Harri Mikkola
Dr., Programme Director
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Finland
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has made the Russian threat increasingly tangible also in the Northern Europe. Finland and Sweden reacted to the changed security situation by dramatically recalibrating their security policy and applying to join NATO. Countries’ accessions will be major geostrategic loss for Russia and change the balance of power in the whole Northern Europe theatre. Transformative, potentially systemic ramifications of the aggression have taken shape also in the very north of Europe: in the Arctic.
In the military sphere, the war of aggression has further underlined the importance of the European Arctic for the defence of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. In the foreign policy sphere, the aggression has caused a serious blow to the paradigm of “Arctic exceptionalism”. The notion refers to common idea in expert analyses and high-level foreign policy statements where the Arctic is framed as an exceptional “zone of peace” and a “territory of dialogue” between the West and Russia despite problems elsewhere on the globe.
However, the bubble of exceptionalism has now burst and caused a general sense of disillusionment for many in the Arctic expert and policy circles. Political, economic and scientific contacts between the Western Arctic states and Russia have been cut. Cooperation with Russia in various Arctic multilateral structures, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, have been halted.
The West has increasingly come to agree that Russia must be deterred in order to stop future aggressions. However, in the Arctic there still are on-going discussions on the need to continue limited international cooperation with Russia. According to these views, cooperation is necessary because of the urgent need for globally important climate and environmental change related data and research, which becomes extremely difficult without Russian participation. The Arctic cooperation is utilized also for political purposes to mitigate tensions and to find some common ground to start to rebuild diplomatic relations after the war of aggression has ended.
However, the cooperative approach is unwarranted at least in two ways. First, its focus is too regional which fails to understand how the Arctic is connected to broader geostrategic constellations in the Northern Europe and beyond. Secondly, it fails to fully understand - or deliberately brackets out - the essence of Russia’s regime’s zero-sum worldview and confrontational and civilizational approach towards the West, as well as the role the Arctic plays in Russian broader revisionists geostrategic plans.
When analyzing the possibilities to diplomatically engage with Russia in the Arctic, it should be noted that by attacking Ukraine, Russia did not aim only to suppress the country under Russian dominance. Russia also made a calculated decision to fully challenge the West and the European security architecture. The county itself was very explicit on this, as stated in the list of demands in December 2021. The demands exposed the magnitude of the revisionist challenge Russia is willing to pose on the key principles of European security architecture, including state’s territorial integrity and state’s right to choose their own security and foreign policy orientation.
The aggression has made it evident that President Putin’s Russia is a revisionist and imperialist power, which cannot be effectively contained with diplomacy or with the mechanisms of the rule-based international order. Domestic developments in Russia itself - such as the military mobilization, suppression of the civil society and increasingly hostile communication in the media landscape – are raising serious questions whether the country is quickly sliding from an authoritarian state to totalitarianism underpinned by a strategic culture of militarism and glorified violence.
President Putin himself has declared the collective West as a strategic enemy, which means that Russia cannot be anymore considered as a normal stakeholder in European security. The Russian challenge is systemic and long-term in nature, and there is no going back to the status quo preceding the war of aggression.
The Arctic economic and military resources continue to play an essential role in Russia's ability to achieve its grand strategic goals. Russia's domestic development, military modernization, international influence and the survival of President Putin's regime continue to depend on revenues from Arctic oil and gas. It is important to underline that through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated Russia’s capacity to conduct international aggressions.
The Western tendency to cling to Arctic cooperation has been beneficial for Russia. First, the Western hopes to build multilateral cooperative security have helped to keep NATO out of the region. Second, it has steered the West to underinvest in Arctic military capabilities and neglect regional deterrence, simultaneously enabling Russia to strengthen its relative position in the region. Third, it has helped to gain access to and utilize international research projects that improve infrastructure in the north, thereby facilitating energy projects and military infrastructure in the region as well. And fourth, it has helped to portray the region as a stable investment area to attract foreign capital for Arctic mega-projects, which in turn has helped Russia to maintain its status as an energy superpower and utilize energy as a weapon against the West.
