Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier: The Baltic as a Western Sea

On May 8, 2022, Finland officially announced its candidacy for NATO membership in spite of Moscow’s threats of future “military-technical measures”. The same goes for Sweden, breaking with its historical neutrality (1814), which is much older than Finland’s. Their entry into NATO will profoundly modify the balance of power in the Baltic Sea.

Located between the Scandinavian peninsula, Fenno-Scandia and the German-Polish plain, the Baltic Sea is a quasi-enclosed sea with a surface area of 450,000 km². The Danish straits are the point of access to the North Sea and the North Atlantic. As a space of confrontation between the West and Russia, the Baltic Sea is sometimes wrongly described as the “Northern Mediterranean ”. French geographer Yves Lacoste designates as “Mediterranean” maritime areas of about 4000 km in length (second order of magnitude), like the Mediterranean Sea, the “Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean Sea” (the “American Mediterranean”) or the South China Sea (the “Asian Mediterranean”). The Baltic Sea is smaller in size: its surface area is almost six times smaller than that of the Mediterranean itself (2.5 million km²). In fact, the term “Northern Mediterranean” functions after the Cold War as a metaphor for peace and prosperity, which has little to do with the situation and prospects of the Baltic.

During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was governed by the “northern balance”: it was shared between the USSR and its satellites (Poland, GDR), the NATO member states (FRG, Denmark) and neutral states (Sweden, Finland). NATO controlled the Danish straits, but its ships hardly penetrated the Baltic, where the Northern Fleet, attached to Kaliningrad (ex- Königsberg), dominated. The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR renewed the geopolitical configuration. To develop cooperation between the Baltic Sea riparians, a Council of Baltic Sea States was established (1992) including Russia. Norway is also a member, and the European Commission is represented. Some of the Baltic riparians also participate in cooperation structures that cover areas of different sizes: the Nordic Council (Scandinavian countries, Iceland), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (Scandinavian countries, Iceland, Russia, European Commission) and the Arctic Council (Scandinavian countries, Iceland, Russia, USA, Canada).

Despite this dense network of organizations, extending regional cooperation to Russia is not easy. Above all, Russia’s revisionist policy worries the countries of the region, which want the security guarantees provided by the Euro-Atlantic bodies (NATO and the EU) to be reaffirmed. Launched in February-March 2014, the Russian war against Ukraine has repercussions in the Baltic. In addition to the provocations at the maritime and air borders of the states in the region, the geopolitical dispute around the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia is aggravated by Putin’s recurring theme of defending the “Russian world” for which he claims Russia has the political and military responsibility. In the Baltic countries, Poland, Finland (a 1340-kilometer border with Russia) and Sweden, a “hybrid war” scenario is feared..

In order to avoid a power grab, NATO and its member states decided at the Newport summit (4-5 September 2014) to consolidate their defense and deterrence posture on the Baltic-Black Sea isthmus (reassurance measures); a decision extended by the Allies in Warsaw (8-9 July 2016), with the “enhanced forward presence.” At the same time, Finland and Sweden began a discussion whether or not to join the Atlantic Alliance and the authorities of both countries developed their military cooperation with NATO and the United States. Sweden and Finland participated in manoeuvres organized by NATO in the Baltic Sea. In addition, Helsinki is negotiating an agreement with Washington on enhanced cooperation in intelligence, training and defence research. Finally, a Centre of Excellence against hybrid threats was created.

For its part, Moscow denounced the establishment of a “cordon sanitaire” and the Russian army deployed anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The idea is to create an air-sea “bubble” to counter operations in support of the Baltic States and to hinder a NATO military deployment. In this way, the Baltic would become a “Russian sea”. All of this is worrying, especially since the strategic situation of the Baltic States would be compromised in a space that is locked down in this way. The possibility of a Russian assault on the “Suwalki Passage”, a strip of Polish-Lithuanian territory that connects Belarus to Kaliningrad, is mentioned. From then on, the destiny of the Baltic states would depend on NATO’s free access to the Baltic and its ability to control the air-sea space.

It is therefore understandable that the new Russian aggression on Ukraine, on 24 February 2022, is at the origin of a historical bifurcation in the Baltic region. On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden officially applied for NATO membership. A particularly significant decision for these countries, which were formerly under pressure from Russia before, during and after the Soviet period. Indeed, Finnish and Swedish politicians, military and diplomats have a deep knowledge of “Russia-Soviet” and intuitively perceive the threats it poses. The situation had to be serious for these two countries to renounce their position of “non-allies”, rooted in historical neutrality, which in the case of Finland was less a matter of choice than necessity - see the Winter War (1939-1940) and the Continuation War (1941-1944).

Nevertheless, Helsinki and Stockholm did not give in to Russian threats. With time, the historians will see in this double Finnish-Swedish decision the logical outcome of a profound political, strategic and military evolution, started once the USSR had broken up. The access to the European Union, in 1995, was accompanied by a rapprochement with NATO (see Partnership for Peace). Since then, military cooperation and multiple exercises have made it possible to develop interoperability between the armed forces of the Allies and those of their Baltic partners. Finland and Sweden are also part of the Nordic Military Cooperation, a structure whose three other participants (Denmark, Norway and Iceland) are members of NATO. In 2017, both joined the Joint Expeditionary Force, set up by London, in which nine Baltic and Nordic countries participated. The ongoing war on Ukrainian soil will have finished convincing the governments, political forces and public opinions of these two countries. 

Already partially integrated at the operational level, through their participation in various NATO and European Union operations, the armed forces of Finland and Sweden will make their contribution to the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The full integration of these two “security providers” will profoundly change the balance of power in the Baltic. More than ever, St. Petersburg and the ports built during the 2000s (Vyborg and Ust-Luga), at the bottom of the Gulf of Finland, will be comparable to a simple window on the Baltic, completed, it is true, by the over-militarized enclave of Kaliningrad. As for the Baltic States, they will be opened up, with Sweden and Finland giving them real strategic depth. Let us emphasize in particular the strategic dimension of the port of Gothenburg, which is essential for supporting the Baltic States and Finland, as well as the central position of the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. 

In short, the Baltic, if the Allies have the will and the means, will be a western sea. More than a strategic transformation, it is a geopolitical upheaval that is at stake. Surely, Finland and Sweden will be security providers for the Western world.