Michael Paul: The Arctic – a challenge for Berlin

Alongside other strategic documents, the German government published new guidelines for German Arctic policy in September 2024, following a lengthy interministerial coordination process.[ii] However, while the document sets out many appropriate goals, it remains a paper exercise, offering few specifics on how these objectives will be achieved beyond general statements of interest and support. On the contrary, all statements regarding planned measures are subject to funding reservations. This high level of ambition does not provide any predictability for partners and allies.

As a continental middle power, Germany has a particular interest in reliable international security, collective crisis management and conflict prevention. This also applies to the Arctic region. Since 1998, Germany has been an observer state in the Arctic Council and, alongside other European observer states such as France and the United Kingdom, can also play a role as an Arctic security stakeholder. Peace and security are increasingly challenged by the strategic rivalry between the major powers, the US and China, and are further jeopardised by Russia's neo-imperialist war policy. This assumption is also reflected in the new German Arctic policy guidelines, which state at the beginning “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed the geopolitical environment for Germany’s Arctic policy”. The German government therefore intends to “play an active role in security policy in order to support its NATO allies and EU partners in the region”.

As the world's third largest economic power and one of the largest consumers of raw materials, Germany conducts most of its foreign trade by sea. Due to this maritime dependency, the German Navy has a special responsibility for the protection of coastal waters and adjacent sea areas, as well as sea lines of communication. For now, the Arctic sea routes – Northern Sea Route (NSR), Transpolar Route and Northwest Passage – remain ice-covered for much of the year, making them difficult for commercial vessels to navigate and unsuitable for continuous maritime traffic. However, this could change and Arctic sea routes would then offer a faster and more cost-effective connection between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and thus between Asia and Europe as well as North America.

In its Arctic Strategy released in July 2024, the Pentagon projected an ice-free Arctic summer as early as 2030. Nevertheless, this does not mean that smooth, reliable freight traffic will be possible in the Arctic Ocean by the 2030s. Chinese container ships navigating the Russian-controlled NSR are better understood as a propaganda-driven endorsement for Russia's war policies than as evidence of the route’s near-term commercial viability (especially since China remains cautious about investing in the maritime infrastructure of Russia’s Arctic zone, which would be essential for regular shipping). On the other hand, future port projects in Iceland, Greenland and Norway are showing increasingly promising prospects. The Arctic's resources are also gaining in importance. 25 of the 34 raw materials classified by the European Commission as strategically important are found in Greenland. In November 2023, the European Union and Greenland therefore established a strategic raw materials partnership to support the development of projects and to build the needed infrastructure through the Global Gateway Initiative.

The guidelines state that “the importance of the Arctic to Germany has continued to grow during the last few years” and one can add that the importance will continue to grow. This assessment is driven not only by geoeconomics but also by geopolitics, particularly due to the growing involvement of the People's Republic of China in the Arctic. The cooperation agreed upon in April 2023 in Murmansk between the Chinese Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard in the NSR is a signal; in October 2024, the first joint patrol took place. This first operation in the Arctic Ocean "effectively expanded the scope of the Coast Guard's navigation at sea, thoroughly tested the vessels' ability to carry out missions in unfamiliar waters, and provided strong support for active participation in international and regional ocean governance," the Chinese Coast Guard explained in a post on the media platform Weibo.[iii] As Chinese ships increasingly use the NSR, it seems to be evolving into an international waterway. Does that mean it is open to others as well? In any case, China is planning to further increase its Arctic ambitions. This became evident when three icebreakers (Xuelong 2, Ji Di and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di) were simultaneously present in the Arctic in July 2024. The construction of another heavy icebreaker should enable China to have a permanent presence throughout the Arctic.

Should the German government now build its own icebreakers? At the very least, German polar research will need a new research icebreaker in the next few years to replace the Polarstern. Without it, the MOSAiC research project (Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate) would not have been possible in 2019-20. However, additional support of Russian icebreakers was still required at the time, which can no longer be relied upon. Arctic research and Europe's security have suffered lasting damage as a result of Russia's war of aggression. The priority now is to rebuild national military capabilities for homeland and alliance defense and to increase conventional deterrence. Following the temporary deployment of US long-range missiles (SM-6 missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons), new long-range missiles developed in Europe must be stationed. The Arctic poses a challenge to Berlin because, in the future, security will also need to be more strongly ensured along NATO's northern flank (and you can´t secure the northern flank without the eastern flank in the wider Baltic Sea region). This includes deterrence through presence, such as military exercises, as well as investments in ships like F126 frigates, which are capable of operating in waters with light ice formation, and closer cooperation with allied Arctic states like Denmark, Finland and Norway. Expanding the cooperation with Norway in submarine construction (U212CD) to other countries, such as Canada, is also conceivable.

[i] His main research interests are within the fields of Arctic security, geopolitics, governance and maritime security. He has published extensively about the Arctic; most recently Der Kampf um den Nordpol. Die Arktis, der Klima­wandel und die Rivalität der Großmächte, Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 2024; Greenland's Paths to Independence. Kalaallit Nunaat, the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States of America, Palgrave Macmillan (Palgrave Research in Peace Studies), forthcoming.
[ii] The Federal Government, Germany´s Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of the climate crisis and the Zeitenwende, Berlin, September 2024, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/2676060/81478190b657d4f85a73e0feaf6ce00c/arktis-leitlinien-data.pdf
[iii] China´s Coast Guard quoted from Astri Edvardsen, “China Coast Guard on First Patrol in the Arctic with Russia”, in: High North News, 4.10.2024, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-coast-guard-first-patrol-arctic-russia

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