right activists have spread disinformation to demonize refugees and bolster sympathetic far-right European allies. In 2021, in retaliation for EU sanctions, Belarus manipulated visa rules and spread disinformation to encourage migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe, before working with Russia to amplify reports of abused migrants at the Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian borders. Russia-aligned actors have tried to stoke worries of Baltic economic collapse from COVID-19, capitalize on economic grievances during 2018’s Yellow Vest protests in France, and entrench Russian trade and natural gas interests in Europe. Today, Russian propaganda seeks to demonize Ukrainian refugees as the cause of Europe’s energy security struggles, a ploy to undermine European solidarity with Kyiv.
Because of these vulnerabilities, the EU’s Baltic states would do well to prioritize long-term resilience to such strains.
For example, leaders in combating misinformation like the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats can share best practices. More broadly, these threats speak to the security value of programs aimed at economic equality and societal cohesion, to accommodate migration and economic shocks with solidarity. They also underscore the benefits of investments in climate resilience in vulnerable countries, which can reduce pressures to migrate. While the war in Ukraine and past crises have offered practice countering similar misinformation, climate change is likely to present a unique and ongoing challenge, given that it is projected to worsen for 20-30 years even in the best-case emissions scenarios. This climate-misinformation nexus will be with the EU for a long time, and Baltic states must prepare for the long haul.