Anna Michalski
Associate Professor
Department of Government, Uppsala University
Sweden
No one denies that 2022 was a year that severely affected the EU’s relations to Russia and China. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine constitutes the most severe security crisis for European countries since the Second World War; its breach of the principles of the European security architecture poses a tangible and immediate challenge to European security interests. As for China, its refusal to integrate into the rules-based international order presents a strategic conundrum for the EU and its member states. Although the EU’s relations to Russia and China were already deteriorating, the war in Ukraine has put the strategic challenge to the forefront of the EU’s burgeoning foreign and security policy. The EU has hitherto responded with unexpected resolve to the challenges arising from Russia’s belligerence whether directly by supporting Ukraine’s war efforts with military aid and sanctions, or by withstanding the weaponization of the energy dependence on Russian gas and oil. In regards to China, bilateral relations reached a new low during the ‘war summit’ of April 2022 and there are few signs of any real improvement since. This implies that the EU now needs rapidly to mature as a strategic actor, which will be no small feat for an organization whose global actorness has long been questioned. In the following, the nature of the main strategic challenges posed by Russia and China to the EU will be explored. To conclude, the paper will review the EU’s response thus far and discuss the main impediments to its emergence as a global strategic actor.
The strategic challenges of Russia and China
As strategic rivals, Russia and China pose challenges that are both similar and different. On a fundamental level, the gravest challenge is the one posing the rules-based international system by not playing by the book of liberal institutionalism and disregarding universal values and norms. In the case of Russia, its disrespect for the principles of the European security architecture is very stark in its invasion of Ukraine as it persistently denies the inviolability of borders and the right for countries to choose their own security arrangements. It has also resorted to the weaponization of raw materials, utilizing relations of economic dependence to influence politics in Europe. In the case of China, the challenge is more multifaceted and possibly more intractable, not least due to its economic and political weight. China has resorted to politicizing economic relations using positive and negative economic statecraft in sophisticated ways to shape international relations to its advantage. Positive statecraft is used through the Belt and Road Initiative which has engaged some EU member states which meet with China in a dedicated diplomatic forum, the 16+1 format. Negative economic statecraft targets both countries and companies. Examples include punishing Lithuania for allowing Taiwan to open a trade office in its name in Vilnius and the Swedish clothing firm H&M for speaking up against human rights violations in Xinjiang. In security terms, China often highlights the absence of strategic issues between the EU and China but with China’s support of the Russian claims of legitimate security concerns due to the enlargement of NATO as the cause of the war in Ukraine, China also poses real challenges to the European security architecture. In the longer run, however, the arguably most fundamental strategic challenge to the EU concerns Russia and China’s denunciation of the international rules-based system through their adherence to power politics and disregard for common rules and principles, as enshrined in international law and practices of multilateralism. The fact that Russia and China purposely undermines bodies such as the UN’s Human Rights Council further weakens the liberal values that the EU stands for. The shift in the internal order away from liberal institutionalism towards a rule by power makes it more difficult for the EU to assert its standing as a normative actor.
The EU’s quest for global actorness in a deteriorating international climate
The EU has after years of hesitation announced that it must become a geopolitical actor. What does that mean in practice? Regarding Russia, the war in Ukraine has pushed the EU and its member states to take action that would have earlier been considered unthinkable. In 2022, the EU enacted a string of sanctions, authorized the financing of military equipment and has come together to drastically reduce the dependency on Russian gas and oil. European companies have left the Russian market and, with support of European governments, barred Russia from the Swift payment system. The road towards a future EU membership for Ukraine has been opened and previously military non-aligned EU member states, Finland and Sweden, are applying for membership of NATO. Going forward, Europe, via the EU, will have to take the forefront in the rebuilding of Ukraine and a new European security architecture based on cooperation between NATO and the EU will be built. Restoring bilateral relations with Russia is still far away.
