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Kimmo Elo: German foreign policy between a rock and a hard place

Dr. Kimmo Elo
Adjunct Professor, Senior Lecturer
Department of Geographical and Historical Studies, University of Eastern Finland
Finland

kimmo.elo@uef.fi

Since unification, Germany’s foreign and security policy has been traditionally characterized by two key elements. The first is Germany’s Western integration, grounded in transatlantic relations, particularly German-U.S. ties, and a steadfast commitment to European integration. This foundation rests on shared values such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy. The second is Ostpolitik, or Eastern policy, initiated during Willy Brandt's chancellorship in the early 1970s. Conceptualized in the famous slogan Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement), this policy recognized the Soviet Union as a central actor in European security and saw rapprochement with it as a crucial step toward democratic change within the Soviet sphere.

After the Cold War, Germany—along with a majority of EU member states—sought to leverage trade and economic relations to promote political reforms in Russia, a strategy now known as Wandel durch Handel (change through trade). Despite a sharp downturn in German-Russian relations beginning in the mid-2000s and continuing through Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Germany and its European partners continued to see economic engagement as a means of pushing for political reform. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked an abrupt end to this strategy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz aptly described the shift as a Zeitenwende (turning point) in his address to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022.

As a geoeconomic power, Germany has sought to maintain stable political relations with countries critical to its economic well-being. Yet Russia’s war on Ukraine has not only removed it from the role of Germany’s energy supplier but has also placed Germany in a challenging position between the U.S. and China. As U.S.-China political and economic tensions have intensified in recent years and are likely to continue escalating, Germany’s diplomatic balance has become increasingly delicate. Donald Trump’s second presidency will likely put more pressure on Germany’s overarching strategy. Meanwhile, strategic cooperation between Russia and China complicates Germany’s efforts to position itself on the global stage.

Chancellor Scholz has emphasized economic considerations over political ones, resulting in an ongoing intra-governmental conflict with Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, who has openly criticized Scholz’s China policy and advocated for stronger commitments to democratic values and the rule of law—even in relations with authoritarian regimes like China. However, the global triangle between Germany, China and the U.S. has gained in importance for Germany, yet is more challenging to master. Three forward-looking factors are especially noteworthy. First, in light of Russia’s aggression, Europe’s—and Germany’s—security and defense policies are likely to remain dependent on NATO and U.S. support, thus reinforcing transatlantic ties. Second, China will continue to be central to Germany’s economic prosperity. And third, U.S.-China relations will likely remain strained, if not openly hostile, for the foreseeable future.

In this context, Germany’s most viable option is to maintain constructive relations with both Washington and Beijing. This approach could enable Germany to navigate a delicate balance within the Washington-Berlin-Paris-Beijing axis, which is increasingly essential for European security. To date, the U.S. has not actively opposed Germany’s cooperative stance toward China, suggesting a degree of tacit support. However, if the U.S. were to change its position and push for stronger alignment from Germany and the EU with its own China policy, Germany’s strategic flexibility could be severely restricted. In response, China might strengthen its ties with Russia. Given that Germany’s China policy has already drawn criticism from some EU member states, a Chinese pivot toward Russia could not only diminish Germany’s influence within the EU but also risk allowing China to drive a political and economic wedge between EU countries, undermining the EU’s global role.

Undoubtedly, the future of both the EU and Germany on the world stage cannot rely on dreams of the grandeur of the past alone. Instead, the Zeitenwende articulated by Chancellor Scholz should serve as a foundation for a robust renewal of European integration. This renewal should combine Germany’s economic strength with France’s political vision to bolster the Western alliance, presenting it as a compelling partner for the Global South. At the same time, it would equip the EU to address rising transatlantic and Pacific tensions, especially in the context of the second Trump presidency.  Such a reform would also prepare the EU to hold its ground in an increasingly turbulent world, rather than being caught between a rock and a hard place.