Rikard Bengtsson
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science, Lund University
Sweden
rikard.bengtsson@svet.lu.se
Russia’s war in Ukraine marks the ultimate step in a deteriorating security situation in Europe over the last decade and is the key driver of a number of security-related developments. Among the most definitive changes in the Baltic Sea context is the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO. Assuming that Sweden will be admitted in due course following Finland’s entry into the alliance in April 2022, the institutional landscape and level of defence integration in the Baltic Sea region is changing fundamentally, with implications not only for the new member-states but also for NATO internal dynamics and future relations with Russia.
This changing security landscape also has implications for security and defence cooperation among the Nordic countries. Nordic cooperation has a long history and has advanced quite far in a number of areas including labour market, education, social security and mobility. In contrast, and following the onset of the Cold War and the different security political paths chosen by of the Nordics, cooperation in security and defence matters has been very limited.
This situation began to change following the end of the Cold War. On the military side, limited cooperation between Norway and Sweden and shortly thereafter Finland began in the areas of exercises, armaments and coordinated peace support operations. Bringing these efforts under the same umbrella, NORDEFCO (Nordic defence cooperation) was established in 2009. The primary driver for this development was economic. It is to be noted that Denmark was not involved initially (due to its somewhat different defence orientation), nor was Iceland, lacking defence forces of its own. Certain common projects were swiftly realized, such as air force exercises and coordinated transports to Afghanistan, but more fundamental joint projects, such as materiel acquisition, proved harder to realize. After a few years, interest in the project vanished. Russian annexation of Crimea and entry into Eastern Ukraine fundamentally changed the logic – Nordic defence cooperation reappeared on the scene, but as a solution to a different problem. Cooperation, including Denmark and to a degree also Iceland, has developed in five areas: capabilities, armaments, human resources and education, training and exercises, and operations. Notable examples include a crisis consultation mechanism, an alternate landing bases arrangement, air surveillance, enhanced cross-border mobility for military personnel, and a number of large-scale exercises. Furthermore, in 2018, the Nordic defence ministers agreed on “NORDEFCO Vision 2025” with the ambition to transfer the peace-time framework into something that would also apply during crisis and conflict.
When it comes to non-military security and defence cooperation, 2009 again marks an important year, both with the release of the Stoltenberg report that sketched a number of cooperative proposals for Nordic joint action in foreign policy and security matters, some of which have later, at least partially, materialized. The same year, the so-called Haga process was set in motion, covering cooperation on civil security and crisis preparedness, involving for instance projects on search and rescue, crisis communication and strategic air support. The initially sketchy pattern of cooperation has subsequently been institutionalized at the Nordic level through the Haga II declaration in 2013 and been further developed in various bilateral and trilateral agreements, notably between Finland, Norway and Sweden.
It can be concluded that on both the military and the civilian side security and defence interaction among the Nordic countries takes place in a multilayered setting, where certain things are done at the Nordic level and others in more limited constellations. The bilateral relationship between Sweden and Finland stands out, explained in large part by the non-membership in NATO.
Having said that, Nordic cooperation in whatever format is taking place in a European and transatlantic context institutionally centered around the EU and NATO. Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in NATO can be expected to impact on military, and to a degree, civilian cooperation. With integration into NATO’s military structures it is hard to envisage projects that are decoupled from NATO processes. Also on the civilian side, NATO’s Resilience Committee may prove to be a natural reference point and arena for Nordic cooperation on societal resilience, just as elements of EU civil protection and resilience cooperation are central to most (and often all) Nordic states. This need not in any way imply that Nordic cooperation will vanish in the areas of security and defence (there are numerous projects in NATO as well as the EU that include a limited number of member-states), but it is likely that these institutions increasingly will be the natural reference point for such initiatives, in turn giving new preconditions for Nordic cooperation.
This changing security landscape also has implications for security and defence cooperation among the Nordic countries. Nordic cooperation has a long history and has advanced quite far in a number of areas including labour market, education, social security and mobility. In contrast, and following the onset of the Cold War and the different security political paths chosen by of the Nordics, cooperation in security and defence matters has been very limited.
This situation began to change following the end of the Cold War. On the military side, limited cooperation between Norway and Sweden and shortly thereafter Finland began in the areas of exercises, armaments and coordinated peace support operations. Bringing these efforts under the same umbrella, NORDEFCO (Nordic defence cooperation) was established in 2009. The primary driver for this development was economic. It is to be noted that Denmark was not involved initially (due to its somewhat different defence orientation), nor was Iceland, lacking defence forces of its own. Certain common projects were swiftly realized, such as air force exercises and coordinated transports to Afghanistan, but more fundamental joint projects, such as materiel acquisition, proved harder to realize. After a few years, interest in the project vanished. Russian annexation of Crimea and entry into Eastern Ukraine fundamentally changed the logic – Nordic defence cooperation reappeared on the scene, but as a solution to a different problem. Cooperation, including Denmark and to a degree also Iceland, has developed in five areas: capabilities, armaments, human resources and education, training and exercises, and operations. Notable examples include a crisis consultation mechanism, an alternate landing bases arrangement, air surveillance, enhanced cross-border mobility for military personnel, and a number of large-scale exercises. Furthermore, in 2018, the Nordic defence ministers agreed on “NORDEFCO Vision 2025” with the ambition to transfer the peace-time framework into something that would also apply during crisis and conflict.
When it comes to non-military security and defence cooperation, 2009 again marks an important year, both with the release of the Stoltenberg report that sketched a number of cooperative proposals for Nordic joint action in foreign policy and security matters, some of which have later, at least partially, materialized. The same year, the so-called Haga process was set in motion, covering cooperation on civil security and crisis preparedness, involving for instance projects on search and rescue, crisis communication and strategic air support. The initially sketchy pattern of cooperation has subsequently been institutionalized at the Nordic level through the Haga II declaration in 2013 and been further developed in various bilateral and trilateral agreements, notably between Finland, Norway and Sweden.
It can be concluded that on both the military and the civilian side security and defence interaction among the Nordic countries takes place in a multilayered setting, where certain things are done at the Nordic level and others in more limited constellations. The bilateral relationship between Sweden and Finland stands out, explained in large part by the non-membership in NATO.
Having said that, Nordic cooperation in whatever format is taking place in a European and transatlantic context institutionally centered around the EU and NATO. Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in NATO can be expected to impact on military, and to a degree, civilian cooperation. With integration into NATO’s military structures it is hard to envisage projects that are decoupled from NATO processes. Also on the civilian side, NATO’s Resilience Committee may prove to be a natural reference point and arena for Nordic cooperation on societal resilience, just as elements of EU civil protection and resilience cooperation are central to most (and often all) Nordic states. This need not in any way imply that Nordic cooperation will vanish in the areas of security and defence (there are numerous projects in NATO as well as the EU that include a limited number of member-states), but it is likely that these institutions increasingly will be the natural reference point for such initiatives, in turn giving new preconditions for Nordic cooperation.