Shota Gvineria
Ambassador, Lecturer in Defence and Cyber Studies
Faculty at the Department for Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College
Tartu, Estonia
The operating principle of Russia's hybrid warfare
The main determinants of hybridity have long been debated in defence policy circles. Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022 shifted the focus from non-military back to conventional tools, jeopardising the entire concept of hybrid warfare. However, for Russia, hybrid warfare was never about choosing between conventional and unconventional tools.
Since the 1990s, Russia has consistently applied all instruments of its power to identify and exploit adversarial vulnerabilities. The main conceptual logic of Russia's so-called kill chain is to conceal its own weaknesses while neutralising the advantages of its adversaries, enabling it to transform reckless policies and escalation potential into a strategic advantage through five steps: 1. Weaponise a vulnerability to create a crisis 2. Initiate negotiations to impose new post-crisis realities 3. Make threats and escalate while negotiating 4. Obtain concessions 5. Secure gains and look for new vulnerabilities to continue the pattern.
Through this kill chain, Russia normalised the use of military and non-military instruments for achieving its political objectives, erasing the division between geopolitical competition with the West and hybrid warfare. The core operating principle of this pattern is based on carefully testing Western red lines and potential responses to Russia's belligerent actions. As a result, Russia relies on non-military instruments of power to operate below the threshold of conflict in NATO member states while using military force to destabilise countries outside the Alliance. The logic is straightforward: Russia will go as far as the West will allow without imposing painful costs.
A broken pattern of blackmail
Russia, emboldened by the successful implementation of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy in its neighbourhood for decades, began constructing this kill chain around Ukraine in the run-up to its full-scale invasion in 2022. In September 2021, 'Zapad' exercises signalled escalatory posture by simulating a nuclear strike and occupation of NATO territories. That same month, after completing the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Russia manipulated energy prices to reinforce these tensions. The next month, Russia began using Lukashenko to instigate a migration crisis at the borders of the Baltic states and Poland. After gradual escalation through multiple domains, Russia began to build up its military presence on the Ukrainian border, culminating in ultimatums to NATO and the US.
Those ultimatums demanded specific concessions from the West, not from Kyiv, turning Ukraine into the object or the theatre of Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Russia's disastrous performance on the battlefield since the invasion demonstrates that Russia was not prepared for an all-out war and was expecting another easy victory. According to the Kremlin's calculus, Ukraine was deceived as to its ability to resist, and the West would once again rush to the negotiating table under Russia's terms. However, the unity and resolve of Ukraine and the West resulted in a first-ever interruption of Russia's kill chain, exposing its strategic and operational dysfunctionality.
The risk of reviving the kill chain
Recent history proves that impunity and a lack of clear opposition provoke Russia to pursue aggressive strategies. Warnings that Russia was preparing to attack Georgia were widely dismissed as a conspiracy, leading to the invasion in 2008 with little consequence for Russia. Similarly, neither the threat of Crimea's annexation and the War in Eastern Ukraine nor its repercussions for European security have been adequately addressed. Even after the US intelligence shared information about the Russian troop numbers, locations, and intentions in February 2022, there was no Western response to the invasion of Kyiv. Deterrence failed in all preceding cases because Russia was convinced that the targeted countries were unprepared for a strong opposition. The West was unwilling to impose painful costs – the formula leading to the concessions to Kremlin.
Failure to understand the main drivers of each other's strategic thinking led the West and Russia to a series of misunderstandings. Western policymaking was crippled by the lack of a unified understanding regarding Russian intentions and capabilities, enabling Russia to exploit these uncertainties. After more than a year of the war, there is still no vision of the desired end state of remarkable Western support for Ukraine. Even defining the conditions of victory and defeat is problematic. For Putin's current circumstances, winning may mean slowly destroying Ukraine through attrition until the cost of the war exceeds acceptable limits and then striking a deal to retain some of the occupied regions of Ukraine. Western political debates partially echo narratives that the West cannot sustain existing levels of support to Ukraine indefinitely, and there is a need to avoid escalation into WWIII by making concessions to the Kremlin. Allowing Kremlin to revive its kill chain is the worst option for Ukraine and European security.
Hybrid lessons from Ukraine
Russia is waging hybrid warfare as a part of its strategic completion with the West. Denial of this reality, resulting in the lack of credible Western deterrents, provoked further aggression and determined the success of Russia's kill chain.
The devastating consequences of the war in Ukraine on entire Euro-Atlantic security prove that the sources of Western vulnerabilities may stem from outside NATO and EU borders. The operationalisation of resilience is core for any credible deterrence, which requires constantly searching for and mending these vulnerabilities before Russia uses them to initiate the kill chain.
Western defence policymaking primarily focuses on conventional warfare and does not proportionally address unconventional aspects. There is the ill practice of treating hybrid warfare as a standalone, underfunded conceptual problem; when instead, it is crucial to incorporate countering it into the regular national defence and security budgetary cycles.
Finally, properly communicating clearly defined policies is vital for deterring Russia's aggressive hybrid warfare and avoiding misconceptions. The counterproductive Western message aimed at deterring Russian aggression was focused on "defending every inch of NATO territory," convincing Putin that there would be no painful costs for invading a non-NATO nation. The only way to discourage Putin from attacking Ukraine would have been to convince him that the West was united and ready for severe sanctions and unprecedented military support. To avoid reviving the kill chain that caused a current shock to Euro-Atlantic security, the West needs to make it clear that there is no way for Putin to win this war. This requires displaying a strategy aimed at supporting not the resistance but the victory of Ukraine, defined as the restoration of territorial integrity under its internationally recognized borders.
