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Eugeniusz Cieślak: Internal security in Poland in 2023

Eugeniusz Cieślak 
Ph.D., Director, Senior Leaders’ Course and Higher Command Studies Course
Baltic Defence College
Tartu, Estonia
eugeniusz.cieslak@baltdefcol.org


The lack of a clear definition of internal security in the Polish legal system and constitution has led to numerous definitions and descriptions by government officials, politicians, and officers of internal security institutions, researchers, and media. These definitions are often subjective, relative, and emotional. In a broad sense, internal security assures conditions for the survival and development of society. In a narrow sense, it relates to safeguarding the constitutional order and the very institution of the state. As of spring 2023, a basic delineation of actions for maintenance of internal security includes upholding of the rule of law and providing for public security, civil protection, and protection of the constitutional order.

Upholding the rule of law and providing for public security is essential to protect citizens and state institutions against criminal and hybrid threats. As of spring 2023, Poland remains a safe country with a level of violent crime well below the EU average. At the same time, thefts caused by soaring inflation and a cost-of-living crisis is on the rise. However, there is a noticeable increase in cybercrime, while detection remains low. Economic crime remains a problem, especially VAT fraud, as well as corruption involving politicians and healthcare professionals. Despite the elimination of large domestic criminal groups, Poland is a place of drug production and human trafficking. The terrorist threat in Poland remains low, although activities supporting terrorism and radicalization have been detected in recent years. Lone-wolf attacks motivated by religious, ethnic, or political hatred cannot be ruled out in the long term. Hate crimes in Poland should be monitored, particularly those motivated by xenophobia, anti-Muslim sentiments, and anti-LGBT rhetoric. The ruling political coalition has frequently used anti-LGBT rhetoric, which may hinder effective protection of the LGBT community against hate speech and crime. With increasing support for extreme right-wing ideologies, hate crime may become a more significant security issue for Poland in the future.

In recent years, hybrid threats have become more apparent. Russian espionage and hostile information activities against Poland have intensified. Malicious narratives capitalize on Polish socio-political polarization. As of spring 2023, the lack of systemic preparations to fight hostile information influence makes Poland vulnerable to hybrid attacks. Instrumentalized migration from Belarus has remained an issue for Poland's internal security since 2021. The pushbacks and restricting access of NGOs and media to the border sparked discussions about violating human rights not only against irregular migrants but also against Polish citizen. While migration from Belarus is not intense in spring 2023, it still poses a threat to Poland’s internal security. Conversely, the reception of millions of Ukrainian refugees did not affect internal security. In both cases, the protection of the state border and internal security proved effective.

Civil protection in Poland remains fragmented and underfunded in spring 2023. Responsibility for the protection of life and health of citizens and national property against the effects of natural and technical disasters remains divided between the government and territorial self-government authorities. There is a lack of coherent legal regulations and works on the civil protection act have been ongoing for dozens of years. Regulations regarding tasks and structures are currently dispersed in various legal acts, and responsibilities to protect are not fully delineated. The underfunding of crisis management and civil protection structures subordinated to territorial self-government is noticeable. There are neither integrated structures for civil protection nor the necessary resources for proper management in the event of a crisis. There is still no integration of crisis management and civil defence structures, despite a noticeable trend in other European Union countries.

An area of concern is the state of protection of the constitutional order in Poland. Since 2015, the ruling party (PiS) has systematically eliminated or reduced the effectiveness of the democratic oversight of the constitutional order. Government actions have limited the independence of the judiciary. The effectiveness of parliamentary control over the executive has diminished. Civil supervision over Polish secret services is assessed by experts as illusory. Recent personnel changes in the internal security services have strengthened the influence of PiS ministers on the activities of these services. Allegations that the special services used the Pegasus software to spy on opposition politicians have still not been clarified. Potential threats to constitutional order may result from the involvement of secret services or their representatives in activities that may affect the results of the 2023 parliamentary elections. Attempts to protect representatives of the ruling coalition who commit corruption crimes from criminal liability is also a possibility.

The outlook for internal security in Poland does not look promising. Attempts to consolidate executive power will impact internal security. Most likely, the transparency of policies and activities related to internal security will suffer further. The prospects for the effective democratic control of government, special services, and judiciary systems look grim. In summation, the security and fundamental rights of Poland’s citizen may suffer due to the erosion of democratic institutions and challenges to the constitutional order.