Patrik Lillqvist: SLOC´s under siege

Maritime traffic and critical underwater infrastructure are in the very hotspot in current contested world. The high dependency on transportation of goods, services, information and energy via sea makes SLOC´s a attractive target. From a military point of view the attacks against maritime traffic and hybrid operations against critical underwater infrastructure are a question of sea control. About who is able to use the sea for its own purposes or deny the use from another. This article tries to portray how the lessons drawn from today´s incidents and crisis are addressed to navies.

From pirates to anchors and missiles
Some 15 years ago Somali pirates caused enormous costs to maritime traffic and to the nations allocating units to compel the pirates. The yearly cost caused by piracy peaked in 2011 as 7 billion U$D.

Huthi attacks with drones, anti-surface missiles and sea mines in the Red Sea against maritime traffic have decreased maritime traffic in the area by 60-70 percent. 

The attacks against underwater infrastructure with dragging anchor and other means are well reported and a form of warfare, where the actor maintains the aggression below the threshold of war.

In the Black Sea, Ukraine defending its sovereignty against belligerent Russia, with hardly any warships, has successfully used a large variety of weapons. In 2022 it laid protective sea mines outside its coast, which caused Russia not to execute any major amphibious operations. The use of land-launched surface-to-surface Neptune missiles caused Russian Black Sea Fleets flagship Moskva to sink and Russian warships have since kept a healthier distance to Ukrainian coast. Ukraine has destroyed or damaged almost 30 Russian warships with missiles and drones. Some victims have been moving, but majority has been static ships. Ukraine has been able to establish sea lines of communication for its grain export without traditional navy ships, although on lower scale than before the war. Russia has not been able to execute an effective embargo against Ukraine because it has not enough capabilities to protect its own units against drones and missiles. Both sides seem to avoid getting enemies from commercial shipping stakeholders, and therefore are not attacking merchant traffic.

Materiel costs
Coping the Somali piracy in 2000-2017 required low end set of military and civilian constabulary capabilities. The pirates used small boats, AK-47 and rocket propelled grenade launchers to seize merchant ships. Warships and patrol ships seized several pirate teams and navies also destroyed pirate vessels on the beaches. Merchant ships were mainly safe if they kept higher transit speed in threatening areas and also by having private armed security teams onboard. 

In order to maintain an adequate level of sea control, it requires first of all situational awareness and presence, which can be done by warships and maritime patrol aircrafts. Warship costs. A corvette costs 400 M€ without missiles, and a frigate 500-1 000 million €. The price tag of a US Arleigh Burke class destroyer is 2 bn US$.  The lower end of military units is an offshore patrol vessel, typically 50-100 M€. A ship-based helicopter like MH-60R or NH-90 cost 50-60 M€. Weapon costs. At the moment attacking with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), like drones, is cheap and the systems are available for anyone. The attacking drones have to be destroyed, and that is not cheap. Israel Navy has used Tamir-missiles. The unit price of the anti-air missile is stated to be in a range of 100 000 – 150 000 U$D. Western frigates and destroyers have launched ESSM, SM-2 and ASTER 15 anti-air missiles, unit price being more than 2 M€. These missiles are also able to intercept anti-surface cruise missiles, which cost 0,5 – 2,5 M€. The most usual naval gun is Leonardo 76 mm gun with a 20 km range. One shot cost a couple thousand € and you might need several bursts of fire. The last trench is a close-in-weapon-system (CIWS). US made Phalanx (12 MUS$) with six 20 mm barrels have a rate of fire of 4500 rounds per minute. A typical burst of 150 rounds is reported to cost 7 000 U$D. Unmanned surface vessels (USV) are not as sensitive to a hit as a flying object therefore requiring several hits or bigger caliber gun or a grenade gun.    

Laserweapons are assumed as one cost effective solution to engage UAV´s and other low-cost systems. UK Armed Forces Dragonfire laser system is at the moment expensive, 100 M£, but a single shot is claimed to cost only 10 £. 

Constant threat consisting of fast, stelth and lethal vectors requires uninterrupted attention, which is strenuous. A long term deployment calls for at least three watches instead of two, if possible. This means more well trained personnel, and training takes years.