Jakob Linnet Schmidt
Analyst
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Denmark
Perceptions of the Baltic Sea security environment
‘In the coming years, Russia will become increasingly threatening and aggressive both in its political behaviour and rhetoric and in its military posture.’ That is how the Baltic Sea security environment is described in the latest unclassified risk assessment by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. An intentional conventional military attack on NATO member states is still considered ‘highly unlikely’. But Russia is perceived to be willing to escalate the conflict with the West to just below the threshold of direct military conflict thus blurring the boundaries between peace, crisis and war. A concern is that misconceptions and errors in a tense situation could spiral out of control and lead to military conflict.
Accordingly, a key Danish priority is to avoid any Russian misinterpretation of NATO’s determination to counter Russian aggressions. Europe needs to take a larger responsibility for European security but deterring Russia must be handled within the transatlantic alliance. This view is profound and has strengthened the belief in the need for a transatlantic bond that is as close as possible, affected Danish security and defence policy, and improved the perspectives for increased regional cooperation.
Transatlantic relations
The security guarantee provided by the US has been vital to Denmark’s security since joining NATO in 1949. But it arguably became more fragile after the end of the Cold War as US priorities gradually drifted away from Europe. Among other things, this led to Denmark prioritising contributions to international military operations led by the US or NATO. Following these efforts, Denmark has been labelled as a ‘super atlantcist’ in the early 2000’s. Nonetheless, these types of contributions are no longer in high demand.
In pursuing a close relationship with the US, Denmark has historically strived to take a role as bridge-builder between North America and Europe. In the last few years, however, Denmark has moved away from bridge-building, now siding more unequivocally with the US, which, for instance, became visible during the controversy regarding the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, AUKUS. In recent years, this has also been demonstrated through a more outspoken critical attitude towards China and especially Russia. Besides an even stronger emphasis on the unity with the US, a wish for the closed possible relations has also manifested itself in more concrete terms. In 2022, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced the beginning of US-Danish negotiations of a bilateral defence cooperation agreement. Although the content of the agreement remains unknown, it was politically emphasised as a departure from the Danish policy since the 1950’s of not allowing permanent military presence of allies in Denmark (Greenland excluded).
Security and defence policy
An aggressive Russia has increased Denmark’s desire for a credible deterrence through the security alliance with the US and the transatlantic alliance. Denmark is hoping to appear as a credible ally in order to have its security guaranteed. This has influenced Danish decision-makers traditional unwillingness to increase defence spending to the level demanded by NATO and the US. Danish defence spending currently amounts to 1.5% of GDP. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the political parties struck a so-called ‘national compromise’ agreeing to reach the NATO target of 2% by 2033 – later adjusted to 2030. Compared to its neighbouring countries the current level and pace may appear unambitious. Yet, from a Danish perspective, it is significant. Increased budgets in neighbouring countries arguably gave impetus to the policy-shift. Denmark had to react to maintain its proclaimed core ally status. The implementation of the 2% target awaits upcoming negotiations on a new defence agreement. However, the new agreement will most likely result in a new balance between expeditionary forces and territorial deterrence with an increased focus on the Baltic Sea Region and the Artic.
Denmark has also re-evaluated its position within the EU. After a referendum in June 2022, the Danish electorate abolished Denmark’s defence opt-out, which, since 1993, had prevented Danish participation in EU cooperation on defence matters. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was imperative in changing the popular opinion.
Improved perspectives for regional cooperation
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO means that all countries in the Baltic Sea Region except Russia are NATO and EU members. With Russia predicted to become increasingly threatening and aggressive in the region and with a need for an increased European responsibility for security in Europe, perspectives for Nordic cooperation have greatly improved. The Nordic Prime Ministers have already stated an ambition for enhanced cooperation regarding defence and security which until now has been confined by divergent alliance status among the Nordic countries. The Nordic Air Commanders’ intent to establish a de facto joint Nordic air force is an early indication of the improved opportunities for deepened cooperation and a blueprint for Denmark’s approach to regional cooperation.