Anna Wetter Ryde
Senior Researcher in Law and Deputy Director
The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS)
Sweden
In a volume published by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS, 2022:1op), Astrid Séville notes that crises may have become a routine part of modern politics, with one crisis simply replacing another. Ironically, these crises are often generated by the global interdependence of today’s world structure that also helps to stabilize regions and strengthen them economically. Managing this dilemma is not only an EU challenge but one that faces all states that are active on the global trade arena. Nonetheless, the European Union seems particularly vulnerable to criticism towards how it manages these crises. This could of course be explained by the presence of particularly strong democracies in Europe – most of them with high ambitions for democratic governance. But in addition to this, EU crisis governance is particularly difficult due to the complex political multi-level system that characterizes the European Union. In the EU, Member States tend to seek instant responses to protect national citizens in times of emergencies while at the same time risking to miss out on how national measures impact European interests – also of concern for them. On the contrary, when the EU acts in the EU’s collective interest, it risks losing touch with national vulnerabilities that – without proper attention – risk deepening European crises.
How can the EU govern effectively and democratically under extraordinary circumstances, i.e. when the EU Member States need prompt solutions for often very complex and globally intertwined challenges? How should the EU decision-makers deal with the fact that some Member States may be better off than others in particular crises that hit European states in an asymmetric way (such as the financial crisis) while in others, states are challenged in a similar way but nonetheless disagree on the political response (as initially in the case of the Next Generation EU recovery plan, responding to COVID-19)? What is the most democratic and policy-effective decision in these situations? Based on lessons learnt from previous crises, there is good reason to reconsider how the EU governs in the crises.
The financial crisis with its roots in the US, is a reflection of a crisis that became a common concern for the interdependent euro-zone, but that also hit the EU Member States in an asymmetric way. EU leaders rhetorically described the challenge as one of “behavioural”, i.e. one that was triggered by Member States that did not abide with the rules. At the time, there was no discussion on structural challenges relating to the design of the euro (Schmidt, SIEPS 2022:1op) but the EU instead responded by harsh austerity and structural reform demands in the most damaged member states. The technocratic European leadership, reflected not least in the role taken by/given to the European Central Bank in the financial crisis expressed things like we must “do whatever it takes to save the euro” (Mario Draghi, Financial Times, 2012). The financial crisis also led to the creation of ad hoc lending facilities (the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism), allowing states to avoid the constraints posed by EU Treaties while also avoiding the constitutional challenges of revising them. The European austerity politics during this period have raised concerns not only relating to perceived counterproductive economic effects of rapid fiscal consolidation and ineffective structural reforms but also for illegitimate decision-making.
The COVID-19 pandemic is instead an example of an external shock with symmetric effects on EU Member States. Nonetheless, the EU Member States were faced with different challenges mainly due to the fact that they are different kinds of Member States. While some were badly prepared in terms of poorly financed health care systems, others were severely hit by the closing down of industries and tourism damaging their economies and not least labour markets.
And so the story continues… The Russian invasion of Ukraine is yet another example of an external shock hitting the EU Member States symmetrically but causing varying stress to national systems. This crisis also indicates that even strong European economies, such as the German, are vulnerable to external shocks and may be in need of concerted EU action. In this case, Germany was particularly vulnerable considering Russia had for decades provided the raw material to fuel German industry. The Russian invasion put immediate pressure to find new producers and Germany was suddenly exposed to the solidarity of the other EU Member States. To make things even more complicated, it can also be difficult to know at national level which politics may be best as in the case of Sweden during the ongoing energy crisis. It is clear that even though Swedish producers currently export electricity at higher prices than they would have received in a closed Swedish market (also a socio-economic gain for Sweden as a country), the electricity consumers (i.e. most of the voters) are affected by higher prices (Flam, SIEPS, 2021).
Against this background, the EU decision maker must act responsibly and often under political pressure. Many researchers who study the EU’s institutional and democratic design share similar concerns for EU crisis politics, highlighting not least how emergency measures; 1) are often adopted swiftly in secret or informal contexts with few opportunities for public debate, 2) challenge accountability structures, (who is in control and responsible?), 3) risk misaligning constitutionally and democratically established arrangements with how things are done in practice 4) tend to get “locked in” – in a way that could have long-lasting effects even outside the state of emergency.
