Dr. Stefan Meister
Head
Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central
Asia, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Germany
meister@dgap.org
While German Russia policy has focused on rapprochement and reconciliation for decades (“change trough interweavement”), the large-scale war against Ukraine since 2022 has led to a shock moment in German foreign policy. Just a few days after the invasion, Olaf Scholz announced a turning point (“Zeitenwende”) in security policy in a government statement. Despite all the hesitation in supporting Ukraine and making security policy adjustments, the German government quickly cut itself off from Russian gas, built LNG terminals and accepted high economic costs in supporting massive European economic sanctions against Russia. As a result, the central foundation of German-Russian relations, which was based on close economic and energy policy interdependence, collapsed. Social and political exchange was also reduced to a minimum. Europe thus witnessed a structural decoupling in the relationship between the two states.
In the view of the German government, Russia has become the greatest security threat to Europe. Even before the comprehensive attack on Ukraine, Moscow was already waging a hybrid war against the West - including disinformation campaigns, hacker and sabotage attacks as well as massive intelligence activities in Germany and other European countries. Nevertheless, it seems to have taken a large-scale war of aggression for relevant sections of the elites and society in Germany to recognize the danger posed by Putin's regime.
Although the massive military and financial support for Ukraine since the “Zeitenwende” declaration and the 100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr show a fundamental change in German foreign and security policy - away from “Russia first” and towards a focus on Ukraine - there still seem to be no real mental and strategic turnaround. The rise of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany and in particular the national-socialist party Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance with demands for an end to sanctions against Russia and the war at practically all costs shows that there is still fear among the German population of being dragged into war and no serious willingness to bear the necessary costs for European security. Even though these parties offer no solutions for ending the war, apart from the absurd and irresponsible demand to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine, they received enormous support in the regional elections in three eastern German states in September.
This is also a consequence of the unclear position of the Federal Chancellor and the different signals sent out by the traffic light coalition regarding support for Ukraine. On the one hand, Olaf Scholz has explicitly supported arms deliveries to Ukraine, while on the other hand he is not prepared to deliver Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine or support Ukrainian military strikes on military infrastructure on Russian territory. He is staging himself as a peace chancellor to respond the rapid decline in his popularity, which has more to do with his lack of leadership than with his Ukraine policy. The German government continues to act too reactively, concentrating on crisis management and, like the US leadership under President Biden, trying to avoid a major escalation with Russia. This shows that many in Germany still do not understand the logic of Russian policy. From Putin's point of view, compromise equates to weakness; appeasement and hesitation encourage him to further aggression. The Russian elites thinks in win-lose categories; the two Minsk agreements and Germany's growing dependence on Russian gas after 2014 have defakto invited Putin to launch a full-scale attack on Ukraine. Russia is militarily and economically much weaker than NATO and the EU but is smartly exploiting the weaknesses and indecision of its opponents to take advantage of this. German society and the elite are particularly vulnerable to this manipulations.
The demand for peace negotiations by parts of the German population and political elite contradicts the current reality on the battlefield. Last but not least, the desire for ending the war and for peace, regardless of the conditions, has opened up a vacuum that populist parties are trying to fill. The re-election of Donald Trump will strengthen Putin's belief that he can negotiate a deal with Washington at the expense of Ukraine and that US support for Ukraine could decrease massively. Olaf Scholz's decision to sack his finance minister and call for a vote of confidence shows that he has understood that the election of Donald Trump means that Germany and Europe must become capable of taking actions. This governing coalition is not able to implement the necessary economic and security policy reforms Germany needs. With new elections in March and the Christian Democrats coming to power, it is to be hoped that Germany will regain its capacity for reform and leadership. Until then, however, Vladimir Putin will use the moment in Washington and Berlin to conquer as much territory as possible in Ukraine.