Piritta Asunmaa
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Finland to
NATO
Permanent Representation of Finland to NATO
Finland
When Finland became a NATO Ally one year ago, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “Finland’s membership will make Finland safer and NATO stronger”. This was well said, but what does membership in NATO mean for Finland?
On one hand, it can be seen as a big step that the country has taken. Finland had previously only relied on its own defence, but is now part of the most successful military alliance, with all its benefits as well as responsibilities. On the other hand, it is fair to say that joining NATO was only a small and logical step for Finland. We have now completed our Western integration, which started with membership in the European Union after the end of the Cold War.
However, in my view, the more interesting question is what kind of a NATO did Finland and Sweden join?
Transformation of NATO and changes in Finnish security and defence thinking had already started in 2014 when Russia attacked Ukraine. First, in this new security environment, the Baltic Sea countries understood that they were now the frontline of confrontation between the West and Russia. During the Cold War, this frontline had been located in Central Europe and the Baltic Sea region had only been a side stage. Second, it was clear that no one could look at the Baltic Sea region in isolation. The Baltic Sea was now part of a frontline that started from the North Atlantic and continued via the Baltic and Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Lastly, both NATO and Finland understood that neither could plan nor defend their own area effectively unless we knew what each party was doing. These developments lead to the deepening and widening of defence cooperation based on mutual interests, even though legally binding treaty obligations and guarantees were missing.
Based on these realizations, the Finnish and Swedish decision to apply for NATO membership seemed like a logical step. At the Madrid Summit, NATO decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of the Alliance. The Summit was also an important milestone for NATO. In Madrid, the Allied heads of state and government approved the new Security Concept for the Alliance, which clearly states that “Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. Because NATO’s decision-making is based on consensus, it is important what the official documents state as they direct further planning and action. In this case, the wording meant that NATO started to develop new plans on how to defend its own area. New plans also meant that NATO had to re-evaluate what kind of command and control structures it needs, what kind of troops are needed to execute the plans and what kind of authority should be given to the SACEUR to carry out the plans.
The first opportunity to evaluate progress on NATO’s new baseline for deterrence and defence came at the Vilnius Summit a year later. For Finland, the Vilnius Summit was even more important because it was the first time Finland was able to participate as a full Ally. Because Finnish accession had happened only months before the Summit, Vilnius became a starting point for the integration of Finland into NATO. This was something that was also clearly stated in the Summit Communiqué.
Today, we can see the first examples of what Finland’s integration into NATO means in practice. In February, Finland stated that it is willing to participate in NATO’s peacetime collective defence activities. This summer, the Finnish Navy will participate in the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One in the Baltic Sea and the Finnish Air Force will participate in NATO’s Air Shielding Mission in Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea region. These actions show that Finland is willing to participate in burden sharing according to NATO’s 360-degree principle. In February, Finland also made some proposals on how NATO could contribute to the collective defence of Finland. First, Finland declared willingness to host a multinational headquarter that could help in the command and control of NATO land forces in the northeast of Europe. Second, Finland proposed that NATO forces could increase their presence in the country through training and exercise activities. This will require further investments in Finland’s host nation support capabilities. The last of the Finnish proposals concerned Finland’s willingness to support NATO’s intelligence and surveillance activities to improve situational awareness in the northeast of Europe.
Swedish accession to NATO took place in March 2024. Like Finnish membership, Swedish membership will make Sweden safer and NATO stronger. Swedish membership also allows Finland and Sweden to deepen and widen their bilateral defence cooperation even further. NATO and collective defence sets a new framework for that cooperation.
The next key event for NATO, Sweden and Finland will be the Summit in Washington DC this July. For NATO, the Summit is an opportunity to further evaluate progress towards achieving the new baseline for deterrence and defence. For Sweden, the Summit will be a starting point and a first chance to give guidance on how Sweden wants to be integrated into NATO’s deterrence and defence. In the case of Finland, we can expect first reporting on the work done to integrate Finland into the Alliance.
The agenda for the Summit is set in cooperation with all the Allies, but in addition, the host nation always plays a special role. Therefore, we can expect that defence investments, NATO’s unwavering support to and strengthened relationship with Ukraine as well as NATO’s partnerships with the so-called IP4 countries (Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand) will be high on the agenda. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is of particular importance to Finland and Europe. Finland, as a new member in NATO, works to advance Ukraine becoming a member of the Alliance, as reaffirmed in the Vilnius Summit.
After the Washington DC Summit, NATO will set its sights on the next Summit in the Netherlands in 2025. Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence against Russia will remain a priority but NATO needs to also keep an eye on long-term trends and developments. How should NATO prepare itself for the era of strategic competition? How will developments in the Indo-Pacific region influence the security of the Euro-Atlantic region? How can we boost our defence industry and how can we make sure future technologies can be used to enhance our defence capabilities? Day by day, NATO is better prepared to the threat posed by Russia, but how should NATO react to instability in the regions surrounding Europe?
Thanks to our strong defence capabilities and strong bilateral defence relationships, Finland has a chance to punch above its weight in the Alliance. This can be achieved with active foreign and defence policy and an active participation in NATO activities. At some point, Finland should consider whether it wants to host a NATO Summit. This would allow Finland to further NATO’s common agenda and Finland’s national interest, which go hand in hand from now on.