Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann
Associated Research Fellow Warsaw Institute
Poland
The starting point for any deterrent strategy is capability. In other words, one has to possess the military means, forces, and resources to execute the threats in case deterrence fails - war constitutes the failure of deterrence. As the Russian occupation of Ukraine continues, Poland is in a state of transition, calibrating its deterrence posture in 3 dimensions including its conventional, nuclear, and cooperative/political spheres.
It is safe to say that during the first half of the previous decade, the Baltic Sea region had already seen an aggressive and assertive Russia eying at the security vacuum left in the northeastern flank. Today, neither the reality nor the motivation has changed. Living to its promise of restoring its military capability in the northeastern flank, Polish investment in the defense sector has attracted wide attention across Europe and the Atlantic. With the United States and South Korea by her side, Poland intends to pursue a renewed strategy of denial and containment of the Russian forces still stationed in Ukrainian territories. The modernization plans of the Polish Armed Forces were included in the “Development Program of the Armed Forces for 2021-2035” (Program Rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych na lata 2021-2035), which was adopted in the second half of 2019. On this note, Poland intends to garner a qualitative superiority in case of military confrontation, including that of its armed ground forces.
Conventional deterrence
Since 2017, Poland’s main military shopping spree has predominantly focused on acquiring American armament, and more recently, this preference has shifted towards South Korea. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Warsaw has ordered 250 U.S.-made Abrams tanks and HIMARS launchers but its most recent arms deals with South Korea include the procurement of newer combat vehicles such as the K2 ‘Black Panther’ tanks and K9 Thunder Howitzers. The signed agreements with the US now certify Polish companies as suppliers to US entities, impacting the research, development, and testing capabilities of the Polish industry, and further mobilizing the domestic defense-industrial base. A technological leap in the production process across the Atlantic is thus taking place. More recently, the transatlantic bond has strengthened with the US concluding an unusual direct loan agreement of $2 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to support Poland’s defense modernization.
Ultimately, the transatlantic bond served to materialize the Development Program, and the second phase of the Wisła program intended to further equip the Polish deterrence strategy in the eastern flank. On a similar note, the Polish Navy is to acquire the newest versions of Orka submarines from South Korea intended to secure the Baltics. With Sweden expected soon to become a NATO member, the Baltic Rim is surely to become the focal point of military containment by conventional deterrence. Such mobilization will effectively turn the Baltic region into a “NATO lake”, freezing most of the Russian future activities in the northern flank.
Notwithstanding, the Polish propensity to rely on the US for its defense capabilities can create asymmetric dependencies. Needless to say, a rising hegemon will not be able to be considered a hegemon if it has to depend on another hegemon for its own security. While it is true that the US has an interest in supplying military equipment to Poland, South Korean interests are more pragmatic. Bringing an Asian giant to Europe and boosting competition in this commercial domain, is a move that several European capitals might not be ready to cope with (Paris, Berlin, London).
From conventional to nuclear deterrence
Deterring a nuclear state with conventional weapons solely is asymmetric and thus, extremely difficult. For this reason, as the strengthening of Polish forces materializes, enabling a nuclear strategy is gaining important momentum. In direct response to Russia deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, Poland has expressed an interest in stationing US nuclear weapons in Polish territory. A potential opportunity that if properly executed, could bring Poland closer to the US.
Concomitantly, the adaptation of the F-35A Lightning II to carry B61-12 (thermonuclear bomb) is a proposition that requires careful consideration. Therefore, Poland’s quests for a more active role in NATO's nuclear-sharing mission would entail tailoring its F-35As arsenal to function as dual-capable aircraft. Once aircraft become operational and in service, further cooperation would see the US and Poland training jointly in coordinated exercises.
Political and cooperative dimension
The exit polls of the October 2023 elections favouring the Civic Coalition leader Donald Tusk could improve U.S.-Polish relations, as well as the ties between Warsaw and Brussels. With its new government, Poland will also become a more eager player in European politics. The outcome of the recent Parliamentary elections and the mobilization of its military and defense reforms, has afforded Poland a groundbreaking playing card with the U.S.. Notwithstanding, the new administration could see a reversal of the deeply conservative policies including elements of the defense investment plans set forth by the Morawiecki’s administration.
Poland’s commitment to technological self-reliance and cutting-edge hardware figures the complexity of defense spending. Whether Warsaw can maintain such a high level of spending over the longer term is a major concern for the next administration. The financial commitment to maintain the cost of operation, maintenance, training, and repairs of the newly procured equipment is to be equated with a combination of conventional with potential nuclear deterrence.
Conclusion
Poland is undertaking a national military leap focusing on the modernization of its military equipment, ground forces, and infrastructure. Undergoing a major modernization of its existing equipment and expansion of its military arsenal and personnel (wanting to recruit about 150,000 troops in the next decade, which will bring its army from the current 128,000 active personnel and 36,000 territorial defense troops to 300,000 soldiers by 2035.).
As a rising geopolitical pivot, Poland’s revised military procurement and defense expenditure is genuine and determined. Driven by its history and regional aspirations, Poland aims to enhance its conventional deterrence by protracting a strategy of denial in the eastern and Baltic flanks. However, the costs of sustaining 4.5% of GDP (or above) on defense spending are less observed. Therefore, should Poland be expected to become the guardian of the East, it is yet to be seen how exactly Poland will cope with a steady influx of migrants, rising inflation and an unspoken and pending rule-of-law consideration involving the independence of its judiciary.