Rt Hon Charles Clarke
Baltic Geopolitics Programme,
Cambridge University
UK
charlesclarke2109@gmail.com
The Russian attack on Ukraine 10 years ago was a turning point in post-World War 2 European history and geopolitics. It set in motion a series of events, as yet incomplete, which are changing the whole balance of European power and forcing a number of unexpected conclusions of which I identify four here.
The most important lesson of all is the clarification that the future of Ukraine lies in its European relationships, notably with the European Union and NATO, with Europe’s norms of democracy and society. This was not clear before 2014. Ukraine’s geopolitical alignment was very much a contested area within Ukrainian politics and national life. There was a genuine dispute. On one side were those who believed that Ukraine’s future lay with its historic relationship with Russia, even if not actually as part of Russia, as Putin and his colleagues preferred. On the other side many Ukrainians shared the ambition that Ukraine should be part of the European Union and NATO.
Putin’s assault upon Ukraine in 2014, reinforced by the further invasion on February 22nd 2022, has categorically resolved that conflict within Ukraine, and not in his favour. Putin’s aggression, cynicism and the destruction he wrought has made it absolutely clear – inside and outside the country - that Ukraine’s future does not lie with, still less within, Russia. This clarity has come at great cost to the Ukrainian people though a national Ukrainian unity has undoubtedly been created, which has become the pro-European, pro-internationalist path for the country’s future. This destination has become inevitable, even though the tribulations on the path to achieving it remain great and the exact process cannot be predicted.
Second, as a result of these events, the rest of the world is increasingly incoherent in working out how best to deal with contemporary Russia. Trust, which, even in the depth of the Cold War still existed, has now disappeared completely and other powers simply do not know how to set about dealing with Russia, at least under its current leadership. Fantasies of leadership change in Russia abound but there is no confidence that such fantasies can come to pass at a time of uncertain American leadership reinforced by worries about a second Trump presidency uncommitted to NATO and its doctrines. It is now urgent for the rest of the world and particularly for Europe to work out the security framework which is likely to be most successful in containing an unreliable Russia.
Russia has never gone through any process of coming to terms with its own past in the 20th century in relation both to Ukraine and to other parts of Europe, such as the Baltic states. It is very difficult to see how a stable future can be created until Russia does come to terms with its past in the way that Germany has successfully been able to do in relation to its Nazi history and to find a very successful means of moving forward.
Third, the Russian invasion forced, and increasingly drives, re-examination of the world’s post 1945 international arrangements, based around the United Nations and Security Council. These lasted fairly successfully for over 60 years but it is now clear that the UN system has been unable either to prevent or to heal conflicts such as that between Russia and Ukraine. This is also true in other situations around the world, but nowhere more seriously than those areas which involve Russia, which remains a member of the Security Council. We are still a long way from finding mechanisms of international cooperation to reinforce or replace the UN arrangements, but if the UN is not to follow the fateful path of its predecessor League of Nations, new creativity will have to go into forging institutional frameworks which can be successful in practice.
This all takes place at a time when US hegemony around the world is far weaker than it used to be for a variety of reasons. This means that the different approaches which will have to be developed to deal with Russia will also have to be applied to threats in other parts of the world such as those in the Middle East and in relation to China and Taiwan.
Fourth, it has taken a long time, but Europe, whether through the prism of the EU or of NATO, is gradually being forced to the realisation that it needs a stronger and more coherent political, diplomatic, military and industrial focus upon its security needs. The full implications of this are not yet clear, but it is now certain that this reassessment has to take place and that the traditional Franco – German alignment will not suffice as a means of addressing these questions. The countries of eastern and central Europe, including those that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, will have an increasing voice in determining how Europe secures itself against an unpredictable Russia, with whom there are few functioning relationships.
These are all major challenges which the events of and since 2014 have sharply clarified. Over the next 10 years we will have to find answers, none of which are at all easy.