Olivier Faury
Ph.D., Associate Professor in Supply Chain Management and Logistics
EM Normandie, Métis Lab
France
If global warming reduces the ice surface and thickness, this allows vessels to sail in previously deemed perilous areas. It also impacts the transit capacity of the Panama Canal. In recent years, one has observed the number of vessels transiting through the canal decreasing while the the transit time has considerably lengthened. Regarding the Suez Canal, the Houthi attacks have forced some maritime companies to sail via the Cape of Good Hope. Additionally, the March 2021 Ever Given case is still fresh in corporate minds notably as regards its economic impacts. Thus the question of safer and more reliable maritime routes is raised.
In this context, the Arctic Ocean increasingly appears as an alternative for some companies. As evidence, a joint venture between DP World and Rosatom for the management of containers along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was signed in 2023. Nevertheless, sailing conditions and maritime activity slightly differ from one area to another. Respecting the announced schedules and related transit times is the main challenge of these new maritime lanes, which entails anticipating and mitigating risks.
High risk maritime routes
Currently, two passages are used: the North-West Passage (NWP) along the Canadian and American shores, and the North-East Passage (NEP) mainly represented by the waters of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The maritime activity in the NEP is made up of oil and gas exportations, fishing, cruiseliners and ferries (in the Norwegian part), vital supplies of northern communities and the necessary deliveries to upgrade existing ports and terminals. The transit activity within this area is rising in volume, but remains limited compared to the amount of cargo exported.
The environment, the seafarers and the vessels are all at risk when sailing in this area, and it requires an appropriate risk management policy. Until now, maritime codes and conventions have been implemented in response to casualties, but the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters i.e. the “Polar Code” (PC) entered into force in 2017 appears as a prophylactic instrument. Amending the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, the PC provides tools to secure polar navigation. However, even if it recalls existing risks a vessel may face within Arctic, the PC only deals with those ships having more than 500 gross tonnage (GT), which is not at all representative of all the navigation throughout the area where small vessels operate.
A 20-year database covering 2000-2020 was to map the main causes of numerous accidents depending on the level of gravity, vessel type, area, and season. The analysis of that database has led to the following risk mapping in the Arctic.
Serious accidents caused by machinery, sandbanks and ice
First, whatever the type of vessel may be, Marine Incident (lowest level of gravity) represent 5.8% of the events assessed, the rest being Serious (82.1%) or Very Serious Casualties (12.2%), meaning that in most cases, the integrity of the vessel is called into question. Such a result clearly stresses that there are no small incidents in Arctic waters.
Looking at the main causes of accidents, machinery (32.2%) is the leading accident factor, wrecked (20%) the second, and climate (12%) the third. Machinery damage raises concerns on the level of ship’s maintenance and the capability of coastal states to offer safe ports for refuge and repairs.
Wrecks are a consequence of the persistent difficulty in mapping the Arctic seabed and the need to identify the various sandbanks. This also explains the reason why underwriters ask shipowners to define the voyage planning they will follow and be assisted by an icebreaker.
Ice represents a double risk for navigation. Its presence can have an impact not only on vessels’ ability to sail but also on the capability of other vessels to help a ship in danger. Moreover, ice has the potential to cause serious casualties or aggravate the consequences of an accident.
An aging fleet of vessels
Fishing vessels represent the highest share of casualties. As most of their GT is below 500 GT, they have no obligation to comply with the Polar Code and their average age is 28 years old, which raises the question of their renewal.
Because of the remoteness of the Russian oil and gas fields, the only way to replenish the plants is by sea, but tankers involved in accidents are 12 years older than the fleet average. However, with the construction of Sabetta and the Yamal LNG Plant, most hydrocarbons exported from Russian terminals are LNG, meaning that the fleet is quite new, and most vessels carrying gas are ARC-7 (able to sail up to ice which is 2.4 m thick).
Despite this, it is striking to notice that cargo ships involved in accidents are 10 years older than the fleet average, and passenger ships are 6.5 years older. Considering the growing regional traffic, the renewal of the latter is of paramount importance.
Search And Rescue (SAR) infrastructures
The density of SAR is unequally distributed between Norway and Russia. Surprisingly, no accidents were reported along the NSR between the Kara Gate and Bering Strait. This questions the data shared by costal states. Knowing that this location faces the largest oil and gas shipments, it constitutes a significant obstacle to analysis.
