Mikael LohseAdjunct Professor of Intelligence Studies
Finland
Amidst Russia's continued aggression, the Security Service of Ukraine (Служба безпеки України, SBU) has become by far the most powerful security sector authority in the country. The SBU is almost an unstoppable force – Juggernaut – due to wartime necessity. Perhaps precisely for this reason, the SBU enjoys strong governmental and societal support. The Service’s current power posture represents the consolidated position of the Government, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament), and the Office of the President of Ukraine. A September 2025 survey showed that 78 % of Ukrainians trust the SBU, placing it as the second most trusted security authority after the National Guard. For comparison, only 14% of Ukrainians trust the judiciary.
The SBU is, by law, a public authority of special purpose with law enforcement functions, and it employs approximately 40,000 people. The Service is also part of Ukraine’s intelligence community. In practice, the SBU’s power is based on its triple role as a special service, a pre-trial investigation (PTI) body, and a military unit.
Counterintelligence is the backbone of any security service. The SBU counterintelligence collects data on the movement of military equipment, concentration of the’s Russian armed forces, location of their bases and ammunition depots and passes this information to the Defence Forces of Ukraine for targeting and destruction. Another top priority of the SBU is the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order. In addition, the SBU is the main authority coordinating the counterterrorism efforts of state agencies. As a special service the SBU is also occupied with the protection of state secrets, in particular, information relating to defence, economics, science and technology, and foreign relations.
The SBU conducts pre-trial investigations in several areas of crime, such as treason and other crimes against national security, terrorism and related crimes, cyber and information security offences, war and occupation-related offences, but also corruption, economic crimes and organised crime. Since the start of the full-scale war, SBU investigators have been investigating over 90,000 war crimes committed by the Russian armed forces. This array of crimes is being documented not only for Ukrainian, but also for international justice.
The main military unit of the SBU is the Special Operations Center “A” carrying out operational-combat activities and special measures. The numerical strength of this unit is at least 10,000 people during the period of martial law. It’s not just about the number; it’s about the fact that “A” is tier one unit among the special forces of Ukraine. The “A” fighters have already destroyed enemy equipment and personnel on an industrial scale, but the most impactful is the unit’s secret operations. These operations include defeating Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and striking thrice the Crimean Bridge. However, the most ingenious strike by the “A” is probably Operation Spiderweb. This covert attack targeted Russian Air Forces’ long-range aviation assets at five air bases using drones concealed in and launched from trucks on Russian territory. As a result, one-third of Russian strategic cruise missile carriers were demilitarised.
The reason why SBU powers are important are negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. The overarching aim of the SBU reform is to limit its scope of functions to counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and protection of state secrets, and to bring the SBU under genuine democratic control. Let’s go through this role by role.
SBU’s scope of activity as a special service is typical compared to any other security service in the West. Instead, there has been more debate about whether the SBU should have PTI powers. Undoubtedly, PTI powers combined with powers and capabilities of a security service create a very powerful institution. However, the acceptability of such an institution from the perspective of accountability and the protection of individual rights depends upon the adequacy of the oversight created to prevent abuse, or overuse of power. A strong special service which is subject to tight internal control and robust external oversight, and, when using PTI powers, control by prosecutors, cannot be said to be incompatible with Council of Europe principles in general, or the European Court of Human Rights in particular. The decisive factor is therefore whether oversight is organised effectively or not. Having said that, the SBU’s areas of crime are too broad, and crimes that do not threaten national security, such as smuggling and other economic offences, should gradually be transferred to the State Bureau of Investigation or Economic Security Bureau.
Where the SBU differs fundamentally from its European counterparts is in its military unit and active warfare. A domestic security service with the combat capability of one division or two brigades would undoubtedly be worrying from a human rights and accountability perspective in a peacetime context. Demilitarizing SBU is therefore essential in the long run. However, this can only happen once Russia convincingly chooses peace or is forced to do so. Until then, the SBU must maintain military strength to make Russia pay and hold at bay.