Wojciech Konończuk
Director
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
Warsaw
Poland
In April 1993, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the first foreign minister of post-communist Poland, delivered his annual address to parliament. At that time, the country was still in the early stages of a difficult transformation – a process that, in the following years, would lead to NATO and EU membership, and two decades later make Poland widely recognized as an exemplary economic success story.
In his speech Skubiszewski, among other things, stated: “The emergence of a number of independent states [on the ruins of the Soviet Union] has favorably altered Poland’s geopolitical situation and created a historic opportunity. (…) Independent, democratic, and secure states along our eastern borders constitute, in themselves, a vital factor in safeguarding Poland’s independence, democracy, and security.”
These words provided a succinct summary of what can be regarded as the longest-standing doctrine of Polish foreign policy, with roots stretching back to the early 19th century. At that time, Polish politicians and thinkers came to the conclusion that Poland – divided among three neighboring great powers, with the Russian Empire in a dominant position – could only regain independence through close cooperation with other subjugated European nations.
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians, who had once created with Poles the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, were seen as natural allies. This belief was famously expressed by the insurgents of the Polish November Uprising against Russian occupation in 1831: “For our freedom and yours.” Today, these words continue to resonate as a powerful slogan among Ukrainians resisting the ongoing Russian invasion.
After the First World War, as Russia was engulfed by the Bolshevik Revolution, efforts emerged to fundamentally reshape the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish–Ukrainian alliance forged in 1920 sought to bring lasting change to the entire region. On the eve of the joint military campaign to recapture Kyiv from the Bolsheviks, Ignacy Daszyński, the first Prime Minister of reborn Poland, declared during bilateral negotiations: “Now Poland is embarking on the path of a new understanding with Ukraine, and I solemnly affirm that, in my view, there can be no free Poland without a free Ukraine, nor a free Ukraine without a free Poland.”
These famous words are often repeated today, particularly by Ukrainians; however, they are frequently and incorrectly attributed to another “classic” of Polish Eastern policy thought, Jerzy Giedroyc, and the second part of the statement is often overlooked. Giedroyc and his émigré magazine Kultura, established in 1947 and published in Paris for more than fifty years, played a crucial role in adapting the Polish Eastern doctrine to the post-1945 geopolitical reality.
Kultura, highly influential within Polish émigré circles and the opposition in communist Poland, regarded Russian imperialism as the greatest threat – one that could not be countered without friendly cooperation with the oppressed nations, mainly Ukrainians. This, in turn, required recognition of the post-Yalta eastern border and the emergence of independent states between Poland and Russia.
In 1993, just a year and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not yet clear whether the newly established states would be able to safeguard their sovereignty. For Poland, which was the first country in the world to recognize Ukraine’s independence, this represented the fulfillment of a task long envisioned by generations of political thinkers who had been shaping the foundations of Polish Eastern policy.
Since then, the key principles of Polish Eastern policy have remained unchanged. Over the past three decades, Poland has consistently supported the independence of Ukraine and Belarus, seeking to strengthen their sovereignty, national identity, and ties with the rest of Europe. This has been an important priority in the foreign policy of every Polish government, treated in a broadly consensual manner.
Today, the whole of Eastern Europe stands at a decisive moment.
Ukraine has effectively defended its freedom against Russian aggressive revisionism, with Poland’s military support – particularly during the first months of the full-scale conflict – playing a crucial role. It can be said with a measure of optimism that, although the war is far from over, Ukraine’s independence is irreversible and will remain a constant feature on the political map of Europe. Polish-Ukrainian relations have not been without occasional tensions, as is true of any neighboring relationship, but shared security interests will continue to serve as a unifying factor between Warsaw and Kyiv.
Belarus, with its repressive regime vassalized to Russia, presents a more difficult situation, and the future of the country, its national and international identity, has yet to be determined. Poland is among the countries most invested in maintaining Belarus as a sovereign actor in European affairs.
The enduring strength of Poland’s Eastern policy over the past thirty years lies in its firm roots in a long-standing tradition and national consensus, combined with a clear awareness of the persistent threat posed by Russia. For the foreseeable future, this threat will continue to represent a key security concern for the entire region.