Karsten Friis
Senior Research Fellow
NUPI – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Norway
Finland’s membership in NATO on April 4th 2023 represent a watershed moment in Baltic and Nordic history. By entering into a formal military alliance with its neighbours, Finland will be part of a united front of deterrence against Russia, reaching from the High North to the Black Sea. The Baltic countries, which always have felt vulnerable and exposed given their geopolitical location, now have a new and capable ally next door. But what are the concrete implications for Nordic-Baltic security and defence?
Finland has after all always been a part of the Western family of liberal democracies and since it joined the European Union, also been firmly anchored in European security architecture. Over the last decade it has also strengthened its bilateral defence ties with NATO, the United States and Sweden. It has also participated in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). As such, nothing is new. Nobody doubted where Finland would stand in case of conflict between Russia and the West. Nonetheless, a formal alliance is not only politically important, it also entails new concrete military solutions which were not possible as a non-aligned country.
As President Niinistö has stated, Finland’s NATO-membership is not complete until Sweden also joins. This responsibility lies in the hands of Türkiye, and there is hope that a ratification can take place after the elections there in May, and before NATO Summit in Vilnius at the end of June. For the general security and defence of Sweden, this delay does not matter much. But if NATO is forced to get on with its defence planning with Finland but without Sweden over the next months and years, this becomes increasingly inconvenient over time. A too long delay should therefore be avoided.
Finland’s (and Sweden’s) NATO-membership implies opportunities to re-think and re-design Nordic-Baltic defence in novel ways, utilizing each others’ forces and capacities more efficiently than was possible before. In short, Nordic and Baltic states will now be able to rely on defence systems of its Nordic neighbours – knowing that these resources also will be available in case of conflict and war. This was the major shortcoming in NORDEFCO until now; cooperation could be developed, but not integration and mutual security interdependence.
So what can we expect? The Nordic Chiefs of the Airforces have already agreed to work jointly to develop an ‘ability to operate seamlessly together as one force’. They plan joint air command and control, flexible and resilient airbasing, shared air situational awareness and common air education, training and exercises. This plus potentially joint air defence, logistics and maintenance, will not only potentially save costs, but more importantly it will strengthen the military effect of the Nordic air forces significantly. With a future fleet of about 250 modern fighter jets (Denmark, Finland, and Norway with F35, Sweden with Gripen), the combined Nordic Airforce will represent a formidable deterrent towards Russia, and a very potent force in European defence. Given the mobility and long reach of aircrafts, this will strengthen NATO’s warfighting capacity in both the Baltic and in the High North.
But this is also a military challenge NATO needs to address. Although the High North and the Baltic Sea in many respects are one common northern front, these two theatres also represent different military threats. In the High North, Russia’s strategic submarines as well as its multi-purpose attack submarines are NATO’s main concern. The former because they represent a direct threat against the American continent, the latter because they can target Allied sea lines of communications, and thereby reinforcement from America to Europe. In the Baltic region, the main problem is partly to protect the population centres around Helsinki and Stockholm, and partly to reinforce the Baltics in a contested environment. These various tasks require different plans and preparations, which may not be directly interlinked. NATO enlargement certainly makes reinforcement of the Baltic states much easier, as NATO will be in a better place to control the region. Sweden will represent a significant rear area, which can support both the High North and the Baltics with land forces. Finnish and Swedish navies will also be crucial in controlling and securing maritime activity in the Baltic Sea.
But these somewhat diverging tasks between the High North and the Baltic Sea has also triggered a debate over which NATO Joint Headquarters Finland and Sweden should be placed under. Norway is already assigned under JFC Norfolk, Virginia, USA, while Denmark is under JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands. The Nordic Chiefs of defence have stated that they wish to be under a common joint command, but there are arguments in favour of both. The ties to the US and reinforcements from the West speaks in favour of Norfolk, while allied support of the Baltic states may point to Brunssum. This question is already somewhat politicised, but should be left to defence planners to decide based on military assessments. Irrespectively of the outcome, all NATO countries and regions will be under one command (SACEUR) should hostilities break out.
All in all, the Nordic NATO-enlargement will stabilise the Baltic Sea and the High North further, as crisis prevention and management will be enhanced through NATO. The days of “Nordic Balance” are long gone and the northern European democracies are more united than ever before in history. It is truly a historical moment.