The Western Arctic stance shouldn’t anymore be based on daydreams or illusions. The stance must match the current realities and the focus should be on building comprehensive deterrence also in the northernmost regions of Europe.
In the military sphere, the war of aggression has further underlined the importance of the European Arctic for the defence of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. In the foreign policy sphere, the aggression has caused a serious blow to the paradigm of “Arctic exceptionalism”. The notion refers to common idea in expert analyses and high-level foreign policy statements where the Arctic is framed as an exceptional “zone of peace” and a “territory of dialogue” between the West and Russia despite problems elsewhere on the globe.
However, the bubble of exceptionalism has now burst and caused a general sense of disillusionment for many in the Arctic expert and policy circles. Political, economic and scientific contacts between the Western Arctic states and Russia have been cut. Cooperation with Russia in various Arctic multilateral structures, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, have been halted.
The West has increasingly come to agree that Russia must be deterred in order to stop future aggressions. However, in the Arctic there still are on-going discussions on the need to continue limited international cooperation with Russia. According to these views, cooperation is necessary because of the urgent need for globally important climate and environmental change related data and research, which becomes extremely difficult without Russian participation. The Arctic cooperation is utilized also for political purposes to mitigate tensions and to find some common ground to start to rebuild diplomatic relations after the war of aggression has ended.
However, the cooperative approach is unwarranted at least in two ways. First, its focus is too regional which fails to understand how the Arctic is connected to broader geostrategic constellations in the Northern Europe and beyond. Secondly, it fails to fully understand - or deliberately brackets out - the essence of Russia’s regime’s zero-sum worldview and confrontational and civilizational approach towards the West, as well as the role the Arctic plays in Russian broader revisionists geostrategic plans.
When analyzing the possibilities to diplomatically engage with Russia in the Arctic, it should be noted that by attacking Ukraine, Russia did not aim only to suppress the country under Russian dominance. Russia also made a calculated decision to fully challenge the West and the European security architecture. The county itself was very explicit on this, as stated in the list of demands in December 2021. The demands exposed the magnitude of the revisionist challenge Russia is willing to pose on the key principles of European security architecture, including state’s territorial integrity and state’s right to choose their own security and foreign policy orientation.
The aggression has made it evident that President Putin’s Russia is a revisionist and imperialist power, which cannot be effectively contained with diplomacy or with the mechanisms of the rule-based international order. Domestic developments in Russia itself - such as the military mobilization, suppression of the civil society and increasingly hostile communication in the media landscape – are raising serious questions whether the country is quickly sliding from an authoritarian state to totalitarianism underpinned by a strategic culture of militarism and glorified violence.
President Putin himself has declared the collective West as a strategic enemy, which means that Russia cannot be anymore considered as a normal stakeholder in European security. The Russian challenge is systemic and long-term in nature, and there is no going back to the status quo preceding the war of aggression.
The Arctic economic and military resources continue to play an essential role in Russia's ability to achieve its grand strategic goals. Russia's domestic development, military modernization, international influence and the survival of President Putin's regime continue to depend on revenues from Arctic oil and gas. It is important to underline that through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated Russia’s capacity to conduct international aggressions.
The Western tendency to cling to Arctic cooperation has been beneficial for Russia. First, the Western hopes to build multilateral cooperative security have helped to keep NATO out of the region. Second, it has steered the West to underinvest in Arctic military capabilities and neglect regional deterrence, simultaneously enabling Russia to strengthen its relative position in the region. Third, it has helped to gain access to and utilize international research projects that improve infrastructure in the north, thereby facilitating energy projects and military infrastructure in the region as well. And fourth, it has helped to portray the region as a stable investment area to attract foreign capital for Arctic mega-projects, which in turn has helped Russia to maintain its status as an energy superpower and utilize energy as a weapon against the West.
The Western Arctic stance shouldn’t anymore be based on daydreams or illusions. The stance must match the current realities and the focus should be on building comprehensive deterrence also in the northernmost regions of Europe.