Ben O’Loughlin
Professor of International Relations
Royal Holloway, University of London
United
Kingdom
Ben.OLoughlin@rhul.ac.uk
Let’s be clear: In a world politics of multipolarity and the sheer diversity of perspectives humans create, there is no “the” narrative. However, the perception of “a” narrative being convincing to some can shape the policy agendas and spending decisions of states and multilateral organisations. This is why the perception of a narrative performing well relates to influence. That perception affects processes and concrete outcomes. As I write in February 2024, there is evidently no shared narrative at the Munich Security Conference, let alone the UN Security Council. It is not just Nato that cannot set “the” narrative. But it can produce a narrative that a majority of its members can promote as a consensus.
There are many reasons Nato finds influence hard to achieve through communication. The result is that Nato’s task is to manage messiness, manage discord, manage opposition. Total autonomy and total clarity are impossible. I will set out four dimensions of this dilemma. They help us plot a pragmatic course for Nato and its communication.
First, this is not a new situation. At an event I attended at Nato Brussels in 2015 even Nato officials identified uncertainty about whether Nato’s narrative on Afghanistan was to defeat the Taliban or contain them, or whether this fitted a wider narrative of global security or security for Nato members. Each Nato member had a caveat about what Nato’s narrative should be. Some national leaders set their policy through reflex and immediate moral indignation, not long-term strategy coordinated with other Nato members. Nato had to coordinate its own communication with other international organisations. Nato focused their communication around on-the-ground operations, but the UN and EU did not. The result was uncertainty within Nato and about Nato.
Second, diversity of interests continue in Nato. Whether the US or European countries buy oil from Russia or Gulf states, or aspire to energy independence, has been a dilemma even since before the 1973 oil crisis. Colliding interests about Iran compound this. By the late 2010s some European countries still wanted the 2015 Iran nuclear deal restored and viewed Iran at least slightly favourably, while others and US allies were more concerned about a developing Iran-China-Russia relationship.
The Russia-Ukraine war has exposed the intensity of these pressures. Germany finally decided to lower its Russian energy imports. However, Russia is still a huge exporter. Not only does that challenge any notion of a global opposition to Russia. It indicates the US does not control the market, pointing to limits of US power. Market activity disrupts Nato’s security narrative.
Third, Nato must navigate how it is narrated by others, not just how it views itself. Nato fits within plots held by states and societies around the world. It is characterised and contextualised based on understandings of its member states, not just its own history. Nato’s narrative on Ukraine will not be accepted by many in the global south. I analysed mainstream news from many countries about the Russian invasion through 2022-23, and found very divergent perspectives. This has implications for considering who might offer even tacit support to Nato.
In Malaysia, news reported that Nato wants a second Cold War to justify its own existence. Russia finds Nato eastward expansion ‘an existential threat’, reported one as an empirical fact in the record of history. Nato members want a long war, not Russia or Ukraine. War makes Nato members’ politicians and arms company shareholders richer. Seven of the largest ten arms companies in the world are Western -- six US, one UK. The only bright spot for Nato was Malaysian journalists’ sense that China is doing nothing to make peace in Ukraine more likely.
South African reporting was more ambiguous. ‘Despite the double standards, lies and hypocrisy of the US, EU, UK, United Nations Security Council and Nato axis,’ one wrote, ‘Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine must be denounced and condemned’. Journalists reported Africa as a continent divided on the war. Some countries voted for the UN resolutions, some against. This indicated some supported international law, some did not – ‘tantamount to endorsing global anarchy’, one wrote. The concern was that such anarchy will affect all humankind. That is South Africa’s security priority.
In Indian news, I found Nato rarely mentioned. For Indian journalists, world politics involves great powers but not institutional alliances. Should that itself be a concern to Nato?
Fourth, Nato must accept that members -- or potential members -- will try to use Nato for particular ends. This must be acceptable to all members. By defying Russian threats by holding to a willingness to join Nato one day, Ukraine took a calculated gamble: if Russia responded militarily, Nato would respond. And it has. Ukraine’s government assessed the insecurity any Russian advance would pose in Central and Eastern Europe. Eventual military victory would depend on using communication to persuade allies to commit resources and will – because of a shared goal.
Recall the concept “ontological security”, the proposition that all actors want a secure identity grounded in a stable environment. Zelensky could exploit vulnerabilities in the West’s ontological security. Post-Cold War, a rules-based international order seemed likely to expand inexorably. By 2022 a multipolar order in which Russia can break some rules, and so too some Nato members, exposed a challenge to a sense of self in the West and across Nato. Yet Nato cannot do nothing. It cannot shrink back. It must act. Ukraine would have support. Nato has managed this relatively well, but internal dissent is not unnoticed. There remains the issue too, as described above, of how the rest of the world perceives Nato’s actions.