Katarina Engberg
Senior Adviser, Ph.D.
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, SIEPS
Sweden
The war in Ukraine has turbocharged the Commission’s professed ambition to create a European Defence Union by 2025.
Some 18 bn euro have been spent by the EU and its member states on providing Ukraine with the weaponry it needs to defend itself against the Russian aggression. Through the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers will be trained. A special task force has been set up with NATO to protect European critical infrastructure, such as the pipelines providing the European Union with the natural gas from its main source Norway.
These are but a few examples of how a perceived existential threat to European security has reinforced the defence dimension of the Union. At the same time, cooperation with NATO is stronger than ever. While complementarity is the buzzword used to describe the relationship between the EU and NATO, it can also be described in terms of organic fusion.
The war forces Europeans to live on a war footing in the sense that, regardless of the outcome of the current war, uncertainty regarding Russia’s long-term ambitions will remain for the foreseeable future. Hence the need to continue to invest in the defence of not only Ukraine but also of the EU and individual member states.
A sense of vulnerability was felt already with the onslaught of covid as 30 happy years of globalisation were replaced by the perceived need to reinforce the resilience of European societies. The Ukraine war added an urgency to protect also against the hostile intent of foreign powers. Much of the efforts in this regard form part of the ambition to create a Security Union, a twin to the Defence Union. Internal security falls under the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) while defence pertains to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In terms of legal basis, the former is based on article 222 in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and the latter on article 42(7) in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Both articles profess solidarity in case of threats, in the first instance against internal security, in the latter in the form of armed aggression.
While legally two different things, in reality they are intertwined, as recognized in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, where hybrid and cyber threats, if they reach a certain level, can activate article V in the Atlantic Treaty about solidarity in case of armed attack. These are areas were the EU offers some comparative advantage and exercises have been carried out jointly, testing the ability of the two institutions to withstand a common threat.
In the same vein, the EU has recently passed the so-called Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER). Among entities listed are energy, transport, health, drinking water, waste water, space and central public administrations. They shall, according to the Directive, prepare for, cope with, protect against, respond to and recover from natural disasters, terrorist threats, health emergencies or hybrid attacks. In addition, the NIS 2 Directive aims to reinforce the resilience and protection of information technologies and structures.
The EU’s financial muscles have been useful in funding the military resources provided by member states to Ukraine. Since the Union’s common budget cannot be used to finance lethal external aid, a so-called off-budget and intergovernmental fund, the European Peace Facility (EPF) of 5 bn euro was created. Almost 4 bn euro have been spent on reimbursing member states for the deliveries to Ukraine and the fund was recently topped up with another 2 bn. However, the EU’s budget can be used for boosting industrial capacity, essential for the medium-term ability to produce the materiel necessary for the Ukrainian war effort. To this avail, a new instrument has been proposed by the Commission’s Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) in the form of the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), with the aim to have member states jointly procure defence materiel. An initial 500 million euro would provide the financial incentive for doing so. Deliberations on the proposal is ongoing in the European institutions.
In parallel to recent initiatives caused by the war, previous programs for defence materiel cooperation, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), have gained a new impetus from the sense of existential threat caused by the war. The total funding for defence purposes of some 10 new bn euro in the EU’s multiannual budget will be revisited through the mid-term review of the budget this coming summer. It will be interesting to see if additional resources for defence will be allocated.
By 2025, the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of 5,000 troops will be put in place, supported by the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPPC).
The EU’s Strategic Compass, coordinated with NATO’s Strategic Concept, provides an overview of the EU’s combined effort in the areas of both internal and external security. As such, it reflects a concept reminiscent of the Nordic concept of ‘total defence’, encompassing both military and civilian aspects. The Ukraine war provides daily illustrations of the importance of mobilizing all of society in the resistance against foreign aggression. The concept has not yet matured fully into a full-blown understanding of the need to merge the twin ambitions to create a Security and a Defence Union. However, the continued pressure of the war will likely contribute to this process in the years ahead.
In a medium-term perspective, the EU through the gradual integration of Ukraine, will share a border with Russia, ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This will add another transformational element to the EU’s defence dimension.
Article 42(7) states that the solidarity clause in case of armed aggression against a member of the EU shall be consistent with commitments under NATO that, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. The Ukraine war has proven the importance of NATO for collective defence while, at the same time, reinforcing the EU’s defence dimension. It is thus not a question of either NATO or EU, but of both and.
A proclamation of a European Defence Union in 2025 would amount to more than a formal exercise but confirm realities created by the Ukraine war.