The area with the highest number of casualties is along the Norwegian shores and in the western part of the NEP, between the Kola Peninsula and the Novaya-Zemlya islands for the west part and within the Okhotsk Sea. SAR presence solves the issue of remoteness and the vessels’ ability to receive assistance. SAR connection to the national logistic infrastructures for both the evacuation of injured seafarers and the supply of spare parts to repair damaged vessels is a point that needs to be brought up.
The combination of the remoteness of SAR and huge distances in the Arctic present a significant challenge for coastal states from technical, ecological, and economic viewpoints. Renewing equipment, especially icebreakers especially, is a matter that concerns both navigation safety and the governance of coastal states in their EEZ.
To conclude, if navigation in the Arctic gains in attractivity, there is a great deal to be done in terms of risk handling. Data management remains a key issue. It is currently possible to gather the type of missing data in three categories: geographic, meteorological, and operational. Defining a precise pathway based on climate conditions such as ice thickness is crucial for vessels to determine their ability to sail within these waters. Data related to the seabed and the existence of sandbanks is also important. Yet, due to the great expanses of the Arctic Ocean, this represents a huge challenge.
Finally, having a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the different accidents that could occur in the Arctic may support underwriters, classification societies, shipowners, and deck-officers in their decision-making and sailing in safer conditions. If data is a fundamental component of Arctic navigation, coastal states can offer shelters to vessels, limit their remoteness, and increase the density of SAR. While safety has made significant progress in recent years, coastal states must make efforts to mitigate risks to sustain the densification of maritime activity in the years to come.
Ph.D., Associate Professor in Supply Chain Management and Logistics
EM Normandie, Métis Lab
France
Laurent Fedi
Senior Professor of Maritime Law
KEDGE Business School
France
Senior Professor of Maritime Law
KEDGE Business School
France
With the ice melting, maritime activity within the Arctic area has increased during the last 20 years. Most of this activity is related to the oil and gas industry, cruise vessels, supply of northern communities and fishing vessels. However, these activities are not equally distributed.
If global warming reduces the ice surface and thickness, this allows vessels to sail in previously deemed perilous areas. It also impacts the transit capacity of the Panama Canal. In recent years, one has observed the number of vessels transiting through the canal decreasing while the the transit time has considerably lengthened. Regarding the Suez Canal, the Houthi attacks have forced some maritime companies to sail via the Cape of Good Hope. Additionally, the March 2021 Ever Given case is still fresh in corporate minds notably as regards its economic impacts. Thus the question of safer and more reliable maritime routes is raised.
In this context, the Arctic Ocean increasingly appears as an alternative for some companies. As evidence, a joint venture between DP World and Rosatom for the management of containers along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was signed in 2023. Nevertheless, sailing conditions and maritime activity slightly differ from one area to another. Respecting the announced schedules and related transit times is the main challenge of these new maritime lanes, which entails anticipating and mitigating risks.
High risk maritime routes
Currently, two passages are used: the North-West Passage (NWP) along the Canadian and American shores, and the North-East Passage (NEP) mainly represented by the waters of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The maritime activity in the NEP is made up of oil and gas exportations, fishing, cruiseliners and ferries (in the Norwegian part), vital supplies of northern communities and the necessary deliveries to upgrade existing ports and terminals. The transit activity within this area is rising in volume, but remains limited compared to the amount of cargo exported.
The environment, the seafarers and the vessels are all at risk when sailing in this area, and it requires an appropriate risk management policy. Until now, maritime codes and conventions have been implemented in response to casualties, but the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters i.e. the “Polar Code” (PC) entered into force in 2017 appears as a prophylactic instrument. Amending the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, the PC provides tools to secure polar navigation. However, even if it recalls existing risks a vessel may face within Arctic, the PC only deals with those ships having more than 500 gross tonnage (GT), which is not at all representative of all the navigation throughout the area where small vessels operate.
A 20-year database covering 2000-2020 was to map the main causes of numerous accidents depending on the level of gravity, vessel type, area, and season. The analysis of that database has led to the following risk mapping in the Arctic.