The researchers are however not in full agreement on what should be done to add democratic legitimacy to European crisis politics. In the following I will focus on two proposals: The first model, a European emergency constitution (see e.g. Kreuder-Sonnen, SIEPS, 2022:1op), reflects an idea also visible among European elite leaders. Former senior Commission official Martin Selmayr has expressed that ‘it would be useful to have in the EU a mechanism, ready to be activated in times of crisis, that temporarily allow it to make decisions in a simpler and faster way to respond to crisis situations with determination’. Researchers underline the importance of ensuring that the “emergency constitution” is codified in advance to rule out abuse of power. They also highlight that such a constitution must give clear instructions on who should do what, under which clearly demarked situations the emergency mandate could be exercised, which checks should be in place to prevent abuse of power and how and when the emergency situation should be brought to an end. The second model argues that the lack of democratic input in EU crisis responses, should be resolved by simplifying and democratizing the EU’s executive structures (see e.g. White, SIEPS, 2022:1op). One crucial element is to tie the EU executive closer to the critical public. This proposal also responds to the democratic challenge caused by the fact that supranational authority (such as the European Commission) tends to accord a prominent role to technocracy. Proponents of the emergency constitution rather see a role for the European Court of Justice (also a technocratic institution) to secure that the emergency constitution is complied with.
Clearly, there is no easy way to decide which way to move forward. However, since EU crisis politics tend to lead to further EU integration, it is clear that the European citizens should get more insight into these decisions. What is also clear is that the decisions must be adopted with respect paid to democratic principles - preferably clearly spelled out in the EU Treaties.
Senior Researcher in Law and Deputy Director
The Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS)
Sweden
In a volume published by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS, 2022:1op), Astrid Séville notes that crises may have become a routine part of modern politics, with one crisis simply replacing another. Ironically, these crises are often generated by the global interdependence of today’s world structure that also helps to stabilize regions and strengthen them economically. Managing this dilemma is not only an EU challenge but one that faces all states that are active on the global trade arena. Nonetheless, the European Union seems particularly vulnerable to criticism towards how it manages these crises. This could of course be explained by the presence of particularly strong democracies in Europe – most of them with high ambitions for democratic governance. But in addition to this, EU crisis governance is particularly difficult due to the complex political multi-level system that characterizes the European Union. In the EU, Member States tend to seek instant responses to protect national citizens in times of emergencies while at the same time risking to miss out on how national measures impact European interests – also of concern for them. On the contrary, when the EU acts in the EU’s collective interest, it risks losing touch with national vulnerabilities that – without proper attention – risk deepening European crises.
How can the EU govern effectively and democratically under extraordinary circumstances, i.e. when the EU Member States need prompt solutions for often very complex and globally intertwined challenges? How should the EU decision-makers deal with the fact that some Member States may be better off than others in particular crises that hit European states in an asymmetric way (such as the financial crisis) while in others, states are challenged in a similar way but nonetheless disagree on the political response (as initially in the case of the Next Generation EU recovery plan, responding to COVID-19)? What is the most democratic and policy-effective decision in these situations? Based on lessons learnt from previous crises, there is good reason to reconsider how the EU governs in the crises.
The financial crisis with its roots in the US, is a reflection of a crisis that became a common concern for the interdependent euro-zone, but that also hit the EU Member States in an asymmetric way. EU leaders rhetorically described the challenge as one of “behavioural”, i.e. one that was triggered by Member States that did not abide with the rules. At the time, there was no discussion on structural challenges relating to the design of the euro (Schmidt, SIEPS 2022:1op) but the EU instead responded by harsh austerity and structural reform demands in the most damaged member states. The technocratic European leadership, reflected not least in the role taken by/given to the European Central Bank in the financial crisis expressed things like we must “do whatever it takes to save the euro” (Mario Draghi, Financial Times, 2012). The financial crisis also led to the creation of ad hoc lending facilities (the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism), allowing states to avoid the constraints posed by EU Treaties while also avoiding the constitutional challenges of revising them. The European austerity politics during this period have raised concerns not only relating to perceived counterproductive economic effects of rapid fiscal consolidation and ineffective structural reforms but also for illegitimate decision-making.
