Dr., Research Fellow
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Germany
jelena.cupac@wzb.eu
The OSCE is currently experiencing an existential crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There are two significant issues facing the Organization. Firstly, the OSCE lacks the ability to effectivly punish Russia for violating its long-standing concept of comprehensive, cooperative, and indivisible security. Secondly, the ongoing war has put many essential organizational functions at risk, such as adopting budgets and extending the mandates of field operations. Many observers and practitioners question the OSCE's ability to handle this immense pressure and are uncertain about its future if it survives. One potential way forward that is being discussed is to put renewed emphasis on the OSCE's role as a forum for promoting cooperation and dialogue among participating states.
Throughout its history, the OSCE has performed a function of an inter-state forum, but its purpose has changed to align with the changing geopolitical landscape in Europe. During the Cold War, CSCE-participating states aimed to establish so-called plural peace—peace based on mutual recognition of differences in political systems and the acceptance of the resulting geostrategic reality. After the Cold War, this orientation changed significantly, as participating states focused on creating a liberal peace that prioritized cooperation between states committed to liberal-democratic principles. By adopting a series of high-level documents in the early 1990s, they established that human rights can only thrive in democratic societies and that true peace can only be achieved among democratic states. However, the initial excitement for these principles did not endure. Russia soon expressed concern about NATO and the EU's eastward expansion, claiming that the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy and human rights were, in fact, a way for the West to interfere in states' internal affairs for their own strategic gain. This assertion, as we know, has played a significant role in Russia’s justification for the invasion of Ukraine.
Based on this historical context, there are a few key lessons that the OSCE can apply if its forum function becomes more significant as the war in Ukraine evolves. The goal should be to use the OSCE as a platform to keep the participating states engaged, discover ways to alleviate tensions, and plan for the future.
For the time being, the participating states will likely continue using the OSCE for mutual accusations. Yet, the ongoing conflict with Ukraine also gives Western countries an opportunity to move beyond the usual finger-pointing and take a more proactive approach. By engaging in “normative deterrence”, these countries can send Russia a clear message that they will not compromise on the OSCE's fundamental principles. This means making it clear that discussions on zones of influence or any such retrograde notion of security will not be up for negotiation, including if Russia succeeds in keeping parts of Ukraine under prolonged occupation. The goal of this approach would be to dissuade Russia from using violence to achieve its objectives and ensure that such actions do not become a norm.
However, as Western states pursue their strategy, they should be cautious not to isolate Russia completely. After all, Russia's sense of marginalization amid the EU's and NATO's eastward expansion might have played a role in its decision to invade Ukraine. In order to avoid falling into this trap again, one solution would be to signal to Russia that the OSCE's liberal purpose has diminished. The Russian leadership has long seen this purpose as a threat rather than a solution to lasting peace in Europe. Accordingly, for the time being, it might be advantageous for Western countries to tone down their focus on human rights and democracy in the context of the OSCE. This does not mean abandoning these values but using them less to blame and shame Russia and other authoritarian member states. By taking this approach, the West could avoid treating Russia's authoritarian regime as an equal partner in European security while simultaneously alleviating some of its anxieties about the OSCE being a Western tool for regime change. This could be the beginning of establishing a reserve of trust necessary for tension de-escalation and future cooperation.
Finally, to prepare for the future, the West could also utilize the OSCE's forum function to establish stronger connections with participating states that are neither EU nor NATO members. These states, primarily located in the Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia, have historically been susceptible to Russian influence and may have hesitated to condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine due to energy and other dependencies. By strengthening security ties with these regions through the OSCE, Western states can prevent them from falling further under Russian influence and invite them to collaborate on shaping European security.