Franziska Stärk
Researcher in the Arms Control and Emerging Technologies program
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
Germany
staerk@ifsh.de
Ulrich Kühn
Dr., Head of the Arms Control and Emerging Technologies program
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)
Germany
kuehn@ifsh.de
Russian nuclear threats have facilitated its conventional war of aggression against neighboring Ukraine. Moscow’s actions serve as a stark reminder of the different spheres of (in)security created by nuclear weapons possession. They underscore the need for critically questioning past, present, and future injustices entrenched in the global nuclear order. Especially NATO’s new Baltic Rim members have a role to play here.
Joining an alliance
Sweden and Finland are on the cusp of NATO membership. Soon, all Baltic Rim countries – with the obvious exception of Russia – will enjoy U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. Although there are currently no plans in Helsinki or Stockholm to host U.S. nuclear weapons, their accession to NATO explicitly requires them to accept the nuclear dimension of the alliance, at least in political terms.
While not yet a primary focus of the northern NATO accession debate, it is crucial to highlight the broader implications of these countries’ nuclear choices, not only as regards the evolving regional security landscape but also within the global nuclear order.
Sharing a legacy
Joining a nuclear alliance comes with legacy costs. Nuclear weapons states and their allies have constructed hierarchical spheres of (in)security and therewith contributed to a global system of nuclear injustice. The war in Ukraine is the most recent example. Russia’s nuclear threats have, thus far, deterred direct external intervention. Despite military, financial, and intelligence support from the West, it is still Ukraine that has to fight the Russian aggressor, mostly on its own. Meanwhile, neighboring NATO member states are safe behind the threat of nuclear deterrence – at least 'safe' until the day that nuclear deterrence might fail.
Conversely, the nuclear periphery – Ukraine and other non-aligned states – lacks not only access to nuclear deterrence, but also pays the costs of nuclear exploitation. Russia, for example, exploits directly the unequal nonproliferation and disarmament obligations enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The NPT not only treats states unequally – some are allowed to have nuclear weapons, all others are not – it also deprives them of the same means to claim consequences in case of misconduct. Were Ukraine to pursue the bomb, it would rightfully face stark international consequences, in line with the NPT’s nonproliferation goal. Meanwhile, Russia’s and all other nuclear weapons states’ procrastinating on their NPT disarmament commitments triggers no fine. Even when Russia violated its direct security guarantees to Ukraine, it faced no serious consequences within the NPT framework.
When it comes to systemic nuclear injustice, however, Russia is not an outlier. Be it the United States, the Soviet Union, China or France, nuclear weapons have caused historic justice grievances stemming from uranium mining and nuclear testing, which continue to impact marginalized communities and the environment to this day.
Making a choice
Thus far, nuclear weapons states and their deterrence protégés have done little to rectify the injustice costs their arsenals have caused in the past and continue to do so up until today. For NATO’s new members, acknowledging this legacy and their future role in dealing with it, therefore, comes with a choice.
In light of Russia's reckless behavior in the nuclear realm, they could either simply revert to the Cold War logic of renuclearizing Europe, effectively extending and aggravating nuclear injustice. A still nascent debate in the alliance about countering increased Russian reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons is already ongoing, and it will become more pressing in the next years. Instead, new NATO member states could lead an effort for a renewed dual track approach, one that balances deterrence with arms control.
Such a message, conveyed by the Baltic Rim countries with their close geographic proximity to Russia, would carry significant weight and could have a considerable external effect beyond the alliance. Instead of simply prolonging an unjust nuclear order, these states could provide future generations with a vision for possible nuclear disarmament, thereby reducing the intergenerational injustice bill of nuclear weapons.
Short of acknowledging the legacy of nuclear injustice, this is the bare minimum that NATO and its new Baltic Rim members should do to build a more just and sustainable security architecture for future generations.
Joining an alliance
Sweden and Finland are on the cusp of NATO membership. Soon, all Baltic Rim countries – with the obvious exception of Russia – will enjoy U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. Although there are currently no plans in Helsinki or Stockholm to host U.S. nuclear weapons, their accession to NATO explicitly requires them to accept the nuclear dimension of the alliance, at least in political terms.
While not yet a primary focus of the northern NATO accession debate, it is crucial to highlight the broader implications of these countries’ nuclear choices, not only as regards the evolving regional security landscape but also within the global nuclear order.
Sharing a legacy
Joining a nuclear alliance comes with legacy costs. Nuclear weapons states and their allies have constructed hierarchical spheres of (in)security and therewith contributed to a global system of nuclear injustice. The war in Ukraine is the most recent example. Russia’s nuclear threats have, thus far, deterred direct external intervention. Despite military, financial, and intelligence support from the West, it is still Ukraine that has to fight the Russian aggressor, mostly on its own. Meanwhile, neighboring NATO member states are safe behind the threat of nuclear deterrence – at least 'safe' until the day that nuclear deterrence might fail.
Conversely, the nuclear periphery – Ukraine and other non-aligned states – lacks not only access to nuclear deterrence, but also pays the costs of nuclear exploitation. Russia, for example, exploits directly the unequal nonproliferation and disarmament obligations enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The NPT not only treats states unequally – some are allowed to have nuclear weapons, all others are not – it also deprives them of the same means to claim consequences in case of misconduct. Were Ukraine to pursue the bomb, it would rightfully face stark international consequences, in line with the NPT’s nonproliferation goal. Meanwhile, Russia’s and all other nuclear weapons states’ procrastinating on their NPT disarmament commitments triggers no fine. Even when Russia violated its direct security guarantees to Ukraine, it faced no serious consequences within the NPT framework.
When it comes to systemic nuclear injustice, however, Russia is not an outlier. Be it the United States, the Soviet Union, China or France, nuclear weapons have caused historic justice grievances stemming from uranium mining and nuclear testing, which continue to impact marginalized communities and the environment to this day.
Making a choice
Thus far, nuclear weapons states and their deterrence protégés have done little to rectify the injustice costs their arsenals have caused in the past and continue to do so up until today. For NATO’s new members, acknowledging this legacy and their future role in dealing with it, therefore, comes with a choice.
In light of Russia's reckless behavior in the nuclear realm, they could either simply revert to the Cold War logic of renuclearizing Europe, effectively extending and aggravating nuclear injustice. A still nascent debate in the alliance about countering increased Russian reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons is already ongoing, and it will become more pressing in the next years. Instead, new NATO member states could lead an effort for a renewed dual track approach, one that balances deterrence with arms control.
Such a message, conveyed by the Baltic Rim countries with their close geographic proximity to Russia, would carry significant weight and could have a considerable external effect beyond the alliance. Instead of simply prolonging an unjust nuclear order, these states could provide future generations with a vision for possible nuclear disarmament, thereby reducing the intergenerational injustice bill of nuclear weapons.
Short of acknowledging the legacy of nuclear injustice, this is the bare minimum that NATO and its new Baltic Rim members should do to build a more just and sustainable security architecture for future generations.