Professor in Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sweden
On the 16 of May 2022, the Swedish Government declared its intention to apply for membership in NATO, only four days after Finland had announced a similar decision. The decision was announced after a speedy reorientation phase among the Swedish decision-makers, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the break-down of the European security order. The decision was the next logical step following a report from the Swedish Foreign Ministry on 13 of May, in which a “new” and “changed” threat assessment was presented due to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Neither existing bilateral security arrangements nor the EU’s security dimensions were deemed adequate in deterring or responding to new threat dynamics. Even though Sweden had gradually increased its military cooperation with NATO and NATO member states ever since the end of the Cold War, the Swedish government had clearly stated over the years that Sweden’s long history of non-alignment was valuable, not only for Swedish security, but also for the stability of the security situation in Northern Europe. The Swedish non-alignment had been a fundamental part of Swedish foreign policy identity, but with the decision to apply for membership, this identity was in flux.
In the Swedish attempts to improve its defense capacities several bilateral agreements concerning defense cooperation had been concluded and the bilateral agreement with Finland even took the form of an operative defense cooperation beyond peacetime. Besides the strategic advantages for NATO if Finland and Sweden joined simultaneously, the emphasis on Finland and Sweden ‘as a package’ underlined that Sweden was not alone in its reorientation towards NATO, and that a NATO membership was necessary if Sweden wanted to keep its close cooperation with a neighboring country. This might be seen as a step towards building a new Swedish-Nordic security identity within NATO.
Simultaneously with the decision-making process in Sweden, security experts as well as stakeholders expressed their strong belief that Sweden (and Finland) would become members in express speed. For example, Anders Fogh Rasmussen NATO’s former Secretary General said the application could be ratified overnight, while Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s present Secretary General, believed that the application process would work smooth and quick. The (almost) unanimous support from Western experts confirmed the Swedish politicians in their expectation that NATO’s member states looked forward to welcoming Sweden and was accepting Sweden’s new Western security identity.
However, the application process has since then encountered several problems. Turkey demanded trilateral negotiations with Finland and Sweden on the fight against terrorism, arms embargoes and mechanisms for a closer dialogue and cooperation. Once the trilateral memorandum was in place, all NATO member states signed the accession protocols for both countries on 5 July 2022 and the next step in the process would be the ratification from each member state.
Even though a memorandum was in place, the problems continued. According to Turkey, Sweden was not doing enough or quickly enough to meet the demands in the memorandum, and even the Swedish Foreign Minister was pointed out as a problem in the relationship between the two countries.
Since the ratification process still has not been solved for Sweden, domestic critique has been raised against the memorandum as such: why should Sweden sign such a document and was it wise to sign a document without a clear timetable also for Turkey’s ratification? During the autumn and winter of 2022, the media focus has been on Turkey’s resentments against the Swedish application. However, during the spring 2023 signs turned up that Hungary, the second country not yet ratifying the Swedish application, was not pleased with the Swedish critique against Hungary’s democratic status. Sweden has been a staunch critic of democratic deficits within the EU, and the question is in what way Sweden can pursue this line of policy in the foreseeable future.
The fact that only Finland, and not yet Sweden, has become a NATO member has affected Swedish self-perception as a coveted country. In March 2023 the Swedish Foreign Minister was confident Sweden would become a member at the NATO meeting in Vilnius in 2023. In April 2023 the confidence had diminished, and the Swedish decision-makers tried to lower the expectations. There are signs that Sweden hopes for more support from other NATO members to put pressure on Turkey and Hungary. Maybe Sweden can hope for a changed focus in the debate; more focus on Sweden’s potential military and strategic contributions to NATO as well as how Russia is benefitting from the present situation, might assist Sweden’s ratification process. Once the ratification process is ready, Sweden can carve out a new Western identity, within NATO.