Hannes Nagel: Weaponized social media as a national security threat

On March 21, 2022, photos of the Retroville shopping centre in Kyiv, which had been hit by a direct hit from Russian missiles the night before, started to spread around the world. Before that a local Tiktoker published a video of Ukrainian army vehicles parked at the mall. As a result, 8 people were killed in the attack and several residential buildings were severely damaged. This is just one of many examples of how the seemingly innocent habitual use of social media (like posting videos) can become life-threatening. In this particular case, a threat to both the protection of human life and morality was realized. Moreover, any thoughtless filming of army objects and positions has the potential to become a threat to national security.

Such incidents are more alarming because the Ukrainian authorities have constantly warned people to refrain from posting certain types of information on social media. Penalties for posting non-public information are also laid down in the relevant legislation, which was also adopted in the very first days after the outbreak of full-scale war. The speed with which this issue was dealt with in Ukraine is itself an example of the seriousness of the problems posed by social media in a war situation. 

At the heart of the problem is the fact that a large proportion of both the civilian and military population use some form of smart device, with a significant proportion also having some form of active social media account. In war, this means that each individual can post (e.g. text, photos, videos or audio recordings), at virtually any time, quickly, often using geotracking, and thereby provide what they have seen or experienced, usually unintentionally but sometimes intentionally (e.g. army positions, combat plans, a hint of a poorly aimed rocket launch etc.), into the cyberspace, where information that can be easily used by the enemy to achieve their objectives. In fact, it has estimated that up to 80% of the intelligence information obtained comes from public sources.1

Social media is mainly of course being used as a platform for getting and sharing information quickly, also in situations where traditional information channels may not work. But it should be borne in mind that the information on social media is often not verified, for example, Ukraine has reported on the so-called fake 'green-corridors' created by the Russians (e.g. in Mariupol). The latter means that desperate civilians have been led through social media posts to evacuation routes that do not exist and which, when reached, are followed by air strikes or even encountered by the enemy.2 

What to do in such a situation where it has been established that the threat is not just theoretical? Ukraine's strategic steps so far have been to inform the public about what is allowed and forbidden behavior on social media, to introduce amendments to the Penal Code, and to develop and deploy social media and certain apps to gather information with the help of the civilians. At the same time, Russia is constantly improving its means of gathering information, which also includes exploitation of children through smartphone games that encourage them to gather information on the positions of the Ukrainian army.

The weaponization of social media that we are seeing now is just another stage in the further development of Russia's information warfare capabilities. Information warfare has a long tradition in Russia, both in theory and in practice, but its formal and legal beginnings as a national discipline date back to 1942.1 However, Russia's current use of information warfare operations is simply a modern, internet-age version of an already well-established Soviet-era tactic of creating alternative reality, with Russia acknowledging that IT can be used in future conflicts. Russia shifted its focus to new, online methods of warfare after its invasion of Georgia in August 2008, particularly in the face of domestic criticism. 

Ukraine has been exposed to Russia's information warfare techniques even before 2014 in preparation for the annexation of Crimea and Donbass. Although the West has also been exposed to Russian forms of information warfare, these peacetime experiences can’t be compared to those of an active conflict. Thus, it is crucial that we support Ukraine also in every way we can in cyberspace, but also learn from the Ukrainian experience to prevent common mistakes. Informing civilians and the military about the dangers of using social media during war, before real conflict begins, can help to avoid damage to infrastructure and vital equipment, civilian injuries and even deaths. 

At the same time, the Retroville case, in the initial phase of the war, is a painful lesson not only for Ukraine but also for Europe, and raises legitimate questions for the internal security authorities among them - how to mitigate such threats?