Iro Särkkä
Dr, Senior Research Fellow
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Finland
iro.sarkka@fiia.fi
The risk of a confrontation between the allied West and Russia has increased in the Baltic Sea region since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and unprovoked war in Ukraine in 2022. From the point of view of security in the Baltic Sea region, Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership is a much-welcomed beam of light both from a hard and a wider security perspective.
Starting with hard security, Finland's and Sweden's NATO memberships will significantly contribute to the defense and deterrence in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. As part of NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defence for the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), the entire Nordic-Baltic region is tied to NATO's new regional defence plans. Some even suggest, that a deterrence by denial bubble will be created, increasing the costs of potential attack by an adversary. More precisely, this could be achieved by joint coordination of allied air and missile defense capabilities, airspace and subwater dominance, shared intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information in the region, as well as developing readiness through operations and exercises in the region.
As NATO members, Finland and Sweden will bring a considerable reinforcement to NATO’s conventional capability with their fleets of vessels, mine-laying, hunting, and clearing, submarine and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as the coastal defence expertise to defend the Baltic Sea area. However, it is not only Finnish-Swedish naval power that strengthens the collective defence of the Baltic Sea region. Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO memberships should be viewed from a wider, 360-degree perspective, encompassing all different operational areas, including, air, land, and cyber, in addition to the traditional maritime domain.
Consider for instance, the combined air power capabilities in the Baltic Sea region with the Finnish and Swedish reinforcements in NATO. The combined total number of technologically advanced fighter aircrafts of the four Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden will figure close to some 300 by 2030s, which is more than some of the larger and more capable European regional powers have. Or the types of possibilities open for the land forces, to use the land and the archipelagic areas in the Baltic Sea region, as staging areas for troops or as exercise domains.
NATO’s peace-time operations in the Baltic Sea region are another indication of enhanced response in the region to Russia’s imminent threat. Sweden has already announced its intentions to send a considerable enforcement to the Canadian-led NATO Forward Land Forces (FLF) in Latvia, and Finland is reportedly contemplating force contributions in the British-led contingency in Tapa, Estonia, in addition to possible future contributions to NATO’s air-policing missions of the Baltic. Furthermore, both Finland and Sweden are expected to contribute to NATO’s force posture in times of crisis.
Hard security, however, really becomes a force multiplier when it enables and advances societal resilience in the region. Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership will further improve security of supply and national resilience in the region, as the two countries will be able to participate fully in NATO's civil emergency planning, benefit from NATO's common resources, situational awareness, and capabilities, and deepen cooperation with the key allies in region. For Finland securing sea transport is an existential question of security of supply, as more than 90% of the Finnish imports and exports are transported by sea. While Finland remains vulnerable to maritime traffic disturbances, NATO membership may alleviate the concern of maintaining safer maritime transport routes in the Baltic Sea region.
From a wider security perspective, one major security concern relates to environmental impact of a potential military conflict or hybrid operation in the region. While NATO might not be in position to stop such a disaster from happening, it can ensure that all key players in the region are prepared to act in unison if it does. To better prepare for such circumstances, other minilateral formats of security cooperation, such as the Northern Group between Baltic and North Sea states, or the Council of the Baltic States, should continue to work towards a common goal, developing strategies and tools to better prepare for tackling wider security threats.
Finally, by bringing their strong societal resilience and educational models to NATO, Finland and Sweden should demonstrate, how hard security and soft security are in fact, interconnected and how the gap between the two can be bridged. A beginning for such a dialogue could be an annual tabletop exercise engaging key civilian and military stakeholders from all allied countries in the Baltic Sea region.