Senior Research Fellow
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
Norway
Norway is not a member of the European Union, but it seeks close security and defence ties with Brussels. Its set up through the EEA agreement, bilateral agreements and ad hoc cooperation has previously worked well for the small Arctic nation, but the war in Ukraine has provided a monumental stress test for the Norwegian outsider-position in European integration. This text takes stock of Norway-EU relations in light of the prolonged war on European soil and reflects on the potential for future developments.
Norway-EU relations at a glance
The EU does not operate with first and second tier third countries. Despite this fact, there is a perception in Norway that the EEA agreement has given Norway a range of benefits. One example to support this is how creative thinking by the Swedish health authorities helped Norway join the EU’s vaccination scheme during COVID-19. Another is the friendly political signaling following the increased energy dependence on Norway after the cut-off from Russian energy sources after the war.
As part of the EEA agreement Norway holds a biannual dialogue with the EU on foreign policy. There are also frequent expert-level meetings with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and yearly meetings on the Middle East, Balkan, OSSE, Russia/Central Asia and Africa. Norway participates in EU declarations and sanctions and can be part of the EU’s statements in international organisations. Norway is part of the European Defence Fund and has joined the PESCO project on military mobility. There is an agreement in place on contribution to civil and military crisis management operations and Norway has contributed to the EU’s Battlegroups. The country is furthermore associated member in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). Finally, Norway participates in programs that reduce mutual vulnerabilities and increase resilience: Horizon Europe, Galileo, Copernicus, Digital, Cise, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
The set-up above is probably the closest cooperation that a third country has with the EU on security and defence. However, given that Norway was previously a contributor to the Battlegroups and civilian and military EU operations, defence cooperation has been scaled down in recent years, especially on the operative side.
The Norwegian debate – no Zeitenwende in sight
Norway currently has the Eurosceptic Centre Party in government, which caused concern that cooperation with the EU would be de-prioritized from 2021. However, the opposite has happened. Centre Party representatives stay away from most EU related debates, and Labour Party ministers have mostly dealt with questions related to security and defence coordination with the EU regarding the war in Ukraine.
Norway-EU relations at a glance
The EU does not operate with first and second tier third countries. Despite this fact, there is a perception in Norway that the EEA agreement has given Norway a range of benefits. One example to support this is how creative thinking by the Swedish health authorities helped Norway join the EU’s vaccination scheme during COVID-19. Another is the friendly political signaling following the increased energy dependence on Norway after the cut-off from Russian energy sources after the war.
As part of the EEA agreement Norway holds a biannual dialogue with the EU on foreign policy. There are also frequent expert-level meetings with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and yearly meetings on the Middle East, Balkan, OSSE, Russia/Central Asia and Africa. Norway participates in EU declarations and sanctions and can be part of the EU’s statements in international organisations. Norway is part of the European Defence Fund and has joined the PESCO project on military mobility. There is an agreement in place on contribution to civil and military crisis management operations and Norway has contributed to the EU’s Battlegroups. The country is furthermore associated member in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). Finally, Norway participates in programs that reduce mutual vulnerabilities and increase resilience: Horizon Europe, Galileo, Copernicus, Digital, Cise, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).
The set-up above is probably the closest cooperation that a third country has with the EU on security and defence. However, given that Norway was previously a contributor to the Battlegroups and civilian and military EU operations, defence cooperation has been scaled down in recent years, especially on the operative side.
The Norwegian debate – no Zeitenwende in sight
Norway currently has the Eurosceptic Centre Party in government, which caused concern that cooperation with the EU would be de-prioritized from 2021. However, the opposite has happened. Centre Party representatives stay away from most EU related debates, and Labour Party ministers have mostly dealt with questions related to security and defence coordination with the EU regarding the war in Ukraine.
The Finnish and Swedish applications to join NATO also set a new standard for the Norwegian debate on security and defence cooperation with the EU. Whereas a marginal proportion of EU friendly voices in the country have argued that the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that security considerations should push Norway to applying for full membership, others fear duplication with NATO and argue that the Nordic bids to join NATO once and for all proves that the EU is an economic union, not a security and defence union. The fear of NATO-EU duplication is arguably stronger in Norway than in most NATO countries. Considering that Denmark ended its opt-out from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2022, Norway is the least responsive Nordic state in light of the war in Europe.
At the same time, where you stand depends on where you sit. I have written a book on Norway-EU relations in security and defence where I labeled Norway a ‘willing outsider’. This has been an apt description since around 2000 when the EU’s efforts in this area increased. EU membership is unrealistic in the foreseeable future given the low support for such negotiations. Therefore, Norway continues to seek solutions to problems as they arise, including after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Norway-EU relations on the Ukraine war
Being a third country limits the scope for action. When the EU decided on its initial package of sanctions against Russia, Norway waited in the corridors, eventually having to implement the sanctions that the member states decided on. In addition, Norway has sent national experts to the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), contributed with medical evacuation through UCPM, and provided a range of equipment through the same mechanism. Most other Norwegian contributions have been bilateral and in cooperation with specific member states and the US and UK. As such, not being a member of the EU has not limited Norway’s ability to support Ukraine, and where possible it has used EU channels to provide aid.
Conclusions
The case of Norway is well-suited to highlight the political dynamics between the EU and third countries in security and defence. There are ambitions on both sides to cooperate, but the outsider-position places clear limitations on what is possible. From the Norwegian perspective, a limiting factor is that the discourse around EU security and defence policy is based on potential developments. On the other hand, the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine shows that it can develop quickly, and as an outsider Norway can only chase these developments. Essentially, the EU could dictate Norwegian security and defence policy much more explicitly, but it would demand more energy in terms of integrating third states and taking a genuine interest in having them onboard. A start would be more comprehensive frameworks for third country association.
Norway-EU relations on the Ukraine war
Being a third country limits the scope for action. When the EU decided on its initial package of sanctions against Russia, Norway waited in the corridors, eventually having to implement the sanctions that the member states decided on. In addition, Norway has sent national experts to the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), contributed with medical evacuation through UCPM, and provided a range of equipment through the same mechanism. Most other Norwegian contributions have been bilateral and in cooperation with specific member states and the US and UK. As such, not being a member of the EU has not limited Norway’s ability to support Ukraine, and where possible it has used EU channels to provide aid.
Conclusions
The case of Norway is well-suited to highlight the political dynamics between the EU and third countries in security and defence. There are ambitions on both sides to cooperate, but the outsider-position places clear limitations on what is possible. From the Norwegian perspective, a limiting factor is that the discourse around EU security and defence policy is based on potential developments. On the other hand, the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine shows that it can develop quickly, and as an outsider Norway can only chase these developments. Essentially, the EU could dictate Norwegian security and defence policy much more explicitly, but it would demand more energy in terms of integrating third states and taking a genuine interest in having them onboard. A start would be more comprehensive frameworks for third country association.