Tobias Fella: Germany and nuclear deterrence under Trump II

Russia's war against Ukraine has marked the return of history, while Donald Trump's election victory has the potential to further impact debates on nuclear deterrence. If Germany is to confront the challenges that come with it, it must become a more measured power.

Caught in the middle

Berlin grapples with mounting concerns about U.S. security commitments, as it enters a third nuclear age, characterized by great power conflict and the increasing impact of conventional capabilities on the nuclear situation. These concerns resonate across Western Europe and are intermingled with rising proliferation risks and pressures to expand extended deterrence guarantees within alliances, especially in Asia. In contrast, nations on NATO’s eastern flank, like Poland, perceive stronger ties to the U.S. under Trump and remain more confident in NATO's nuclear umbrella. This creates push and pull factors for Germany that is used to relying on extended U.S. nuclear deterrence, while also working towards disarmament and a more united and autonomous Europe.

Germany and the bomb: From Adenauer to Scholz

German doubts about the reliability of U.S. defense commitments are not new. In the 1950s, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss considered developing nuclear weapons due to concerns about a diminishing U.S. military presence in Europe and the rising Soviet threat. They contemplated a "Bonn bomb" and potential collaboration with France, but these plans never materialized. Instead, Germany became part of NATO's nuclear sharing agreement. Strauss later criticized this arrangement, likening it to being a “little puppet allowed to run alongside the military band with his toy trumpet”.

Although there have been similar calls and opinions from time to time mostly from the fringes of the political debate, Germany's position remains rooted in international agreements. In the Two Plus Four Treaty Germany renounced the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons, and as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it joined in 1975 as a non-nuclear weapon state, these commitments are cornerstones of Germany's foreign policy identity.

However, this time structural forces could lead to a change. Trump's election victory and upcoming return to the Oval Office, combined with the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, has created a new security situation that may compel Germany to reassess its position. Even before the election, key political figures across the spectrum began discussing nuclear deterrence alternatives. These include Friedrich Merz and Wolfgang Schäuble from the CDU/CSU; Sigmar Gabriel from the SPD; Joschka Fischer from the Green Party; and Christian Lindner from the FDP. Despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaffirming Germany's long-standing position against seeking its own nuclear weapons, the debate has the potential to resurface again in the coming months.

Not so fast: Navigating nuclear limits

While a German or EU nuclear capability is seen as unrealistic or counterproductive, attention has shifted to existing European nuclear powers. France maintains about 290 warheads and the United Kingdom (UK) has around 225, both modernizing their primarily submarine-based arsenals, with France also employing air-launched cruise missiles for its “final warning” capability.

French President Macron proposed a strategic dialogue in 2020, suggesting France’s nuclear deterrence could play a role in European collective security. These proposals have limitations as Paris insists on retaining full control over its arsenal. The French arsenal also lacks certain capabilities present in the U.S. arsenal necessary for extended deterrence or symbolic sharing arrangements, such as gravity bombs. The UK faces similar challenges, with nuclear forces dependent on U.S. technology.

Significant obstacles remain for all discussed options. Legal constraints pose a major challenge, as European non-nuclear states are NPT signatories, prohibiting them from acquiring nuclear weapons. Overcoming technical and economic hurdles requires substantial investments amid political polarization and budgetary constraints. Public opinion is another barrier, though attitudes may be shifting; a mid-2022 poll found that 52% of Germans supported U.S. nuclear weapons in their country, marking the first time in decades that a majority has taken this position.

Conventional deterrence first, second, and third

Against this background, Berlin should prioritize strengthening conventional deterrence. At the same time, Germany - together with the UK, France, and possibly Poland - should carefully initiate a discussion platform on nuclear deterrence. This platform should explore ways to enhance deterrence without unnecessarily creating additional risk.

Germany is entering an era of conventional and nuclear instability marked by the erosion of arms control frameworks and the dawn of a new missile age in Europe— exemplified by the planned deployment of US medium-range missiles on German soil starting in 2026. In response, Germany must integrate deterrence and arms control strategies more effectively than in the past. It can no longer afford to oscillate between extremes -either an almost exclusive focus on deterrence or a simplified approach to disarmament. The situation is too serious for that; balance is needed.