The main determinants of hybridity have long been debated in defence policy circles. Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022 shifted the focus from non-military back to conventional tools, jeopardising the entire concept of hybrid warfare. However, for Russia, hybrid warfare was never about choosing between conventional and unconventional tools.
Since the 1990s, Russia has consistently applied all instruments of its power to identify and exploit adversarial vulnerabilities. The main conceptual logic of Russia's so-called kill chain is to conceal its own weaknesses while neutralising the advantages of its adversaries, enabling it to transform reckless policies and escalation potential into a strategic advantage through five steps: 1. Weaponise a vulnerability to create a crisis 2. Initiate negotiations to impose new post-crisis realities 3. Make threats and escalate while negotiating 4. Obtain concessions 5. Secure gains and look for new vulnerabilities to continue the pattern.
Through this kill chain, Russia normalised the use of military and non-military instruments for achieving its political objectives, erasing the division between geopolitical competition with the West and hybrid warfare. The core operating principle of this pattern is based on carefully testing Western red lines and potential responses to Russia's belligerent actions. As a result, Russia relies on non-military instruments of power to operate below the threshold of conflict in NATO member states while using military force to destabilise countries outside the Alliance. The logic is straightforward: Russia will go as far as the West will allow without imposing painful costs.
A broken pattern of blackmail
Russia, emboldened by the successful implementation of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy in its neighbourhood for decades, began constructing this kill chain around Ukraine in the run-up to its full-scale invasion in 2022. In September 2021, 'Zapad' exercises signalled escalatory posture by simulating a nuclear strike and occupation of NATO territories. That same month, after completing the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Russia manipulated energy prices to reinforce these tensions. The next month, Russia began using Lukashenko to instigate a migration crisis at the borders of the Baltic states and Poland. After gradual escalation through multiple domains, Russia began to build up its military presence on the Ukrainian border, culminating in ultimatums to NATO and the US.
Those ultimatums demanded specific concessions from the West, not from Kyiv, turning Ukraine into the object or the theatre of Russia's geopolitical ambitions. Russia's disastrous performance on the battlefield since the invasion demonstrates that Russia was not prepared for an all-out war and was expecting another easy victory. According to the Kremlin's calculus, Ukraine was deceived as to its ability to resist, and the West would once again rush to the negotiating table under Russia's terms. However, the unity and resolve of Ukraine and the West resulted in a first-ever interruption of Russia's kill chain, exposing its strategic and operational dysfunctionality.
The risk of reviving the kill chain
Recent history proves that impunity and a lack of clear opposition provoke Russia to pursue aggressive strategies. Warnings that Russia was preparing to attack Georgia were widely dismissed as a conspiracy, leading to the invasion in 2008 with little consequence for Russia. Similarly, neither the threat of Crimea's annexation and the War in Eastern Ukraine nor its repercussions for European security have been adequately addressed. Even after the US intelligence shared information about the Russian troop numbers, locations, and intentions in February 2022, there was no Western response to the invasion of Kyiv. Deterrence failed in all preceding cases because Russia was convinced that the targeted countries were unprepared for a strong opposition. The West was unwilling to impose painful costs – the formula leading to the concessions to Kremlin.
Failure to understand the main drivers of each other's strategic thinking led the West and Russia to a series of misunderstandings. Western policymaking was crippled by the lack of a unified understanding regarding Russian intentions and capabilities, enabling Russia to exploit these uncertainties. After more than a year of the war, there is still no vision of the desired end state of remarkable Western support for Ukraine. Even defining the conditions of victory and defeat is problematic. For Putin's current circumstances, winning may mean slowly destroying Ukraine through attrition until the cost of the war exceeds acceptable limits and then striking a deal to retain some of the occupied regions of Ukraine. Western political debates partially echo narratives that the West cannot sustain existing levels of support to Ukraine indefinitely, and there is a need to avoid escalation into WWIII by making concessions to the Kremlin. Allowing Kremlin to revive its kill chain is the worst option for Ukraine and European security.
Hybrid lessons from Ukraine
Russia is waging hybrid warfare as a part of its strategic completion with the West. Denial of this reality, resulting in the lack of credible Western deterrents, provoked further aggression and determined the success of Russia's kill chain.
The devastating consequences of the war in Ukraine on entire Euro-Atlantic security prove that the sources of Western vulnerabilities may stem from outside NATO and EU borders. The operationalisation of resilience is core for any credible deterrence, which requires constantly searching for and mending these vulnerabilities before Russia uses them to initiate the kill chain.
Western defence policymaking primarily focuses on conventional warfare and does not proportionally address unconventional aspects. There is the ill practice of treating hybrid warfare as a standalone, underfunded conceptual problem; when instead, it is crucial to incorporate countering it into the regular national defence and security budgetary cycles.
Finally, properly communicating clearly defined policies is vital for deterring Russia's aggressive hybrid warfare and avoiding misconceptions. The counterproductive Western message aimed at deterring Russian aggression was focused on "defending every inch of NATO territory," convincing Putin that there would be no painful costs for invading a non-NATO nation. The only way to discourage Putin from attacking Ukraine would have been to convince him that the West was united and ready for severe sanctions and unprecedented military support. To avoid reviving the kill chain that caused a current shock to Euro-Atlantic security, the West needs to make it clear that there is no way for Putin to win this war. This requires displaying a strategy aimed at supporting not the resistance but the victory of Ukraine, defined as the restoration of territorial integrity under its internationally recognized borders.