Director for Northern Europe
Atlantic Council
Chair of the Board
Institute for Security and Development Policy
Sweden
The past decade has proven historically transformative for Sweden’s security policy. In 2013, when Russian aircraft simulated a nuclear bomb strike close to the Swedish border, the Swedish Armed Forces had no jet fighters ready to scramble due to low levels of readiness for territorial incidents. The incident reflected the perceived Russian threat level at the time. A year later, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine drastically altered the perception of Russia. For Sweden, this was a rude awakening, triggering rapid adaptation to the worsened security situation in the Baltic Sea region.
Sweden’s decision to join NATO may seem like an abrupt change after more than 200 years of military non-alignment. However, already because of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden positioned itself, alongside Finland, as informal allies to NATO in the Baltic Sea region, cooperating extensively within the sphere of collective defense and preparing to “plug in” to the Alliance’s operations if necessary. Not until Russia´s aggression reached unprecedented levels through its full-scale invasion of Ukraine did Sweden formally apply for NATO membership.
For many years after the Cold War, the Baltic Sea region was one of the most peaceful areas in the world. Facing no state threats, Sweden’s national defence was to a large extent dismantled. Conscription abandoned as was total defence planning. The Armed Forces re-oriented towards smaller expeditionary forces for international missions and the renewal of defence equipment put on hold.
The deteriorated security situation in the Baltic Sea region in 2014 abruptly brought antagonistic state threats back to the core of security and defence policy. Suddenly, at the frontline of systemic competition between Russia and the West, the Baltic Sea region was characterized by tensions and uncertainty. This caused a shift in Swedish security and defence doctrine in three dimensions: national defence, international defence cooperation, and emphasis on the international rules-based order.
First, on national defence, it was central to reactivate conscription to exercise in larger formations and more often and to re-establish permanent military presence on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Sweden heavily invested in defence equipment, including new next-generation submarines, Gripen fighter aircrafts, and the Patriot missile defence system. Increased investments occurred from an albeit low level. The report of the Swedish Defence Commission in May 2019 outspokenly concluded that the Armed Forces would not be able to meet an armed attack against Sweden.
Secondly, on international defence cooperation, Sweden indulged in shaping a patchwork of bilateral, peacetime collaborative agreements with its neighbors, most notably with Finland,
with whom arrangements also encompassed joint planning in crisis or war. The bilateral relationship with the US was crucial for Sweden´s security, and in 2016 Sweden signed a defence agreement with the Americans. In addition, the UK played a prominent role through the engagement of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in the Baltic Sea region, which Sweden joined in 2017. There was also a trilateral format between Sweden, Finland, and the US, and in 2020, Sweden, Finland, and Norway signed an agreement to establish coordinated operational planning for parts of the three Nordic territories. Sweden’s relationship to NATO also took on a new dimension after 2014, as NATO returned to its core task of collective defence and gradually turned its strategic gaze towards the Baltic Sea region. Through the Enhanced Opportunity Partners Program, Sweden and Finland became closest partners to NATO, participating in various advanced exercises with wartime scenarios, ready to “plug in” to NATO’s response planning if needed.
Thirdly, Sweden took a strong and outspoken stance against Russia’s breach of the international rules-based order. Sweden openly and transparently signaled that it stood in solidarity with others and would not hesitate to take sides in times of crisis and war. Stockholm cited Russia’s assertive behavior and military build-up as the need to strengthen its defence efforts and its deterrence posture.
On February 24, 2022, the foundation for Sweden’s security and defense doctrine shook. A full-scale invasion by Russia on a neighboring country caused public opinion to skyrocket in support for joining NATO, and the political parties followed suite. It became clear that there was no substitute for article 5 guarantees in such a severe situation. In May 2022, Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership and hopefully, Sweden will be a full member by the Vilnius summit in mid-July 2023, benefitting the security of the whole Alliance.
Sweden’s decision to join NATO may seem like an abrupt change after more than 200 years of military non-alignment. However, already because of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden positioned itself, alongside Finland, as informal allies to NATO in the Baltic Sea region, cooperating extensively within the sphere of collective defense and preparing to “plug in” to the Alliance’s operations if necessary. Not until Russia´s aggression reached unprecedented levels through its full-scale invasion of Ukraine did Sweden formally apply for NATO membership.
For many years after the Cold War, the Baltic Sea region was one of the most peaceful areas in the world. Facing no state threats, Sweden’s national defence was to a large extent dismantled. Conscription abandoned as was total defence planning. The Armed Forces re-oriented towards smaller expeditionary forces for international missions and the renewal of defence equipment put on hold.
The deteriorated security situation in the Baltic Sea region in 2014 abruptly brought antagonistic state threats back to the core of security and defence policy. Suddenly, at the frontline of systemic competition between Russia and the West, the Baltic Sea region was characterized by tensions and uncertainty. This caused a shift in Swedish security and defence doctrine in three dimensions: national defence, international defence cooperation, and emphasis on the international rules-based order.
First, on national defence, it was central to reactivate conscription to exercise in larger formations and more often and to re-establish permanent military presence on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Sweden heavily invested in defence equipment, including new next-generation submarines, Gripen fighter aircrafts, and the Patriot missile defence system. Increased investments occurred from an albeit low level. The report of the Swedish Defence Commission in May 2019 outspokenly concluded that the Armed Forces would not be able to meet an armed attack against Sweden.
Secondly, on international defence cooperation, Sweden indulged in shaping a patchwork of bilateral, peacetime collaborative agreements with its neighbors, most notably with Finland,
with whom arrangements also encompassed joint planning in crisis or war. The bilateral relationship with the US was crucial for Sweden´s security, and in 2016 Sweden signed a defence agreement with the Americans. In addition, the UK played a prominent role through the engagement of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in the Baltic Sea region, which Sweden joined in 2017. There was also a trilateral format between Sweden, Finland, and the US, and in 2020, Sweden, Finland, and Norway signed an agreement to establish coordinated operational planning for parts of the three Nordic territories. Sweden’s relationship to NATO also took on a new dimension after 2014, as NATO returned to its core task of collective defence and gradually turned its strategic gaze towards the Baltic Sea region. Through the Enhanced Opportunity Partners Program, Sweden and Finland became closest partners to NATO, participating in various advanced exercises with wartime scenarios, ready to “plug in” to NATO’s response planning if needed.
Thirdly, Sweden took a strong and outspoken stance against Russia’s breach of the international rules-based order. Sweden openly and transparently signaled that it stood in solidarity with others and would not hesitate to take sides in times of crisis and war. Stockholm cited Russia’s assertive behavior and military build-up as the need to strengthen its defence efforts and its deterrence posture.
On February 24, 2022, the foundation for Sweden’s security and defense doctrine shook. A full-scale invasion by Russia on a neighboring country caused public opinion to skyrocket in support for joining NATO, and the political parties followed suite. It became clear that there was no substitute for article 5 guarantees in such a severe situation. In May 2022, Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership and hopefully, Sweden will be a full member by the Vilnius summit in mid-July 2023, benefitting the security of the whole Alliance.