Serious accidents caused by machinery, sandbanks and ice
First, whatever the type of vessel may be, Marine Incident (lowest level of gravity) represent 5.8% of the events assessed, the rest being Serious (82.1%) or Very Serious Casualties (12.2%), meaning that in most cases, the integrity of the vessel is called into question. Such a result clearly stresses that there are no small incidents in Arctic waters.
Looking at the main causes of accidents, machinery (32.2%) is the leading accident factor, wrecked (20%) the second, and climate (12%) the third. Machinery damage raises concerns on the level of ship’s maintenance and the capability of coastal states to offer safe ports for refuge and repairs.
Wrecks are a consequence of the persistent difficulty in mapping the Arctic seabed and the need to identify the various sandbanks. This also explains the reason why underwriters ask shipowners to define the voyage planning they will follow and be assisted by an icebreaker.
Ice represents a double risk for navigation. Its presence can have an impact not only on vessels’ ability to sail but also on the capability of other vessels to help a ship in danger. Moreover, ice has the potential to cause serious casualties or aggravate the consequences of an accident.
An aging fleet of vessels
Fishing vessels represent the highest share of casualties. As most of their GT is below 500 GT, they have no obligation to comply with the Polar Code and their average age is 28 years old, which raises the question of their renewal.
Because of the remoteness of the Russian oil and gas fields, the only way to replenish the plants is by sea, but tankers involved in accidents are 12 years older than the fleet average. However, with the construction of Sabetta and the Yamal LNG Plant, most hydrocarbons exported from Russian terminals are LNG, meaning that the fleet is quite new, and most vessels carrying gas are ARC-7 (able to sail up to ice which is 2.4 m thick).
Despite this, it is striking to notice that cargo ships involved in accidents are 10 years older than the fleet average, and passenger ships are 6.5 years older. Considering the growing regional traffic, the renewal of the latter is of paramount importance.
Search And Rescue (SAR) infrastructures
The density of SAR is unequally distributed between Norway and Russia. Surprisingly, no accidents were reported along the NSR between the Kara Gate and Bering Strait. This questions the data shared by costal states. Knowing that this location faces the largest oil and gas shipments, it constitutes a significant obstacle to analysis.
The area with the highest number of casualties is along the Norwegian shores and in the western part of the NEP, between the Kola Peninsula and the Novaya-Zemlya islands for the west part and within the Okhotsk Sea. SAR presence solves the issue of remoteness and the vessels’ ability to receive assistance. SAR connection to the national logistic infrastructures for both the evacuation of injured seafarers and the supply of spare parts to repair damaged vessels is a point that needs to be brought up.
The combination of the remoteness of SAR and huge distances in the Arctic present a significant challenge for coastal states from technical, ecological, and economic viewpoints. Renewing equipment, especially icebreakers especially, is a matter that concerns both navigation safety and the governance of coastal states in their EEZ.
To conclude, if navigation in the Arctic gains in attractivity, there is a great deal to be done in terms of risk handling. Data management remains a key issue. It is currently possible to gather the type of missing data in three categories: geographic, meteorological, and operational. Defining a precise pathway based on climate conditions such as ice thickness is crucial for vessels to determine their ability to sail within these waters. Data related to the seabed and the existence of sandbanks is also important. Yet, due to the great expanses of the Arctic Ocean, this represents a huge challenge.
Finally, having a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the different accidents that could occur in the Arctic may support underwriters, classification societies, shipowners, and deck-officers in their decision-making and sailing in safer conditions. If data is a fundamental component of Arctic navigation, coastal states can offer shelters to vessels, limit their remoteness, and increase the density of SAR. While safety has made significant progress in recent years, coastal states must make efforts to mitigate risks to sustain the densification of maritime activity in the years to come.
For a complete analysis, see:
Fedi, L., Faury, O., Etienne, L., Cheaitou, A., Rigot-Muller, P. (2024). Application of the IMO taxonomy on casualty investigation: Analysis of 20 years of marine accidents along the North-East Passage, Marine Policy (162), 106061.
Fedi, L., Faury, O., Etienne, L., Cheaitou, A., Rigot-Muller, P. (2024). Application of the IMO taxonomy on casualty investigation: Analysis of 20 years of marine accidents along the North-East Passage, Marine Policy (162), 106061.