Ludvig Filhm: Aligning Swedish security policy to NATO

The application by Sweden to join NATO in May 2022, marked the end to the country's military non-alignment policy. Sweden has been a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme since 1994, Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EOP) since 2014, and has been a Host Nation of NATO since 2016, allowing the country to increase its abilities to provide and receive military support from NATO in war and crisis situations. The country has also for a long time been participating in NATO activities, exercises and operations. However, it was first after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as well as Finland's decision to join NATO, that Sweden seriously addressed the membership question and at the end decided to apply for membership in the alliance.

Since Finland's accession is already completed, the coming Swedish accession will have the impact that all five (5) Nordic countries will be members of NATO, which will have a huge effect for the collective defence of NATO territory especially in Northern Europe and around the Baltic Sea.

The main reason for Sweden to apply for NATO membership was, of course, the benefit of being covered by NATO's security guarantee in Article 5 of the Founding Treaty. Anyway, when becoming a member of NATO, it is crucial not just to ask what NATO can do for us, but even more important, to ask what we can do for NATO. As Secretary General of the Swedish Atlantic Council, an organization that has raised our voice for Swedish NATO membership for many years, I will share some reflections on the Swedish debate about our country's contribution to the implementation of NATO's strategic concepts.

Sweden will be a strategically important and active member of NATO that contributes to the alliance's collective defence to the fullest. The Swedish Government and the Armed Forces have clearly pointed out a direction for Sweden to participate in NATO without red lines regarding how extensive the coordination between Sweden and NATO can become. This is wise as it provides the best possible conditions for Sweden and NATO to jointly examine how Sweden best can contribute to common security and find the right synergies for Sweden and NATO allies as providers of security in Northern Europe and especially in the Baltic Sea.

Sweden's geographical position will certainly be of importance when determining areas to operate in and operations to focus on. Coordination with Finland, the other Nordic countries, allies around the Baltic Sea, the United Kingdom and other partners of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the USA will naturally have a vital strategic significance.

Especially increased Nordic cooperation will be crucial since the Nordic neighbors already have a close military cooperation due to its common interests of security in the region. The Nordic countries' Armed Forces and governments also have expressed a common will to strengthen coordination of air force, marine and ground forces. The five Nordic countries should all be part of the same command structure and operation area; in this way, the conditions for joint defence planning increase, which would strengthen the countries' joint ability to operate in the Nordic region and the surrounding area. As Swedish Major General K. Neretnieks has expressed, it would be a powerful instrument, if, for example, the Nordic countries air forces could operate as one air force, and the marines as one marine, in operations in the area. An increased Nordic coordination will be a strong contributor to security also in NATO's eastern flank. To strengthen the defence of the eastern flank even more, Sweden should also contribute to the military presence in, for example, the Baltic states, through NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). Contributing to security in the Baltic states will be a top priority for Sweden.

Sweden should contribute with competence and resources to all military disciplines in NATO:s domain. Some areas where I believe Swedish contribution would be of great importance are the rapid response forces such as the Allied Response Force (ARF), air policing, Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) and, as previously mentioned, the EFP. With a small but rather modern Armed Forces, Sweden will be a contributing factor to a stronger common defence.

Lastly, Sweden will also be an active part in the future development of NATO. As one of many supporters of Ukraine, Sweden will as a NATO member keep on working for an increased support to the Ukrainian armed forces in their fight to retake their territories invaded by Russia. Sweden is also likely to be a driving force for the enlargement of NATO in accordance with the Open Door Policy of the alliance; therefore, Ukrainian membership will probably be a priority for Sweden. In an unstable time the transatlantic link needs to become stronger, and with Sweden in NATO, the link will be strengthened while the conditions for a secure Europe and North America will increase.