Senior Fellow
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
USA
As the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reaches the 50th anniversary of the opening of negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act, it faces the most serious crisis in its history due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That action violated all of the fundamental principles of the CSCE/OSCE, including especially the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that recognized the sovereignty of all participating states and banned the threat or use of force against all other signatories. Furthermore, it violated the 1990 OSCE Charter of Paris that affirmed the right of all states to choose their own security arrangements, as well as the UN Charter, which in 1945 included the Ukrainian SSR as one of the original 51 UN member states. Furthermore, Russian aggression has undermined confidence throughout the region in cooperative security and led to a strengthening of military security structures within Europe, especially the NATO alliance.
Throughout its 50-year history the OSCE has witnessed many conflicts between and within its 57 participating states, but none, even during the Cold War, have paralyzed its work as much as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the Cold War, the CSCE provided a framework for dialogue about shared security interests in Europe that eventually laid the foundation for bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. After 1990, the OSCE created a comprehensive set of institutions to prevent violent conflicts and to enhance mutual security across the continent. Presently, however the OSCE lacks a working budget and has been unable to agree on a Chairperson-in-Office for 2024, although Finland is scheduled to assume that position in 2025. As a consensus organization, decisions require the consent of all 57 participating states; since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has blocked numerous decisions in the Permanent Council (PC), limiting the OSCE’s ability to perform major functions.
Whether Russia should be suspended or dismissed from the OSCE due to its flagrant violations of the foundational principles established during the past 50 years has become a topic of debate. Although important OSCE activities are limited by Russia, the key dilemma is that without Russia it loses much of its raison d’être. Except for the remaining neutral and non-aligned states that continue to be relevant, the OSCE without Russia increasingly looks more like NATO or the EU, and it is not clear what functions it could perform that cannot be managed in other institutions, including the UN. Furthermore, Russian behavior will have important consequences for European security well into the future, and its exclusion from the OSCE may well do more harm than good over the long run.
The OSCE continues to serve important functions in spite of the present stalemate. Among the most important are its field missions under the Conflict Prevention Centre in potential conflict regions, most notably in Moldova (Transdniestria), Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh), Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all five Central Asian participants; the escalation of any conflicts where OSCE missions are currently engaged could exacerbate the security of the region. However the war in Ukraine ends, the OSCE’s long experience in that country will be important for managing any postwar scenario. Similarly, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights monitors elections in most states, playing an important role in preventing democratic “backsliding,” while also monitoring and reporting on human rights violations in the region. The office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Hague can continue to play a valuable role to prevent discrimination against ethnic minorities from becoming a source of future violent conflict. The Secretariat performs important tasks inter alia in border security and preventing trafficking in human beings.
Therefore, a case can be made for maintaining the less well-known but important OSCE functions, keeping the OSCE alive, even if on “life support” for the immediate future. It is still important to maintain the structures that are not now being blocked and that will be needed for the OSCE potentially to recreate itself after the war in Ukraine ends; at that time, a functioning European security organization will be more relevant than ever. Given the extensive Russian violations of OSCE principles, it will be challenging to rebuild trust in Russia’s future behavior, but without Russian participation in a multilateral security institution rebuilding a stable foundation for regional security will likely be an insurmountable task. In conclusion, the way in which the Russian war in Ukraine ends, and how that impacts Russian foreign policy, will significantly affect whether or not the OSCE survives, and if so, what functions it can maintain and develop to strengthen security cooperation after the war in Ukraine as it did during and after the Cold War.
Throughout its 50-year history the OSCE has witnessed many conflicts between and within its 57 participating states, but none, even during the Cold War, have paralyzed its work as much as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the Cold War, the CSCE provided a framework for dialogue about shared security interests in Europe that eventually laid the foundation for bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. After 1990, the OSCE created a comprehensive set of institutions to prevent violent conflicts and to enhance mutual security across the continent. Presently, however the OSCE lacks a working budget and has been unable to agree on a Chairperson-in-Office for 2024, although Finland is scheduled to assume that position in 2025. As a consensus organization, decisions require the consent of all 57 participating states; since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has blocked numerous decisions in the Permanent Council (PC), limiting the OSCE’s ability to perform major functions.
Whether Russia should be suspended or dismissed from the OSCE due to its flagrant violations of the foundational principles established during the past 50 years has become a topic of debate. Although important OSCE activities are limited by Russia, the key dilemma is that without Russia it loses much of its raison d’être. Except for the remaining neutral and non-aligned states that continue to be relevant, the OSCE without Russia increasingly looks more like NATO or the EU, and it is not clear what functions it could perform that cannot be managed in other institutions, including the UN. Furthermore, Russian behavior will have important consequences for European security well into the future, and its exclusion from the OSCE may well do more harm than good over the long run.
The OSCE continues to serve important functions in spite of the present stalemate. Among the most important are its field missions under the Conflict Prevention Centre in potential conflict regions, most notably in Moldova (Transdniestria), Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh), Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all five Central Asian participants; the escalation of any conflicts where OSCE missions are currently engaged could exacerbate the security of the region. However the war in Ukraine ends, the OSCE’s long experience in that country will be important for managing any postwar scenario. Similarly, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights monitors elections in most states, playing an important role in preventing democratic “backsliding,” while also monitoring and reporting on human rights violations in the region. The office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Hague can continue to play a valuable role to prevent discrimination against ethnic minorities from becoming a source of future violent conflict. The Secretariat performs important tasks inter alia in border security and preventing trafficking in human beings.
Therefore, a case can be made for maintaining the less well-known but important OSCE functions, keeping the OSCE alive, even if on “life support” for the immediate future. It is still important to maintain the structures that are not now being blocked and that will be needed for the OSCE potentially to recreate itself after the war in Ukraine ends; at that time, a functioning European security organization will be more relevant than ever. Given the extensive Russian violations of OSCE principles, it will be challenging to rebuild trust in Russia’s future behavior, but without Russian participation in a multilateral security institution rebuilding a stable foundation for regional security will likely be an insurmountable task. In conclusion, the way in which the Russian war in Ukraine ends, and how that impacts Russian foreign policy, will significantly affect whether or not the OSCE survives, and if so, what functions it can maintain and develop to strengthen security cooperation after the war in Ukraine as it did during and after the Cold War.