Research Associate
Arms Control Association
Washington D.C., USA
grosa@armscontrol.org
Russia’s unjustified war on Ukraine has unleashed much suffering, displaced millions, and wrecked any prospects of cooperative security for the foreseeable future. Moscow’s revisionist actions have hastened shifts in the broader European security order, and inevitably, the threat perceptions that held it together. Because of this, NATO as an alliance and its member states face the challenge of designing a strategy and posture that can improve stability and enhance deterrence while lowering the temperature of the overall standoff. As a result, the Allies should invest in improved lines of communication with adversaries.
Russia’s war on Ukraine showed that Russia is willing to launch a full-scale attack on its neighbor despite the risks and costs this endeavor may pose. Moscow’s decision prompted its neighbors to rethink their own defense gaps, and the limits of NATO’s security assistance when it comes to non-NATO members. Perhaps the best example is Finland’s accession to NATO and Sweden’s NATO bid after years of non-aligned status, which will undoubtedly change the balance of forces in the Euro-Atlantic region. In addition, NATO members have asserted their shifting threat perceptions. “The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. [Russia] has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable security order,” NATO’s new strategic concept states.
New force postures fixed on these new threat perceptions are also emerging. Guided by the new strategic concept, the new force plans of NATO members include deployment of a brigade-level military presence on NATO’s eastern flank and an increase in its high-readiness joint task force from 40,000 troops to 300,000 troops by 2023. NATO members have strengthened their Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic Sea by upgrading them to brigades, and established four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, essentially doubling the number of troops on the ground from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, Moscow claims that it is at war with the West. “The Western elite make no secret of their goal, which is, I quote, “Russia’s strategic defeat.” What does this mean to us? This means they plan to finish us once and for all,” said President Vladimir Putin on February 21. Russia also announced impressive plans to beef up its own force posture short after in response to Sweden and Finland’s prospective NATO accession.
Prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine, the anemic and less developed 6th Combined Arms Army was located opposite to the Baltic states tasked with protecting “ground approaches” to St. Petersburg and northern approaches to Moscow. Russia’s lofty plans include the establishment of an army corps in Karelia, new military districts in the Moscow, and Leningrad region carved out from the Western Military district among other announcements. However, the feasibility and how these changes will be implemented despite the decimation of Russia’s ground forces in Ukraine is to be seen.
If anything, the emerging security environment is likely to be shaped by force build-ups, and more coercive threats. Especially as Russia’s conventional forces further degrade in Ukraine, seeing as President Putin has resorted to using the specter of nuclear annihilation to prevent the West from interfering in its war on Ukraine. Moscow also seems intent on camouflaging its military and political weaknesses with secrecy.
Understandably, some will assert that Russia is not a good faith actor, and that Moscow can only be held back through conventional force deterrence and strength. Nonetheless, improved communication via quiet diplomacy with military backing can result in more credible threats and clarify the rules of the game. To ease risks, policy maker must invest in improved channels of communication as they continue to support Ukraine. As the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region stabilizes, restarting low-level military to military contacts with the aim of managing an adversarial relationship could be helpful. If governments refuse to talk to each other, track 2 discussions will strengthen communication about threat perceptions.
After guns fall silent in Ukraine, Europe will likely need to establish or re-establish shared principles to guide relations between states in the Euro-Atlantic region. From this, new risk reduction mechanisms will arise. New short-term and long-term risk reduction measures could bolster deterrence through diplomacy, including negotiated limits on military deployments and activities. New agreements could include viable provisions of old agreements. But until then, arms control is back to basics.
Russia’s war on Ukraine showed that Russia is willing to launch a full-scale attack on its neighbor despite the risks and costs this endeavor may pose. Moscow’s decision prompted its neighbors to rethink their own defense gaps, and the limits of NATO’s security assistance when it comes to non-NATO members. Perhaps the best example is Finland’s accession to NATO and Sweden’s NATO bid after years of non-aligned status, which will undoubtedly change the balance of forces in the Euro-Atlantic region. In addition, NATO members have asserted their shifting threat perceptions. “The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. [Russia] has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable security order,” NATO’s new strategic concept states.
New force postures fixed on these new threat perceptions are also emerging. Guided by the new strategic concept, the new force plans of NATO members include deployment of a brigade-level military presence on NATO’s eastern flank and an increase in its high-readiness joint task force from 40,000 troops to 300,000 troops by 2023. NATO members have strengthened their Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic Sea by upgrading them to brigades, and established four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, essentially doubling the number of troops on the ground from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, Moscow claims that it is at war with the West. “The Western elite make no secret of their goal, which is, I quote, “Russia’s strategic defeat.” What does this mean to us? This means they plan to finish us once and for all,” said President Vladimir Putin on February 21. Russia also announced impressive plans to beef up its own force posture short after in response to Sweden and Finland’s prospective NATO accession.
Prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine, the anemic and less developed 6th Combined Arms Army was located opposite to the Baltic states tasked with protecting “ground approaches” to St. Petersburg and northern approaches to Moscow. Russia’s lofty plans include the establishment of an army corps in Karelia, new military districts in the Moscow, and Leningrad region carved out from the Western Military district among other announcements. However, the feasibility and how these changes will be implemented despite the decimation of Russia’s ground forces in Ukraine is to be seen.
If anything, the emerging security environment is likely to be shaped by force build-ups, and more coercive threats. Especially as Russia’s conventional forces further degrade in Ukraine, seeing as President Putin has resorted to using the specter of nuclear annihilation to prevent the West from interfering in its war on Ukraine. Moscow also seems intent on camouflaging its military and political weaknesses with secrecy.
Understandably, some will assert that Russia is not a good faith actor, and that Moscow can only be held back through conventional force deterrence and strength. Nonetheless, improved communication via quiet diplomacy with military backing can result in more credible threats and clarify the rules of the game. To ease risks, policy maker must invest in improved channels of communication as they continue to support Ukraine. As the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region stabilizes, restarting low-level military to military contacts with the aim of managing an adversarial relationship could be helpful. If governments refuse to talk to each other, track 2 discussions will strengthen communication about threat perceptions.
After guns fall silent in Ukraine, Europe will likely need to establish or re-establish shared principles to guide relations between states in the Euro-Atlantic region. From this, new risk reduction mechanisms will arise. New short-term and long-term risk reduction measures could bolster deterrence through diplomacy, including negotiated limits on military deployments and activities. New agreements could include viable provisions of old agreements. But until then, arms control is back to basics.