Associate Fellow at the Europe programme
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)
Sweden
Russia’s illegal war of aggression on Ukraine has forever changed Europe. Therefore, the EU and its member states need – and have started – to adopt and transform its security and defence policies. And as a consequence of the war, the EU institutions – and in particular the European Commission as well as the diplomatic service the European External Action Service (EEAS) – has also strengthened their roles in EU security and defence policy making. This is a noticeable development as security and defence is traditionally seen as a national prerogative and a ‘taboo’ at the European level for EU institutions such as the Commission.
Firstly, the Commission leadership has thus far been instrumental in putting in place the hardest ever sanctions packages on Russia after their full-scale invasion and war on Ukraine. The Commission president von der Leyen and her team has also been in very close contact with the US administration to coordinate the transatlantic response towards Russia and for the support to Ukraine. The EU and its institutions have also stepped-up the financial support for Ukraine.
On the defence side several taboos have fallen in Europe. This includes the support of weapons to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF). Thus far, the EU – by April 2023 – has provided €3.6 billion through the EPF and the total amount of military support from EU and its member states lies around €12 billions in arms and ammunition. In March 2023 the EU also took a ground-breaking decision on joint procurement of ammunition to support Ukraine. Moreover, at the time of writing this Baltic Rim Economies review analysis, the EU member states and the European Parliament is negotiating the Commission’s proposal on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through the common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). An initiative that could be seen as breaking another taboo on EU joint procurement and as an important stepping stone for future initiatives. And in 2023 the Commission is also expected to present further new initiatives on joint procurement of defence equipment as well as initiatives to enhance the defence-industries production capacity in Europe.
The EU’s new Strategic Compass in security and defence (a ‘white book’ for EU security and defence policy developments) adopted by the EU leaders in March 2022 moreover outlines that the EU ‘‘will make a quantum leap to become a more assertive and decisive security provider, better prepared to tackle present and future threats and challenges’’. This new strategy outlines the EU and its member states ambitions in security and defence for the coming decade. Some of the elements in the Compass that the Commission is working on include investment in defence-industrial capacity, cyber and hybrid defence issues, the strengthening of Military Mobility in Europe as well as a new EU maritime security strategy and an EU strategy for space and defence. These developments only underscore the new and enhanced role for the Commission in EU security and defence policy. Moreover, the work on the Strategic Compass also inclined a stronger working relationship between the EU institutions on defence matters.
However, these new developments also follow a longer trend, starting particularly under the tenure of the former Commission president Juncker (2014-2019). One of the most noticeable developments was the launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF) – an instrument to support defence-industrial cooperation in Europe in order to strengthen the EU's Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). And the EDF was arguably a gamechanger for the role of the European Commission in EU defence policy. Moreover, in his 2017 State of the Union address, President Jean Claude Juncker, also outlined the ambition of the European Union to establish a full-fledged European Defence Union by 2025 – a goal that was later echoed by President von der Leyen.
Moreover, the Commission is also strengthening its role and policies in regard to the geo-economic field. Today we are seeing the blurring of policy fields, where security and defence policy issues are becoming increasingly entangled with for instance trade, technology, and economic issues. Thus, the Commission has outlined and launched new EU initiatives on among others a foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, export control measures, and trade defence instruments such as an instrument to counter economic coercion against EU member states.
Russia’s illegal war of aggression has only underscored the current geopolitical tensions in the world. Just as the EU Strategic Compass underlines that ‘’in this era of growing strategic competition, complex security threats and the direct attack on the European security order, the security of our citizens and our Union is at stake’’ and that thus ‘’the EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor’’. Hence we need the EU institutions – together with the member states – to continue to improve and strengthen European defences in the coming years ahead.
Firstly, the Commission leadership has thus far been instrumental in putting in place the hardest ever sanctions packages on Russia after their full-scale invasion and war on Ukraine. The Commission president von der Leyen and her team has also been in very close contact with the US administration to coordinate the transatlantic response towards Russia and for the support to Ukraine. The EU and its institutions have also stepped-up the financial support for Ukraine.
On the defence side several taboos have fallen in Europe. This includes the support of weapons to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF). Thus far, the EU – by April 2023 – has provided €3.6 billion through the EPF and the total amount of military support from EU and its member states lies around €12 billions in arms and ammunition. In March 2023 the EU also took a ground-breaking decision on joint procurement of ammunition to support Ukraine. Moreover, at the time of writing this Baltic Rim Economies review analysis, the EU member states and the European Parliament is negotiating the Commission’s proposal on the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through the common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). An initiative that could be seen as breaking another taboo on EU joint procurement and as an important stepping stone for future initiatives. And in 2023 the Commission is also expected to present further new initiatives on joint procurement of defence equipment as well as initiatives to enhance the defence-industries production capacity in Europe.
The EU’s new Strategic Compass in security and defence (a ‘white book’ for EU security and defence policy developments) adopted by the EU leaders in March 2022 moreover outlines that the EU ‘‘will make a quantum leap to become a more assertive and decisive security provider, better prepared to tackle present and future threats and challenges’’. This new strategy outlines the EU and its member states ambitions in security and defence for the coming decade. Some of the elements in the Compass that the Commission is working on include investment in defence-industrial capacity, cyber and hybrid defence issues, the strengthening of Military Mobility in Europe as well as a new EU maritime security strategy and an EU strategy for space and defence. These developments only underscore the new and enhanced role for the Commission in EU security and defence policy. Moreover, the work on the Strategic Compass also inclined a stronger working relationship between the EU institutions on defence matters.
However, these new developments also follow a longer trend, starting particularly under the tenure of the former Commission president Juncker (2014-2019). One of the most noticeable developments was the launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF) – an instrument to support defence-industrial cooperation in Europe in order to strengthen the EU's Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). And the EDF was arguably a gamechanger for the role of the European Commission in EU defence policy. Moreover, in his 2017 State of the Union address, President Jean Claude Juncker, also outlined the ambition of the European Union to establish a full-fledged European Defence Union by 2025 – a goal that was later echoed by President von der Leyen.
Moreover, the Commission is also strengthening its role and policies in regard to the geo-economic field. Today we are seeing the blurring of policy fields, where security and defence policy issues are becoming increasingly entangled with for instance trade, technology, and economic issues. Thus, the Commission has outlined and launched new EU initiatives on among others a foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, export control measures, and trade defence instruments such as an instrument to counter economic coercion against EU member states.
Russia’s illegal war of aggression has only underscored the current geopolitical tensions in the world. Just as the EU Strategic Compass underlines that ‘’in this era of growing strategic competition, complex security threats and the direct attack on the European security order, the security of our citizens and our Union is at stake’’ and that thus ‘’the EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor’’. Hence we need the EU institutions – together with the member states – to continue to improve and strengthen European defences in the coming years ahead.