Aurimas Švedas
Associate Professor
University of Vilnius
Lithuania
When considering the fate of the early Lithuanian state (1253–1795) and the First Republic of Lithuania (1918–1940), historians dramatically summarise it as such: for a state that finds itself in the zone of contact between Western and Eastern civilisation, geopolitical circumstances sometimes act with overpowering force – force majeure. This is a trend that has been well illustrated in 20th-century history. The new international system devised in Versailles in 1919 did not manage to create the provisions for maintaining a sustainable peace in Europe. Dangerous tendencies became more apparent in the 1930s, when the Nazis assumed power and turned Germany’s foreign policy down the path of aggressive revenge and revisionism, while Stalinist Soviet Russia, which was building itself into an ever greater military power, started seaching for ways how to extend tsarist Russia’s expansionist imperial policy. All these processes meant one thing for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (as well as for the rest of Central Eastern Europe) – their space for geopolitical manoeuvring was consistently shrinking, whereas the abolition of Poland’s statehood in September 1939 was also de facto the beginning of the loss of independence of Lithuania and its northern neighbours. Existing amid the field of tension created between Berlin, the capital of the Third Reich, and Moscow, asserting itself as the Third Rome, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia felt as if they were minor besieged fortresses, whose crews’ efforts unfortunately no longer had any significant impact.
The Lithuanian state, restored on March 11, 1990, and its Baltic neighbours exist in a completely different geopolitical reality in the 21st century. Being a member of the European Union and NATO, Lithuania is engaged in partnership and cooperation with more than thirty states, which have an interest in seeing political and economic stability in the Republic of Lithuania, and ensuring its geopolitical security. At the same time, Lithuania’s geopolitical, economic and cultural interests extend from Helsinki to Lisbon, and from Washington to Canberra.
In 1994, Lithuania accepted important international commitments when, as part of Denmark’s battalion, the first Lithuanian peacekeeping force LITPLA-1 joined in the United Nations Organisation’s peacekeeping mission in Croatia. Over the course of 33 years, the geography and nature of such missions has grown extraordinarily broad: Lithuania’s soldiers have participated in operations organised by the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), EU, NATO and other international coalitions in some of the most dangerous hotspots in the world. In this context, Lithuania’s mission in Afghanistan in 2005–2013 is worthy of a separate mention. This was the first and the largest independent international operation during which Lithuanian Special Operations Forces commanded the NATO international security support forces group for reconstruction in the Ghor Province. Equally important activities have been underway in the political sphere. In 2013, Lithuania chaired the European Council, and from May 1, 2015 it held the rotating Presidency of the UN Security Council. In July 11–12, 2023, the NATO Summit will be taking place in Vilnius for the first time ever.
Thus, being members of the EU, NATO and other international organisations allows the Baltic States, which in the 20th century felt like small, lonely besieged fortresses, make a fundamental contribution to resolving today’s security challenges. What are they exactly? Let us begin from the legacy of the 20th century. One such legacy is the behaviour of so-called spoiler states that do not obey the existing international rules (the People’s Republic of China should be mentioned first here) and the transformation of the Russian Federation and Belarus into totalitarian states. Another few security crisis points formed in the 21st century that were created by transnational acts of terror, migration processes, problems in the economy at large and the rise in populism.
Now we are well aware that the challenges discussed earlier were merely a prelude to the fundamental security crisis in Europe, when on February 24, 2022 the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin began the second stage of war against Ukraine, seeking the physical destruction of this state and its society.
What can Lithuania and the other countries of the Baltic Sea region do in this new – war – situation, and how can this action be taken? They will obviously have to take on new responsibilities in the creation and implementation of a strategy to restrain Russia, thereby contributing to the efforts of the United States, Great Britain and Central East European states (Poland, Czechia and Slovakia). Finland’s and Sweden’s decision to join NATO is also a very important step in the implementation of this strategy.
Why do we need to talk about a strategy for restraining totalitarian Russia today? Well, because this state, whose acts in the 21st century hark back to 19th-century geopolitical categories, is implementing a policy of imperial expansion. The credo of this policy: Russia is like an ocean. The purpose of raising waves (information, hybrid and conventional wars) in this ocean is to change the geopolitical landscape in Europe as far and as deeply as Russia can manage. Where will the expansion of this totalitarian state, seeking empire status, stop?
The answer to the latter question depends in part on Lithuania and the other states in the Baltic Sea region. In the 21st century, they are not only members of NATO (making use of the security “umbrella” this organisation provides), but also act as the European Union’s external borders, and (just as importantly) are defenders of the values and ideas professed by this Community.
Does a happy ending to history await Lithuania and the other states in the Baltic Sea region this time?
Unfortunately, this is a question we have yet to answer.