Docent of Strategy and Security Policy
The Finnish National Defence University
Finland
Russia started a large-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022 after eight years of low-intensity war of attrition in Eastern Ukraine. Today, this all-out war has lasted for more than a year and has inflicted at least tens of thousands of casualties, most likely hundreds of thousands wounded and dead soldiers, mercenaries and civilians. The economic costs of this war are extremely high - not to mention the enormous scale of human suffering, misery and grief.
Russia's war in Ukraine has highlighted several "new" (read: old) aspects of contemporary security environment. Many of these have direct consequences for the Baltic Sea region. I will touch upon the two major long-term aspects of this war that should influence Western statesmen and public officials in their deliberations about providing security and safety in the Baltic Sea area and throughout Europe
The first of these concerns Russia's military capability and its willingness to use force in order to promote its national interests - however these are defined by Russia's political elite. The second aspect is related to Western states' military capability to deter and defend against a large-scale war and the way that this capability has atrophied since the end of the Cold War.
Russia's war has - once again - showed the perils of launching a large-scale military campaign with faulty assumptions and overtly optimistic expectations related to the feasibility of attaining the goals of war. In addition, a factor facilitating Russia's inability to achieve its military goals was based on over-hyping its military capability that never reached its full potential due to Russia's systemic corruption and inflexible military culture, which conceptualizes soldiers as "war material" that can be expended in long-term operations that have virtually no military utility.
So, this war has demonstrated in the cruelest way Russian political leadership's willingness to use military force to promote its interest. However, Russia's military has lost at least one generation of modern military hardware and tens of thousands of soldiers in the war so far. This will significantly influence its ability to wage war and conduct large-scale military operations during the next decade. Although Russia's Armed Forces still possess a significant number of (old/older) platforms and systems that can cause enormous destruction - even without going nuclear - its ability to achieve meaningful political outcomes with the force of arms is highly degraded. The political and military prestige of Russia has declined.
Concerning Western states' military capabilities for large-scale warfare, the post-Cold era has been a time of atrophy and decay. Most Western states have not developed their militaries for the kind of war we are witnessing today in Ukraine. On the contrary, many European states have transformed (read: cut) their armed forces to participate with small contributions to multinational out-of-area operations - whether in the name of military crisis management, counter-terrorism operations or counter-insurgency operations. After almost 30 years of "warfare light", Europa has shed most of its Cold War era military "overweight". Today this is a problem.
When one combines the lessons from Russia and the West for the Baltic Sea region, it is easy to conclude that in the short to medium term the situation is dangerous and could spin out of control rapidly. On its current path, Russia is going to hit a brick wall eventually. This does not necessarily mean the end of hostilities directed against Ukraine. Desperate actors can resort to desperate means. However, the big picture is that Russia will get weaker economically, politically and militarily the longer this war lasts. In this same period (1-5 years), Western possibilities to support Ukraine militarily - or to bolster their big war military capabilities - will be limited. The shadow of post-Cold War European defence cuts is cast well into the future. It takes at least a decade to significantly increase one's military capability after the decision has been made and additional resources are allocated for capability development.
Over the long run, Western states will have ample possibilities to navigate the dramatically worsened security situation they find themselves in today. If appropriate decisions related to boosting large-scale warfare capabilities is made throughout NATO, and if those decision are executed systematically NATO-wide, conventional Western military capability in the 2030s in Europe and for Europe will most likely overshadow that of Russia. European economic power may be converted into military power, but this takes time. Europe can make it if Russia can effectively start its own process of military transformation and capability development soon - a development that is highly contingent and does not look probable today.
Russia's war in Ukraine has highlighted several "new" (read: old) aspects of contemporary security environment. Many of these have direct consequences for the Baltic Sea region. I will touch upon the two major long-term aspects of this war that should influence Western statesmen and public officials in their deliberations about providing security and safety in the Baltic Sea area and throughout Europe
The first of these concerns Russia's military capability and its willingness to use force in order to promote its national interests - however these are defined by Russia's political elite. The second aspect is related to Western states' military capability to deter and defend against a large-scale war and the way that this capability has atrophied since the end of the Cold War.
Russia's war has - once again - showed the perils of launching a large-scale military campaign with faulty assumptions and overtly optimistic expectations related to the feasibility of attaining the goals of war. In addition, a factor facilitating Russia's inability to achieve its military goals was based on over-hyping its military capability that never reached its full potential due to Russia's systemic corruption and inflexible military culture, which conceptualizes soldiers as "war material" that can be expended in long-term operations that have virtually no military utility.
So, this war has demonstrated in the cruelest way Russian political leadership's willingness to use military force to promote its interest. However, Russia's military has lost at least one generation of modern military hardware and tens of thousands of soldiers in the war so far. This will significantly influence its ability to wage war and conduct large-scale military operations during the next decade. Although Russia's Armed Forces still possess a significant number of (old/older) platforms and systems that can cause enormous destruction - even without going nuclear - its ability to achieve meaningful political outcomes with the force of arms is highly degraded. The political and military prestige of Russia has declined.
Concerning Western states' military capabilities for large-scale warfare, the post-Cold era has been a time of atrophy and decay. Most Western states have not developed their militaries for the kind of war we are witnessing today in Ukraine. On the contrary, many European states have transformed (read: cut) their armed forces to participate with small contributions to multinational out-of-area operations - whether in the name of military crisis management, counter-terrorism operations or counter-insurgency operations. After almost 30 years of "warfare light", Europa has shed most of its Cold War era military "overweight". Today this is a problem.
When one combines the lessons from Russia and the West for the Baltic Sea region, it is easy to conclude that in the short to medium term the situation is dangerous and could spin out of control rapidly. On its current path, Russia is going to hit a brick wall eventually. This does not necessarily mean the end of hostilities directed against Ukraine. Desperate actors can resort to desperate means. However, the big picture is that Russia will get weaker economically, politically and militarily the longer this war lasts. In this same period (1-5 years), Western possibilities to support Ukraine militarily - or to bolster their big war military capabilities - will be limited. The shadow of post-Cold War European defence cuts is cast well into the future. It takes at least a decade to significantly increase one's military capability after the decision has been made and additional resources are allocated for capability development.
Over the long run, Western states will have ample possibilities to navigate the dramatically worsened security situation they find themselves in today. If appropriate decisions related to boosting large-scale warfare capabilities is made throughout NATO, and if those decision are executed systematically NATO-wide, conventional Western military capability in the 2030s in Europe and for Europe will most likely overshadow that of Russia. European economic power may be converted into military power, but this takes time. Europe can make it if Russia can effectively start its own process of military transformation and capability development soon - a development that is highly contingent and does not look probable today.