Jussi Soramäki
Senior Ministerial
Advisor, Marine and Maritime Policy
Government
Strategy Department, Finnish Prime Minister’s Office
Finland
The freedom of the seas is the cornerstone of international trade and crucial for our well-being. Maritime transport covers over 80 % of world trade. In 2023, the share of maritime transport in Finland’s foreign trade accounted for 96% of Finland’s exports and imports. The freedom of the seas is challenged by recent actions against submarine infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. These actions also pose a threat for the security of supply and for the environment.
The first incident, by the Hong Kong registered container ship Newnew Polar Bear, took place in October 2023. Dragging its anchor, it allegedly damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, and the EE-S1, a submarine communications cable between Sweden and Estonia. The Newnew Polar Bear was able to exit the Baltic Sea without any attempts to stop it.
The second incident by Yi Ping 3, a Chinese bulk carrier, happened in November 2024. Dragging the ships anchor through the seabed over 90 nautical miles it succeeded in damaging of the submarine telecommunications cable C-Lion1 between Finland and Germany and the Arelion cable between Sweden. After damage, the ship was quickly followed by a Danish Navy ship and Yi Ping 3 anchored at the Danish Straits for inspection which was carried out by the Chinese authorities. Later, a group of observers from Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland were able to join the Chinese investigation team briefly. The ship left its anchorage after a month.
The third incident happened in December 2024, when the tanker Eagle S, registered in Cook Islands dragged its anchor, and damaged the Estlink 2 submarine power cable and four communication cables. The ship was stopped by Finnish Coast Guard and escorted to Finnish territorial waters where it was seized. A port state control was conducted. The inspection report shows serious defects in Eagle S. The investigation by the Finnish Police is ongoing.
Russia has used the so-called shadow fleet to avoid sanctions and to continue oil exports. The shadow fleet is according to IMO a fleet of between 300 and 600 tankers primarily comprised of older ships, including some not inspected recently, having substandard maintenance, unclear ownership, and a severe lack of insurance. It has been estimated that potential number of tankers that could be added to the shadow fleet is up to 2000 vessels.
The shadow fleet poses an environmental threat not only for the Gulf of Finland but for the entire Baltic Sea and beyond. A good example of the threat is the non-manoeuvrable tanker Eventin, which carries oil from Ust-Luga, Russia. It has been towed to German territorial waters to avoid a major oil spill.
The three incidents in the Baltic Sea, The Newnew Polar Bear, Yi Ping 3 and the latest, Eagle S have revealed that the Law of the Sea is less functional when dealing with sabotage.
Steps to solve the problems have already been taken. The recent Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit, in the presence of the EU, agreed with enhanced NATO presence and made a statement for future action. NATO has launched the enhanced Vigilance Activity Baltic Sentry to improve situational awareness and deter hostile activities. It has also activated the Commander Task Force-Baltic in Rostock which coordinates Allied ships in the Baltic Sea. NATO´s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure and NATO´s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network is going to support efforts to protect and secure undersea infrastructure. A Memorandum of Understanding on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Baltic Sea region will be drafted.
First, a surveillance system which was also proposed by JEF that detects any unusual movements close to submarine infrastructure, will be established. The system would allow for a quick response if something unusual is happening. An enhanced co-operation between NATO, EU and national operators is needed. Co-operation and shared situational awareness at all levels is key.
Re-negotiating conventions such as the UNCLOS normally takes a very long time and the chances for a desirable outcome are not very high. Instead, we should study the existing conventions such as UNCLOS if allows for new interpretations. The NATO Baltic Summit decided to identify further measures in accordance with international law of the sea, including the freedom of navigation, to prevent and effectively respond to wilful damaging of critical undersea infrastructure or irresponsible behaviour. The foreign ministries will jointly work on the matter.
Sanctions can be very effective. A part of the shadow fleet tankers has already been sanctioned and this should be continued, but we should not forget to target the shipowners, too. The sanctioning of the oil receiving ports and refineries, when possible, could prove very effective.
It is important to contact the flag states directly and work with them. The Finnish Government started the talks already in 2023 when visiting Panama and we expressed our serious concerns about the increased risk of an accident and an oil spill in the Gulf of Finland. The discussions with the flag states are being continued at the highest level in Finland.
Several actions to prevent future sabotage on submarine infrastructure have been proposed now as well as how to deal with the dark fleet. Now it is time to act and work together with all stakeholders concerned.