Kristian Søby Kristensen
Senior Researcher, Director
Center for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen
Denmark
ksk@ifs.ku.dk
On March 7, 2024, Sweden formally – and finally – became NATO’s 32nd member. Together with Finnish membership, NATO’s northern enlargement fundamentally change the security geography of the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic region. With new and capable Nordic members, the Baltic Sea is by many commentators heralded as a ‘NATO lake’, and integrating Swedish and Finnish territory in the Alliance makes the North Cape a seamless NATO operating space. NATO’s northern enlargement undoubtedly strengthens NATO – politically as well as from a military planning perspective.
But what are the consequences from a Danish perspective? Across the board, NATO’s northern enlargement is seen as a good thing by Danish decision makers and the Danish security policy commentariat. In addition to a shift in the regional balance of power, the enlargement opens new possibilities for further Nordic defense cooperation – a popular political option in Denmark. And indeed, the Nordics have been quick to initiate even closer operational defense cooperation, including prominently in the air domain. Still, NATO’s northern enlargement also brings with it new choices and pose new challenges for Danish defense and security policy.
First, and by clear geographical dictate, Denmark stands out compared to the three other European Nordics and risks some marginalization within that group. Finland, Norway, and Sweden share either a land border or close proximity to Russia. From an air and land perspective, close cooperation between the three makes sense operationally, especially around the North Cape. Denmark’s immediate utility in this military theater is low. Indeed, military geography indicates a potentially wider division of labor within the Baltic Sea Region with Denmark’s responsibilities centered on maintaining allied control of the Danish Straits and functioning as a staging area for allied troops moving into the Baltic Sea Region. This, to a certain extent, would be tasks shared with Norway and Sweden, which underlines that increased Danish cooperation with the other Nordics is not an either/or-question, but about the countries flexibly coming together in different settings.
Another challenge follows from the political and diplomatic dynamics and workings of NATO HQ in Brussels. What individual allies bring to the table are key to determining their status. Military capabilities are evidently the most important currency in this status game, but other more intangibles ones also count. Especially Finland has arrived in NATO with high status. On the intangible end of the scale, Finland is widely seen as having new and valuable experience with and knowledge about Russia. Finland being ‘in the know’ about Russia is manifest both in the force structure of the Finnish armed forces and in the resilience of wider Finnish society. Both are attuned to the threat from Russia. That is not the case in Denmark where the armed forces have been fundamentally re-structured to conduct stabilization operations in the Global South. Finnish and Swedish membership inevitably leads to a relative Danish status loss. In general terms, the Nordics are often seen as a group, and thus easily compared. With all the Nordics in NATO, a certain amount of intra-Nordic beauty contest is to be expected, with each country jockeying for status and influence.
The very Nordic togetherness that is generally seen as a major strength, both inside and outside the region, may thereby also come with risks – it may be too much of a good thing. On the one hand, solidarity is a strong norm in NATO. Security is supposed to be a shared collective good within the alliance, and NATO is historically allergic to regionalization. On the other hand, there are high expectations that one of the things the Nordics bring to NATO is the ability to work closely together. The Nordics need to jointly handle this paradox. In the same vein, relations to neighboring countries and regions also need to be taken into consideration. Not least the Baltic states’ individual and collective defense and security relations to the Nordics and the Nordic region are in flux. With increased Nordic cooperation comes risks to other valued and long-held Danish relations.
The analyzed challenges and choices do not fundamentally alter the bottom-line: NATO’s northern enlargement is a positive development for Denmark. It marginalizes Russia regionally in Denmark’s “near abroad”, and it creates a new impetus for increased Nordic defense cooperation. In terms of both geography and like-mindedness, NATO’s center of gravity moves closer to Denmark. Yet, even positive international developments need to be managed if states are to realize their full potential.