Professor of Strategy
Finnish National Defence University
Finland
The Nordic-Baltic region have for a long time been a somewhat diverse region vis-à-vis Russia. The Baltic countries and Poland were, at least in the Nordic countries, often seen as antagonistic in their stance towards Russia, whereas the Nordic countries tended to emphasize dialogue and in general more shades of grey when dealing with Russia.
This all started to change by December 2021, when Russia put forward the highly contentious list of security demands it wanted the west to agree to in order to lower tensions in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, effectively seeking to create a sphere of interest in Europe for Russia. Since then, and especially since the outbreak of Russia’s attack to Ukraine in February 2022 security situation in Europe has deteriorated. What was planned as a short “special military operation” by Russia against an inferior enemy has turned into a large-scale conflict between states, in which prolonged fighting has been at a high intensity and over a wide geographical area. Consequently, there have been vocal calls in Europe for acceleration of defence industries and attention on stronger societal resilience as well as energy security, most notably formulated by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz as the European Zeitenwende, or watershed moment.
It remains to be seen whether Central European countries – Germany and France in particular – will live up to this talk. What can be said, however, is that with its attack, Russia has managed to unwittingly create a such a watershed moment in the Baltic Sea region. Since 2021/2022, we have witnessed a nearly complete loss of strategic trust to Russia’s intentions in Northern Europe – a development that the Russian leadership has initiated and accelerated with its unpredictable behavior. What has come to replace dialogue is an emerging sense of being front-line states. As a consequence, Finland and Sweden, two countries with long-held traditions of neutrality made a rare grand strategy level decision to apply for NATO membership, rendering, once accomplished, the Baltic Sea nearly totally a NATO lake.
Taking into consideration the ongoing NATO enlargement and Russia’s apparent mismatch between its imperial ambitions and its actual military, economic and diplomatic capabilities as demonstrated in the prolonged Ukraine war, how can we describe the emerging security setting in the Baltic Sea region? A few immediate findings can already be suggested:
First, the full integration of Finland and Sweden will profoundly change the balance of power in the Baltic Sea region, making Russia a militarily inferior player for the foreseeable future. Indeed, it’s been quite a while since NATO last time was joined by new members with significant military capabilities. Already partially integrated at the operational level, through their participation in various NATO and European Union operations, the armed forces of Finland and Sweden will make their contribution to the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area in general but in particular in Northern Europe.
Secondly, however, the idea of the Baltic Sea as a NATO lake does not stand up to critical scrutiny. The region is quite vulnerable to non-military interference for a number of reasons, such as its density of commercial shipping routes, pipelines and other undersea infrastructure, and awareness of environmental issues within the coastal states. Below the threshold of direct armed confrontation Russia has thus room for manoeuvre, within which it can put political pressure on the countries of the region. In Northern Europe, Russia's actions have already manifested themselves in many different ways. The country has used the area hybrid methods, including airspace violations, GPS jamming, cyber activities, oppressive diplomatic communications, energy policy and the manipulation of asylum seeker flows. This being the case, maybe the threats facing the Baltic Sea region tomorrow are more hybrid than military.
Third, NATO is not a silver bullet in terms of security. Many of the above hybrid issues can be tackled more efficiently through the means that are at the European Union’s disposal. While NATO holds the key military assets, it still lacks sufficient operational speed. Therefore, NATO may serve best as the platform for defence cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full commitment by all members. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, NORDEFCO and various bi and trilateral defence arrangements are promising developments in this regard.
In sum, the Russian leadership has with its actions created a block of determined front-line states in the Baltic Sea region, unified by willingness to invest on defence, to increase mutual security cooperation and to robustly support Ukraine in the ongoing war. The longevity of this block as a unified voice in Europe remains to be seen, but as a whole, it is difficult to foresee a return to the past.
This all started to change by December 2021, when Russia put forward the highly contentious list of security demands it wanted the west to agree to in order to lower tensions in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, effectively seeking to create a sphere of interest in Europe for Russia. Since then, and especially since the outbreak of Russia’s attack to Ukraine in February 2022 security situation in Europe has deteriorated. What was planned as a short “special military operation” by Russia against an inferior enemy has turned into a large-scale conflict between states, in which prolonged fighting has been at a high intensity and over a wide geographical area. Consequently, there have been vocal calls in Europe for acceleration of defence industries and attention on stronger societal resilience as well as energy security, most notably formulated by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz as the European Zeitenwende, or watershed moment.
It remains to be seen whether Central European countries – Germany and France in particular – will live up to this talk. What can be said, however, is that with its attack, Russia has managed to unwittingly create a such a watershed moment in the Baltic Sea region. Since 2021/2022, we have witnessed a nearly complete loss of strategic trust to Russia’s intentions in Northern Europe – a development that the Russian leadership has initiated and accelerated with its unpredictable behavior. What has come to replace dialogue is an emerging sense of being front-line states. As a consequence, Finland and Sweden, two countries with long-held traditions of neutrality made a rare grand strategy level decision to apply for NATO membership, rendering, once accomplished, the Baltic Sea nearly totally a NATO lake.
Taking into consideration the ongoing NATO enlargement and Russia’s apparent mismatch between its imperial ambitions and its actual military, economic and diplomatic capabilities as demonstrated in the prolonged Ukraine war, how can we describe the emerging security setting in the Baltic Sea region? A few immediate findings can already be suggested:
First, the full integration of Finland and Sweden will profoundly change the balance of power in the Baltic Sea region, making Russia a militarily inferior player for the foreseeable future. Indeed, it’s been quite a while since NATO last time was joined by new members with significant military capabilities. Already partially integrated at the operational level, through their participation in various NATO and European Union operations, the armed forces of Finland and Sweden will make their contribution to the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area in general but in particular in Northern Europe.
Secondly, however, the idea of the Baltic Sea as a NATO lake does not stand up to critical scrutiny. The region is quite vulnerable to non-military interference for a number of reasons, such as its density of commercial shipping routes, pipelines and other undersea infrastructure, and awareness of environmental issues within the coastal states. Below the threshold of direct armed confrontation Russia has thus room for manoeuvre, within which it can put political pressure on the countries of the region. In Northern Europe, Russia's actions have already manifested themselves in many different ways. The country has used the area hybrid methods, including airspace violations, GPS jamming, cyber activities, oppressive diplomatic communications, energy policy and the manipulation of asylum seeker flows. This being the case, maybe the threats facing the Baltic Sea region tomorrow are more hybrid than military.
Third, NATO is not a silver bullet in terms of security. Many of the above hybrid issues can be tackled more efficiently through the means that are at the European Union’s disposal. While NATO holds the key military assets, it still lacks sufficient operational speed. Therefore, NATO may serve best as the platform for defence cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full commitment by all members. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, NORDEFCO and various bi and trilateral defence arrangements are promising developments in this regard.
In sum, the Russian leadership has with its actions created a block of determined front-line states in the Baltic Sea region, unified by willingness to invest on defence, to increase mutual security cooperation and to robustly support Ukraine in the ongoing war. The longevity of this block as a unified voice in Europe remains to be seen, but as a whole, it is difficult to foresee a return to the past.