Associate Professor of Asian International Relations
Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University
Lithuania
Like their fellow smaller Baltic Rim countries, the trio of Baltic States have been compelled to acknowledge China as a notable factor in their security at least since mid-2017, when for the first time three Chinese naval vessels entered the Baltic Sea to conduct drills with their Russian counterparts. Less than two years later, the trio’s intelligence agencies explicitly recognised China as a threat to their national security, and that position has remained basically unchanged ever since.
In August 2019, an unprecedented diplomatic incident occurred in the heart of Vilnius, precipitating Lithuania’s shift in its China policy, a transformation which has become particularly acute since the election of the country’s new government in late 2020. Most importantly, the proclaimed ‘values-based foreign policy’ gave rise to a series of initiatives that collectively composed a review of the bilateral relationship with China, as a result of which Lithuania became the first country to officially withdraw from the then 17+1 platform of cooperation between China and ‘Central and Eastern European countries’ and opened the Taiwanese Representative Office under that particular title in 2021.
It was the latter decision that induced Beijing to retaliate in a multi-pronged and largely unprecedented manner, including unilaterally downgrading the bilateral relationship to the level of chargé d’affaires, the tacit application of sanctions against Lithuanian components in the global supply chains, and the cynical borrowing of Russian propaganda narratives to target the country informationally. In late 2021, therefore, Lithuania found itself at the receiving end of some of the most assertive and unique non-military pressure measures China had ever used against anyone, especially in the Nordic-Baltic region.
In an eponymous academic article published precisely during that complex time, I argued that China had actually emerged as a factor in the security of the Baltic States before this was officially acknowledged by them in 2017, particularly if security were to be understood in broader terms and assessed from the perspective of less direct global/systemic and European/sub-systemic impact. As the Baltic States all have open and fairly digitalised economies and are also small states with a particular stake in the preservation of international rules, obligations and peace in general, the trio had by then become exposed to China’s stepped-up and often destabilising activities in the global commons, and its more regularised and diversified security presence on the periphery of, and in, Europe itself. Notably, these Chinese advances were often facilitated by none other than Russia.
A decisive test of this perception occurred on February 24, 2022. Merely three weeks before the start of the largest military hostilities in Europe since the Second World War, China in effect subscribed to Russia’s consciously provocative interpretation of security on the continent with all of its negative potential repercussions on the Nordic-Baltic region in general and the Baltic States in particular. Despite the terrible performance of the Russian military on the battlefield in both key senses of efficiency and the laws of war, Beijing remained a rather committed friend of Moscow.
Indeed, while driven by decidedly self-interested motives, China has become the single most important foreign country allowing Russia to partially evade the effects of international sanctions. It has also shamelessly spread some of the most absurd Russian propaganda related to the war. Although strong evidence of its supplying Russia directly with arms has yet to emerge at the time of writing, China retains a plethora of means to do so in a covert, circuitous and plausibly deniable manner, particularly if the much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive would result in the collapse of the Russian defensive lines.
Despite apparently neutral voting patterns at the UN, China’s global diplomacy during the full-scale war has effectively amounted to support for Russia, as showcased by its Global Security Initiative presented in April 2022 and particularly by the so-called 12-point Peace Plan announced on the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion. While both initiatives are thinly veiled attempts to raise China’s own global profile and salvage Russia from a military and political defeat, the latter is anything but a real peace plan and actually conforms to China’s ideal position on the conflict in question.
For the Baltic States, all of this meant a definite reappraisal of China. Not only did the Lithuanian government suddenly feel vindicated in its policies towards both Eurasian authoritarian giants, but Estonia and Latvia decided to follow their neighbour by officially opting out of the Chinese ‘whatever+1’ platform. China’s objective transition from a mere security factor to a threat is the root cause of this shift.
In August 2019, an unprecedented diplomatic incident occurred in the heart of Vilnius, precipitating Lithuania’s shift in its China policy, a transformation which has become particularly acute since the election of the country’s new government in late 2020. Most importantly, the proclaimed ‘values-based foreign policy’ gave rise to a series of initiatives that collectively composed a review of the bilateral relationship with China, as a result of which Lithuania became the first country to officially withdraw from the then 17+1 platform of cooperation between China and ‘Central and Eastern European countries’ and opened the Taiwanese Representative Office under that particular title in 2021.
It was the latter decision that induced Beijing to retaliate in a multi-pronged and largely unprecedented manner, including unilaterally downgrading the bilateral relationship to the level of chargé d’affaires, the tacit application of sanctions against Lithuanian components in the global supply chains, and the cynical borrowing of Russian propaganda narratives to target the country informationally. In late 2021, therefore, Lithuania found itself at the receiving end of some of the most assertive and unique non-military pressure measures China had ever used against anyone, especially in the Nordic-Baltic region.
In an eponymous academic article published precisely during that complex time, I argued that China had actually emerged as a factor in the security of the Baltic States before this was officially acknowledged by them in 2017, particularly if security were to be understood in broader terms and assessed from the perspective of less direct global/systemic and European/sub-systemic impact. As the Baltic States all have open and fairly digitalised economies and are also small states with a particular stake in the preservation of international rules, obligations and peace in general, the trio had by then become exposed to China’s stepped-up and often destabilising activities in the global commons, and its more regularised and diversified security presence on the periphery of, and in, Europe itself. Notably, these Chinese advances were often facilitated by none other than Russia.
A decisive test of this perception occurred on February 24, 2022. Merely three weeks before the start of the largest military hostilities in Europe since the Second World War, China in effect subscribed to Russia’s consciously provocative interpretation of security on the continent with all of its negative potential repercussions on the Nordic-Baltic region in general and the Baltic States in particular. Despite the terrible performance of the Russian military on the battlefield in both key senses of efficiency and the laws of war, Beijing remained a rather committed friend of Moscow.
Indeed, while driven by decidedly self-interested motives, China has become the single most important foreign country allowing Russia to partially evade the effects of international sanctions. It has also shamelessly spread some of the most absurd Russian propaganda related to the war. Although strong evidence of its supplying Russia directly with arms has yet to emerge at the time of writing, China retains a plethora of means to do so in a covert, circuitous and plausibly deniable manner, particularly if the much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive would result in the collapse of the Russian defensive lines.
Despite apparently neutral voting patterns at the UN, China’s global diplomacy during the full-scale war has effectively amounted to support for Russia, as showcased by its Global Security Initiative presented in April 2022 and particularly by the so-called 12-point Peace Plan announced on the first anniversary of the full-scale invasion. While both initiatives are thinly veiled attempts to raise China’s own global profile and salvage Russia from a military and political defeat, the latter is anything but a real peace plan and actually conforms to China’s ideal position on the conflict in question.
For the Baltic States, all of this meant a definite reappraisal of China. Not only did the Lithuanian government suddenly feel vindicated in its policies towards both Eurasian authoritarian giants, but Estonia and Latvia decided to follow their neighbour by officially opting out of the Chinese ‘whatever+1’ platform. China’s objective transition from a mere security factor to a threat is the root cause of this shift.