Senior Researcher
Pan-European Institute
University of Turku
Finland
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe has seen a surge in suspected hybrid operations – sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and espionage – designed to destabilise without triggering open war. Hybrid warfare blends military and non-military tactics to exploit vulnerabilities and achieve strategic goals, often operating in a “gray zone” that complicates detection, attribution and response.
From Crimea to escalation of hybrid operations
Though hybrid tactics are ancient, the term gained prominence after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, where it used unmarked troops, cyberattacks, economic pressure, and disinformation to legitimize its actions. Since then, Russia has repeatedly employed hybrid methods. These include, among others, interfering elections to sow discord and undermine trust in democracy, disrupting societies and economies with cyberattacks and sabotage, and creating energy dependencies to exert economic and political pressure.
In our study published by the Finnish National Defence University, we analysed the coverage of Russia’s hybrid operations in European media in the 2000s (Mäkinen & Liuhto 2025). We found that suspected cases of Russian hybrid operations have occurred with increasing frequency since Russia began its full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, and especially since 2024. Russia’s faltering war in Ukraine has led it to intensify its hybrid campaigns against the West, aiming to erode the consensus on Western support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. In addition, the expulsion of hundreds of Russian intelligence officers acting under diplomatic cover has forced Russia to change its way of operating in Europe.
Opinion manipulation and election interference
According to our study, Russia’s hybrid warfare spans four dimensions: economic, political, societal and military. These dimensions often overlap, with for instance disinformation campaigns serving multiple strategic purposes – undermining unity in the EU and NATO, influencing public opinion and elections, and weakening support for Ukraine.
By spreading false narratives, especially via social media, Russia seeks to manipulate public opinion and election results, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and strengthen societal polarisation. The 2024 EU Parliament Elections were preceded by a major disinformation campaign that targeted large EU member states to reduce support for Ukraine and boost pro-Russian candidates. Recent examples of election interference concern Moldova’s parliamentary elections in September 2025, where, along with spreading disinformation, Russia was alleged of vote-buying and protest funding, and the first round of Romania’s presidential elections in December 2024, where a pro-Russian candidate surged via a TikTok campaign, leading to annulled election results.
Disrupting infrastructure and society
Media has reported about suspected Russia-linked sabotage and cyberattacks that have targeted railways, energy and telecommunication cables, and public services in Europe. In addition, GPS jamming has disrupted air and sea traffic. Though impacts have so far been limited, large-scale disruptions of infrastructure could paralyze critical sectors like logistics and finance.
Hybrid tactics can also be used to cause insecurity and instability. In 2024, hundreds of schools in Czechia and Slovakia received bomb threats, and logistics and commercial facilities in Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and the UK were targeted by arson attacks. Instrumentalised migration has also been used to provoke political and societal strain – Russia and Belarus have directed asylum seekers to EU borders on several occasions during the last decade.
Ambiguity and diverse actors
Hybrid warfare blurs the line between war and peace. It is often unclear whether incidents are state-sponsored or random acts, and proving guilt and holding someone accountable is difficult. Russia increasingly uses intermediaries and digital platforms like Telegram for recruitment, making attacks harder to predict and trace. Russia also typically denies involvement and floods the media with misleading information to further increase confusion.
Nevertheless, defending against hybrid threats requires balance. Over-securitisation can also fuel fear and undermine democracy – playing into an adversary’s hands. Because Russia seeks to cause confusion and division, fostering cooperation and information sharing at national and EU levels is a key to countering hybrid influence.
References
Mäkinen, Hanna – Liuhto, Kari. 2025. Russia’s shadow war: The media coverage of Russia’s hybrid war against the EU in the 21st century. In Russia’s war against Ukraine: Trends and lessons (Ed. Pentti Forsström). Department of Warfare, Series 2: Research Reports No. 37. Helsinki: National Defence University. https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3535-4