Tony Lawrence
Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme
International Centre for Defence and Security
Estonia
Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine provides stark evidence of its readiness to go to war to further its geostrategic ambitions. Despite huge political and military setbacks in Ukraine, Russia has not abandoned its demands for broad changes to Europe’s security architecture that would subjugate its neighbours, including in the wider Baltic region, to its malign influence. This demands a forceful response from NATO.
While a Russia-NATO military conflict may be unlikely in the short term, Russia will strive to rapidly rebuild its armed forces after the war. NATO must be ready. Meanwhile, Russia will continue to use military assets to gather intelligence, harass neighbours, and sow uncertainty and fear. The apparent jamming of GPS signals from Gogland is a recent example of the sort of sub-threshold activity that will probably increase as Russia seeks to attack Western interests with limited instruments.
In a NATO-Russia Baltic conflict, naval forces would need to undertake numerous and diverse missions including controlling national waters and ports, striking and defending sea lines of communication, attacking and protecting critical infrastructure such as undersea pipelines and cables, and conducting and frustrating amphibious operations. To provide effective defence, and thus credible deterrence, regional navies must be proficient in a full range of naval warfare disciplines—including anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air operations, and mining and mine countermeasures—in the unique geographical, meteorological, and hydrological conditions of the Baltic Sea. Prerequisites for successful NATO operations on the sea also include effective maritime situational awareness, and multi-domain and multinational command and control.
Finland’s accession and Sweden’s likely accession to NATO are important developments in enhancing defence against and deterrence of Russia in the maritime domain. Finland’s Pohjanmaa multi-role corvettes, due to begin construction this year, will provide year-round capabilities for surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare, mine-laying, and command and control. Sweden’s A-26 Blekinge submarines (expected from 2027) will be tailored for Baltic Sea operations, including capacity for seabed warfare. Swedish and Finnish surface presence and maritime patrol aircraft will significantly enhance maritime situational awareness, currently a weakness in the Baltic region.
Elsewhere in the eastern Baltic, Estonia has acquired new coastal defence radars, naval mines, and 290 km-range Blue Spear coastal defence missiles, while Lithuania has procured an additional mine countermeasures vessel from the UK. Poland is also enhancing its navy, with the acquisition of three multi-role Miecznik class frigates, and Swedish-built signals intelligence vessels.
These and other developments will substantially improve the abilities of NATO states to maintain a close eye on Russia’s destructive activities in the maritime domain in peacetime and frustrate its operations during conflict. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to enhance maritime deterrence and defence. Three key watchwords are capability, cooperation, and cohesion.
Many Baltic Sea states have in recent years prioritised the development of land forces, a tendency reinforced by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While the maritime domain has seen some investment, Baltic maritime capability remains thin. Situational awareness is incomplete, and regional states lack a full set of capability options to counter Russian aggression at sea. As NATO states ramp up their defence spending, the maritime domain must also see an appropriate level of investment.
The huge expense of building effective maritime defence and deterrence can, however, be partly mitigated by improving cooperation at all levels: between naval and constabulary maritime forces; and between states—in management processes such as acquisition and logistic support, and in operations. The commanders of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian navies have proposed wide-ranging cooperation, including shared procurement and whole-life management of a new fleet and common planning of exercises and operations. Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO offers an opportunity to build together a stronger Baltic maritime identity, including enhanced information sharing, exercises, and command and control.
Finally, the presence of NATO warships from beyond the region sends a strong deterrence message of NATO cohesion to any potential aggressor. NATO countries must continue to exercise and demonstrate presence in the Baltic Sea.
While the circumstances of the Baltic Sea have shifted dramatically from the ‘red lake’ of the Cold War to a body of water almost surrounded by NATO and EU states, it retains geostrategic significance as a space in which the West directly borders Russia. NATO needs strong maritime capabilities here as part of a robust and comprehensive package to deter, and if needed defend against, this hostile neighbour.
While a Russia-NATO military conflict may be unlikely in the short term, Russia will strive to rapidly rebuild its armed forces after the war. NATO must be ready. Meanwhile, Russia will continue to use military assets to gather intelligence, harass neighbours, and sow uncertainty and fear. The apparent jamming of GPS signals from Gogland is a recent example of the sort of sub-threshold activity that will probably increase as Russia seeks to attack Western interests with limited instruments.
In a NATO-Russia Baltic conflict, naval forces would need to undertake numerous and diverse missions including controlling national waters and ports, striking and defending sea lines of communication, attacking and protecting critical infrastructure such as undersea pipelines and cables, and conducting and frustrating amphibious operations. To provide effective defence, and thus credible deterrence, regional navies must be proficient in a full range of naval warfare disciplines—including anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air operations, and mining and mine countermeasures—in the unique geographical, meteorological, and hydrological conditions of the Baltic Sea. Prerequisites for successful NATO operations on the sea also include effective maritime situational awareness, and multi-domain and multinational command and control.
Finland’s accession and Sweden’s likely accession to NATO are important developments in enhancing defence against and deterrence of Russia in the maritime domain. Finland’s Pohjanmaa multi-role corvettes, due to begin construction this year, will provide year-round capabilities for surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare, mine-laying, and command and control. Sweden’s A-26 Blekinge submarines (expected from 2027) will be tailored for Baltic Sea operations, including capacity for seabed warfare. Swedish and Finnish surface presence and maritime patrol aircraft will significantly enhance maritime situational awareness, currently a weakness in the Baltic region.
Elsewhere in the eastern Baltic, Estonia has acquired new coastal defence radars, naval mines, and 290 km-range Blue Spear coastal defence missiles, while Lithuania has procured an additional mine countermeasures vessel from the UK. Poland is also enhancing its navy, with the acquisition of three multi-role Miecznik class frigates, and Swedish-built signals intelligence vessels.
These and other developments will substantially improve the abilities of NATO states to maintain a close eye on Russia’s destructive activities in the maritime domain in peacetime and frustrate its operations during conflict. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to enhance maritime deterrence and defence. Three key watchwords are capability, cooperation, and cohesion.
Many Baltic Sea states have in recent years prioritised the development of land forces, a tendency reinforced by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While the maritime domain has seen some investment, Baltic maritime capability remains thin. Situational awareness is incomplete, and regional states lack a full set of capability options to counter Russian aggression at sea. As NATO states ramp up their defence spending, the maritime domain must also see an appropriate level of investment.
The huge expense of building effective maritime defence and deterrence can, however, be partly mitigated by improving cooperation at all levels: between naval and constabulary maritime forces; and between states—in management processes such as acquisition and logistic support, and in operations. The commanders of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian navies have proposed wide-ranging cooperation, including shared procurement and whole-life management of a new fleet and common planning of exercises and operations. Meanwhile, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO offers an opportunity to build together a stronger Baltic maritime identity, including enhanced information sharing, exercises, and command and control.
Finally, the presence of NATO warships from beyond the region sends a strong deterrence message of NATO cohesion to any potential aggressor. NATO countries must continue to exercise and demonstrate presence in the Baltic Sea.
While the circumstances of the Baltic Sea have shifted dramatically from the ‘red lake’ of the Cold War to a body of water almost surrounded by NATO and EU states, it retains geostrategic significance as a space in which the West directly borders Russia. NATO needs strong maritime capabilities here as part of a robust and comprehensive package to deter, and if needed defend against, this hostile neighbour.