Tomasz Szubrycht: New aspects of security threat in the Baltic Sea

The Baltic Sea is unique because of its geographical, hydrometeorological, economic, military and political factors. It is an inland, shallow, brackish sea and has some of the busiest shipping routes in the world. There are many underwater and surface maritime critical infrastructure in the Baltic. Since July 2005 the whole Baltic Sea has been covered by AIS which allows real-time monitoring of ships’ traffic. The Baltic is approved by IMO as Particularly Sensitive Sea Area. Finally, among Baltic countries only Russia is not the UE and NATO member. It has been the area of confrontation between Russia and other countries for many years.

Hybrid activities are very attractive for Russia because they have very favorable cost-effect ratio. What is more, it is very difficult to attribute a specific entity to responsibility and it is difficult to prove that such action was intentional. According the international law it is not also easy to punish gray zone aggressors.

Hybrid activities can include: unlawful actions against maritime critical infrastructure, cyberattacks on terminals, sabotages in ports, causing an intentional leak of petrol from 
a wreck, intentional pollution of the sea, long-term recognition of sea area as unsafe for navigation due to military exercises, intentional turning off the AIS by ships or aircrafts, dangerous maneuvers of Russian ships and aircrafts and GPS jamming.  

The threats to the security of shipping in the Baltic have been observed for several years. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia has been suspected of numerous actions, classified as hybrid activities, against economic and political interests of countries considered hostile by Russia. These activities are multidimensional and are not limited only to the Baltic Sea. Currently it can be observed that such activities are more and more frequent and are becoming more and more dangerous.

In 2024 several fires took place in many countries in Europe, which turned out to be intentional arsons. The evidence indicates with high probability that they had been caused by GRU officers or saboteurs inspired by the Russian secret services. There were also several strange accidents with underwater fiber and electrical cables. There were at least 10 European underwater cables damaged in the years 2021-2024. The depths at which some of these incidents occurred indicate that damages were intentional and had required specialized equipment for deep-water operations. 

Incidents with critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea show the need to take an immediate and robust action to secure this infrastructure. 

The analysis show that the actions against maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea will decrease in the coming months. However, the following actions are likely to be intensified: Russian shadow tankers fleet (called also dark fleet) will increase its activities, intentional fuel leakage from wrecks will occur, provocative actions of Russian ships and planes along with declaring area in international waters as dangerous for navigation due to military exercises will become frequent. These actions will create security threats and will force the EU countries to take protective measures. They will not be only military threats, but also non-military threats, generating the involvement of separate forces, which consequently will have a financial effect on EU countries.

The Baltic Sea is the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area and needs special protection because of its significance for recognized ecological and others attributes, which may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities. Pollution of the marine environment in the Baltic Sea as a result of intentional actions or accidents are one of the most serious threats. The ships from shadow Russian tankers fleet are very often in poor technical condition. Such ships are serious threats to the environment. To minimize these threats is not easy because of the UNCLOS Convention.

However, the entry or exit from the area is controlled by the EU countries, such ships must enter the territorial waters of Sweden, Denmark and Germany and that allows us to act. There are same rules of the UNCLOS which allow to take actions against the Russian shadow tanker fleet example: art. 39 (2b), art. 42 (1a, 1b), art. 43 (b), art. 194 (1, 2) art. 220 (3, 5, 6) and art. 226 (1a, 1ai, 1bi, 1c).

Russia has been testing the ability to stretch the relations with other countries for many years. The EU countries must define the red line for Russia in the Baltic and clearly indicate the principles of the Baltic deterrence strategy. We must also work out the answer to the question what the EU will allow Russia to do and what will not be allowed and accepted in the Baltic.