The COVID-19 pandemic is instead an example of an external shock with symmetric effects on EU Member States. Nonetheless, the EU Member States were faced with different challenges mainly due to the fact that they are different kinds of Member States. While some were badly prepared in terms of poorly financed health care systems, others were severely hit by the closing down of industries and tourism damaging their economies and not least labour markets.
And so the story continues… The Russian invasion of Ukraine is yet another example of an external shock hitting the EU Member States symmetrically but causing varying stress to national systems. This crisis also indicates that even strong European economies, such as the German, are vulnerable to external shocks and may be in need of concerted EU action. In this case, Germany was particularly vulnerable considering Russia had for decades provided the raw material to fuel German industry. The Russian invasion put immediate pressure to find new producers and Germany was suddenly exposed to the solidarity of the other EU Member States. To make things even more complicated, it can also be difficult to know at national level which politics may be best as in the case of Sweden during the ongoing energy crisis. It is clear that even though Swedish producers currently export electricity at higher prices than they would have received in a closed Swedish market (also a socio-economic gain for Sweden as a country), the electricity consumers (i.e. most of the voters) are affected by higher prices (Flam, SIEPS, 2021).
Against this background, the EU decision maker must act responsibly and often under political pressure. Many researchers who study the EU’s institutional and democratic design share similar concerns for EU crisis politics, highlighting not least how emergency measures; 1) are often adopted swiftly in secret or informal contexts with few opportunities for public debate, 2) challenge accountability structures, (who is in control and responsible?), 3) risk misaligning constitutionally and democratically established arrangements with how things are done in practice 4) tend to get “locked in” – in a way that could have long-lasting effects even outside the state of emergency.
The researchers are however not in full agreement on what should be done to add democratic legitimacy to European crisis politics. In the following I will focus on two proposals: The first model, a European emergency constitution (see e.g. Kreuder-Sonnen, SIEPS, 2022:1op), reflects an idea also visible among European elite leaders. Former senior Commission official Martin Selmayr has expressed that ‘it would be useful to have in the EU a mechanism, ready to be activated in times of crisis, that temporarily allow it to make decisions in a simpler and faster way to respond to crisis situations with determination’. Researchers underline the importance of ensuring that the “emergency constitution” is codified in advance to rule out abuse of power. They also highlight that such a constitution must give clear instructions on who should do what, under which clearly demarked situations the emergency mandate could be exercised, which checks should be in place to prevent abuse of power and how and when the emergency situation should be brought to an end. The second model argues that the lack of democratic input in EU crisis responses, should be resolved by simplifying and democratizing the EU’s executive structures (see e.g. White, SIEPS, 2022:1op). One crucial element is to tie the EU executive closer to the critical public. This proposal also responds to the democratic challenge caused by the fact that supranational authority (such as the European Commission) tends to accord a prominent role to technocracy. Proponents of the emergency constitution rather see a role for the European Court of Justice (also a technocratic institution) to secure that the emergency constitution is complied with.
Clearly, there is no easy way to decide which way to move forward. However, since EU crisis politics tend to lead to further EU integration, it is clear that the European citizens should get more insight into these decisions. What is also clear is that the decisions must be adopted with respect paid to democratic principles - preferably clearly spelled out in the EU Treaties.
References
EU Crisis Management, SIEPS, 2022:1op
Flam,
Harry, Höga elpriser kan hota den gröna omställningen, SIEPS, Perspektiv, 2021 (in
Swedish)
The European Commission as a Political Engine of
European integration, in conversation with Martin Selmayr - Groupe d'études
géopolitiques (geopolitique.eu)
ECB ‘ready to do whatever it takes’ | Financial Times
(ft.com)