Olga Bertelsen: Russian influence operations among western intellectuals

Olga Bertelsen

Russian subversive operations among foreign academics, intellectuals, and politicians are corrosive not only to democracies and their values, but they make Russia’s military solutions in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere possible. Recruitment and cooptation of the Western intellectual and political elites help Russian intelligence spread disinformation and reinforce narratives that emanate from the Kremlin. Russian intelligence professionals understand very well that whoever controls the narrative has power. They thoroughly study the vulnerabilities of target countries and prepare them for major political manipulations, using a combination of techniques, including disinformation, targeted assassinations and the like. These operations have been quite successful, and Estonia and the United States serve as the most recent and persuasive examples of the effectiveness of these techniques. Viacheslav Morozov, professor of Political Science at Tartu University, and Dimitri Simes, Russian-American author and editor, spread disinformation for years before the former was arrested by the Department of Police Security of Estonia and the latter was indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

With technological advancements and proliferation of social media platforms, the dissemination of false narratives as part of information warfare has become more sophisticated and difficult to detect. The dynamics and the results of these operations illuminated the fact that Western educational and research institutions constitute a vulnerability in each state and a target for Russian subversive activities. Because of their pervasiveness, it is absolutely vital to safeguard Western democratic institutions and academia and to curtail Russian influence or at least alleviate its impact. Two counterintelligence avenues appear to be effective: 1) the governments of democratic states should change laws and regulations to protect their institutions and citizens from the damaging effect of influence operations and propaganda; 2) the states should establish programs to educate broader audiences about Russian disinformation and recruiting operations and techniques. They should be free of charge or heavily subsidized by the government or local authorities.

These measures imply serious reforms in the areas of education, law enforcement, and communications capacities. Western governments need to reconceptualize their approach to alleviating exploitable vulnerabilities of their states, improving public diplomacy and enhancing societal awareness about Russia’s attempt at subverting democratic societies. These efforts will help ordinary people stay alert and increase their activism, responding publicly to Russian falsehoods. The openness of Western academia by definition remains a problem and a vulnerability that encourages Russian intelligence to target expert communities, well-educated and knowledgeable. Cooperation with Russian agents of influence (including scholars) and Russian front organizations, as well as the acceptance of substantial funding from them for questionable activities, should be punishable by law. The main argument against this approach is articulated by the defenders of human rights and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: Western democracies, they argue, should engage Russian academics and experts in a dialogue with foreign scholars instead of isolating them. Yet many American and European academic institutions undertook a logical step, discouraging dialogue and any ties with Russian state-sponsored educational institutions, after many prominent Russian scholars and educators signed the “Statement of the Russian Union of University Rectors” that supported Russia’s war against Ukraine and called to stand behind their president and the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Notably, the European Union has terminated cooperation with Russian research institutions, suspending payments to existing contracts and ceasing new ones under Horizon Europe. The majority of non-Russian scholars argue that suspension of cooperation between Russian and Western academia is warranted and needed, at the very least until the end of the war and deconstruction of the Putin regime. Clearly, Russia’s genocidal practices in Ukraine do not facilitate bridge-building activities between Russia and the West.                   

Interestingly, this pause in cooperation has not been ultimately translated into a pause in Russian influence operations conducted in the West. Inspired by Putin’s Order # 229, Russian intelligence is as active as in the past, but it seems to rely more on the achievements and assets built at the end of the Cold War and during the first two decades of Putin’s reign. In this climate and space, foreign scholars themselves should take responsibility and develop robust knowledge about foreign influence operations, which will enhance their ability to distinguish between disinformation and truth, and forge certain levels of confidence and intellectual fortitude to understand and withstand the pressure of Russian soft power. Most importantly, they have to publish studies on the topic in English to attain broader readership, as well as the accounts of their own experiences being targeted by Russian influence operations. These exposés will significantly disrupt Russian intelligence’s subversive activities and degrade their networks overseas.