Zdzisław Śliwa
Ph.D.
Wrocław University
Poland
Poland’s geostrategic location is crucial for Europe’s security, especially in light of Russia’s aggressive attempts to rebuild the former Soviet empire and restore its past power. Bordering both Kaliningrad and Belarus—sites of military exercises such as Zapad 2025 designed to intimidate NATO—Poland serves as both a “gatekeeper” against potential attacks on Central and Western Europe and a “land bridge” linking Western Europe with the Baltic states and Ukraine. Any subordination or partial occupation of Ukraine elevates Poland’s role as a frontline nation, making Ukraine’s victory and integration with NATO, the EU, and the democratic world essential. Poland’s security policy reflects a profound distrust of Russia’s willingness to coexist peacefully. Lately, violations of Polish, and NATO, airspace and hybrid attacks are clear evidence of hostile intentions targeting the Poland and democratic nations.
Warsaw’s substantial investments in defence highlight its credibility as a reliable and capable ally. At the same time, Poland recognizes that in the event of Russian aggression, it must be prepared to defend itself before allied forces are fully deployed, particularly land forces. While unity under NATO’s Article 5 remains vital, Poland also emphasizes the importance of Article 3. Currently, it allocates 4.7% of GDP to defence—an effort supported by both government and the society—funding six divisions and several independent units equipped with modern weaponry acquired through ambitious modernization programs. Key initiatives, such as expanding drone capabilities and revitalizing the defence industry, reflect lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine.
EU support through the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 program provides tangible benefits, but timely implementation remains a challenge. As a result, some capabilities will not reach the desired level before 2030, while others may be delayed even further. Poland also plans to expand its armed forces to 300,000 personnel, including 250,000 professionals and 50,000 members of territorial defence units. These measures strengthen deterrence and enhance Poland’s credibility within NATO and the EU, presenting it as a reliable contributor to the defence of the Alliance’s Eastern Flank. Still, political and diplomatic efforts are as critical as the military ones: maintaining strong alliances has never been more important. NATO and EU membership, the strategic partnership with the United States, and regional cooperation remain cornerstones of Polish security. Advancing national interests will require skilful diplomacy that unites rather than divides key partners.
The Ukrainian experience demonstrated how an attempted “blitzkrieg” can quickly devolve into a war of attrition, requiring mobilization reserves and robust defence industry capacities. Both deterrence and defence must be reinforced. Poland’s defence industry, however, is not yet fully prepared to sustain long-term combat operations with sufficient ammunition, new equipment, or repair facilities. Transitioning the sector into crisis and war mode will require new legal frameworks and deeper integration with allied defence industries.
Another neglected area has been preparing society for crisis and war. For too long, the focus remained on the military instrument of power and NATO’s security guarantees. The war in Ukraine sparked overdue debates about civil defence, resilience, and the integration of civilian efforts into national security. Today, education includes pro-defence curricula and practical training, while media and social platforms promote citizen contributions to security. This strengthens resilience against Russian propaganda, as well as hybrid and cyberattacks, and fosters a culture of resistance. Allocating 0.3% of GDP annually to civil defence is a prudent step.
Poland is building a comprehensive system of total defence, supported by new funding, regulations, and stronger military capabilities designed to protect both the state and its citizens, an improvement of relations between military and civilian entities, the private sector and the public sector or national and international companies needs attention. The Russian threat will stay, and there is consensus among Polish politicians and the population that she cannot be trusted. This is an impetus to enhance national capabilities utilising all resources with the support of NATO and EU partners. The time factor is playing a role as aggressive Kremlin narratives, underpinned the wartime industry and military build-up, leaving no hope for any change of imperialistic ambitions. The consensus among political elites to cooperate on national defence, stability and investments in instruments of national power require complete agreement across all public administration levels. Defence spending must be treated holistically to include military domain and civil society to develop effective national defence system in years to come.
A key challenge in Poland is a deeply divided society, marked by animosity between the government and the opposition party. This undermines the continuity of security decisions and weakens the country on multiple fronts. It could undermine Poland’s alertness to confront Russia and to address the consequences of hybrid attacks. Military modernisation requires a collective endeavour among parties, although some disagreements have arisen, and certain projects have been decided upon without thorough study based on political choices. The adoption of the total defence concept will enhance Poland’s and regional stability, deterrence and defence posture based on reliable military capabilities, well understood by Russia. The combination of professional and territorial defence forces, operational preparation of terrain, resilient society and a dependable military industry reflects power. As the NATO member, Poland must also ensure its decisions remain aligned with regional defence plans, recognizing that in the first wave of aggression it will be Polish forces—backed by a resilient society—who bear the initial burden of defence. The European Union must remain a central pillar in supporting diverse Polish security domains, not solely through its substantial allocation of €43.7 billion to Poland under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, but by embodying the unity and resolve of European nations in confronting the enduring threat posed by Russia. Finally, the strategic partnership with US is confirmed and extremely important; however, any ‘pivot’ of the US foreign policy could cause reduction of US involvement in Europe.