Russia has become a pariah state in many parts of the world. The future of Russia holds many dangerous scenarios, not least a possible break-up or prolonged internal chaos with grave implications for the EU and its member states. China poses a more complex picture for the EU. On the one hand, relations between China and the EU have deteriorated a great deal in in the last five years since the President von der Leyen described it as a triptych – partner, competitor, rival – and pronounced her presidency of the Commission to be a geopolitical one. Since then the EU has moved to protect against economic coercion, set up a Human Rights Sanctions Regime and used it against Chinese individuals, pushed forward its role as security provider in the Indo-Pacific region, and set up a Community for Democracies. At the same time, it tries to balance the demands from the US to follow its increasingly tough posturing towards China. Also, it has not ruled out eventually ratifying the suspended Comprehensive Investment Agreement with China. Overall, the EU sees China as an economic competitor and a strategic rival – a stance which has only deepened since the war in Ukraine. Nonetheless, it knows that it needs to handle its relations with China in a way that is in line with its own identity as a normative power, but at the same time does not aggravate tensions to a point of no return.
The strategic challenges of Russia and China
As strategic rivals, Russia and China pose challenges that are both similar and different. On a fundamental level, the gravest challenge is the one posing the rules-based international system by not playing by the book of liberal institutionalism and disregarding universal values and norms. In the case of Russia, its disrespect for the principles of the European security architecture is very stark in its invasion of Ukraine as it persistently denies the inviolability of borders and the right for countries to choose their own security arrangements. It has also resorted to the weaponization of raw materials, utilizing relations of economic dependence to influence politics in Europe. In the case of China, the challenge is more multifaceted and possibly more intractable, not least due to its economic and political weight. China has resorted to politicizing economic relations using positive and negative economic statecraft in sophisticated ways to shape international relations to its advantage. Positive statecraft is used through the Belt and Road Initiative which has engaged some EU member states which meet with China in a dedicated diplomatic forum, the 16+1 format. Negative economic statecraft targets both countries and companies. Examples include punishing Lithuania for allowing Taiwan to open a trade office in its name in Vilnius and the Swedish clothing firm H&M for speaking up against human rights violations in Xinjiang. In security terms, China often highlights the absence of strategic issues between the EU and China but with China’s support of the Russian claims of legitimate security concerns due to the enlargement of NATO as the cause of the war in Ukraine, China also poses real challenges to the European security architecture. In the longer run, however, the arguably most fundamental strategic challenge to the EU concerns Russia and China’s denunciation of the international rules-based system through their adherence to power politics and disregard for common rules and principles, as enshrined in international law and practices of multilateralism. The fact that Russia and China purposely undermines bodies such as the UN’s Human Rights Council further weakens the liberal values that the EU stands for. The shift in the internal order away from liberal institutionalism towards a rule by power makes it more difficult for the EU to assert its standing as a normative actor.
The EU’s quest for global actorness in a deteriorating international climate
The EU has after years of hesitation announced that it must become a geopolitical actor. What does that mean in practice? Regarding Russia, the war in Ukraine has pushed the EU and its member states to take action that would have earlier been considered unthinkable. In 2022, the EU enacted a string of sanctions, authorized the financing of military equipment and has come together to drastically reduce the dependency on Russian gas and oil. European companies have left the Russian market and, with support of European governments, barred Russia from the Swift payment system. The road towards a future EU membership for Ukraine has been opened and previously military non-aligned EU member states, Finland and Sweden, are applying for membership of NATO. Going forward, Europe, via the EU, will have to take the forefront in the rebuilding of Ukraine and a new European security architecture based on cooperation between NATO and the EU will be built. Restoring bilateral relations with Russia is still far away.
Russia has become a pariah state in many parts of the world. The future of Russia holds many dangerous scenarios, not least a possible break-up or prolonged internal chaos with grave implications for the EU and its member states. China poses a more complex picture for the EU. On the one hand, relations between China and the EU have deteriorated a great deal in in the last five years since the President von der Leyen described it as a triptych – partner, competitor, rival – and pronounced her presidency of the Commission to be a geopolitical one. Since then the EU has moved to protect against economic coercion, set up a Human Rights Sanctions Regime and used it against Chinese individuals, pushed forward its role as security provider in the Indo-Pacific region, and set up a Community for Democracies. At the same time, it tries to balance the demands from the US to follow its increasingly tough posturing towards China. Also, it has not ruled out eventually ratifying the suspended Comprehensive Investment Agreement with China. Overall, the EU sees China as an economic competitor and a strategic rival – a stance which has only deepened since the war in Ukraine. Nonetheless, it knows that it needs to handle its relations with China in a way that is in line with its own identity as a normative power, but at the same time does not aggravate tensions to a point of no return.