Hans-Georg
Ehrhart
Senior
Fellow
Institute
for Peace and Security Research of the University of Hamburg
Germany
Since war has a tendency to escalate into extremes, it must be politically contained with the aim of ending it as soon as possible and preventing it in the future. This is particularly relevant when, as in the case of the war in Ukraine, nuclear powers are directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, it makes sense to hypothesize the war’s possible outcomes and risks. I assume three possible scenarios[i]: 1. Russia wins the war. 2. Ukraine wins the war. 3. Nobody wins and the conflict then remains in an unstable stalemate. The first scenario is unlikely but entails a high risk for Germany and Europe. The second scenario is less unlikely but is also associated with a high risk due to the assumed use of tactical nuclear weapons. The third scenario is more likely and is associated with a comparatively lower risk. Taking each of these scenarios into account, we can reach the following conclusions:
First, Germany has various security policy options depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine: 1. The completion of a fully integrated EU defense, economic and financial union. 2. The assumption of a quasi-hegemonic leadership role as the primary American mainland sword in Europe. 3. The formation of a European Caucus within NATO and close security policy cooperation between NATO and the EU. It wouldn't actually take the war in Ukraine to implement these options in one form or another. However, so far, the political will and the corresponding framework conditions have been lacking. The war in Ukraine could produce both.
Second, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a decisive impact on German and European security The possibility of a Russian victory would entail high security risks for Germany and Europe and would have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine and the stability of the continent. It should, therefore, be prevented. A Ukrainian victory may be desirable, but it is associated with a very high risk of nuclear escalation, which could lead to the destruction of Ukraine, or even Europe. A stalemate would probably result in a new "Cold War", which at best could be transformed into a "Cold Peace" in the form of non-violent competition between systems. At worst, it would mean permanent tensions and the threat of war in the sense of a permanent struggle for the right order.
Third, there are three common truths: One is that Russia remains a very relevant Eastern European neighbor for Germany and the EU in terms of geography and potential. The other common truth is that the USA will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future. Germany and Europe thus have an interest in appropriate US involvement in and for Europe. The third common truth is that China plays a significant role in this conflict. In the event of a Russian victory China could feel encouraged to use force to achieve its goals concerning Taiwan. A Russian defeat would compromise Chinese ambitions and allow the US to focus on Beijing. That is why China has no interest in a defeated Russia. A stalemate in the Ukraine war would tie the US more closely to Europe and enable Beijing to play the role of mediator, whose influence in Europe and Russia would increase.
Fourth, regardless of the scenario, Berlin will have to spend more on its own and EU defense. The more the US involvement in Europe decreases, the greater the German and European defense burden will be. Moreover, Germany's share of the support costs for Ukraine is likely to increase. At the same time, Berlin must advance the European integration project and ensure the economic and political stabilization of Eastern Europe. This is expected to lead to increased national budget conflicts in Germany. In order to minimize such conflicts, possibilities for peaceful coexistence with a Russia that remains imperialist must be explored.
Since a victorious peace is unlikely for any of the protagonists and the costs are constantly rising not only for the direct opponents of the war but also for their supporters and the not-inconsiderable number of states that are staying out, Berlin should strive for a settlement along the lines of the third scenario. This combines a territorial compromise acceptable to both opponents with the maintenance of Ukraine's legal position and postpones a final settlement to the future.
Germany should be aware that the bon mot attributed to the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Hastings Ismay, still applies in a modified form: NATO is there to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans involved (instead of "down", as in the original quote). It continues to be in Germany's interest to work towards restoring the Harmel formula of 1967, according to which sufficient defense capability and détente can enable security between system opponents. After all, Russia will not disappear from the scene and will one day be interested in co-operation again. Finally, Berlin should be careful not to grow into a hegemonic role. This means investing in European integration more than ever.
[i] For a more detailed analysis of the scenarios see: Hans-Georg Ehrhart. Germany and Europe after the Ukraine war in 2025: Three scenarios, in: Putin’s war in Ukraine. Edit. By Vladimir Sazonov and Andres Saumets. Estonian Journal of Military Studies, 23/2023, pp. 199-211.