Andrey
Makarychev
Professor
of Regional Political Studies
University
of Tartu
Estonia
In the academic literature wars and military crises are usually discussed as states of exception that are used by sovereign authorities to apply extraordinary and often coercive measures. Indeed, Estonia - as well as all other countries affected by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine – introduced multiple bans, limitations and restrictions, including the de facto closure of the border with Russia even for Russian holders of Schengen visas, cancellation of cultural events with participation of Russian artists, refusal to matriculate Russian students in Estonian universities, and rejection to issue work permits for holders of Russian passports.
Yet in the meantime, exceptional circumstances can boost what is known as productive power that generates novel political experience and practices. I will dwell upon four of them.
First, Estonia that accommodated more than 60,000 Ukrainian war refugees is facing a new experience of cultural and societal integration. Even after the war ends, Estonia might host a sizable Ukrainian community willing to educationally, linguistically and professionally integrate in society, and do so faster than the old generation of local Russophones. A new Slavic minority with a high level of loyalty to their new home country might be beneficial for Estonian model of multiculturalism, and might also have a positive demographic effect, especially for underpopulated areas.
Second, the influx of Ukrainian war escapees strengthened coordination between Estonia and Finland in immigration policies. A major novelty in this respect was an agreement to relocate some of the refugees from Estonia to Finland, in case if – and when – Estonian resources to host them are exhausted. It appears that in this domain the Estonian – Finnish cooperation is more fruitful than in the case of bilateral negotiations on liquified gas terminal which so far did not bring the expected outcomes.[1]
Third, the war reinforced the rationale for a new regional – and still informal – platform for security policy coordination between the three Baltic states and Poland. On a symbolic side, in April 2022 the four heads of states visited Kyiv as a group to express support for President Zelenskiy and solidarity with the Ukrainian people. On a more practical side, speakers of the four parliaments met in January 2023 to more closely coordinate policies of the respective countries towards Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. Against this background, Kristi Raik, the director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute posits that „the Baltic states and Poland do not fear any real or imagined escalation as much as a Russian victory…. And they have made their frustration with Western handwringing clear. From the viewpoint of these countries, the West’s inconsistent and constantly shifting limits on the kinds of weapons it will deliver unnecessarily prolong the war“.[2]
Fourth, Estonia is a leader in initiating the legal procedure of using the frozen Russian financial assets for economically rebuilding Ukrainian infrastructure.[3] Although the feasibility of confiscating Russian funds has been challenged by some Estonian legal experts,[4] the activity of the Estonian government in this terrain received support from Brussels.[5] This new initiative ought to be seen within the framework of a wider Estonian strategy of “ramping up mobilisation of its own resources and calling on”[6] allies to follow suit. Other examples of this approach include Estonian leadership in qualifying the war against Ukraine as genocide and terrorism, and in preparing legal and political backgrounds for an international tribunal on Russia’s military crimes.
These new foreign policy practices might be discussed as parts of a broader phenomenon dubbed by Benjamin Tallis “the new idealism” – “an increasingly morally grounded geopolitics … that prioritises human rights and fundamental freedoms, liberal democracy, collective self-determination for democracies and, above all, the right of their citizens to a hopeful future“.[7] In Central Europe and the Baltic states this „neoidealism“ was very much inspired by Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russian invasion and made possible significant innovations in Estonian foreign policy.
[1] https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/state-ready-acquire-paldiski-lng-quay-earlier-agreed
[2] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/08/ukraine-russia-war-escalation-collapse-victory-baltic-poland-putin-imperialism/?fbclid=IwAR374yQWKGjb_vUrcA8tusY-tCcKj8EsLgE2yo6gWVM3bcdbbHieafRj-Ek
[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-09/estonia-to-move-ahead-of-eu-with-plans-to-seize-russian-assets
[4] https://rus.err.ee/1608843307/professor-tlu-otchuzhdenie-rossijskih-aktivov-podorvalo-by-princip-immuniteta-gosudarstv
[5] https://rus.err.ee/1608848614/v-es-ocenili-jestonskie-predlozhenija-po-antirossijskim-sankcijam
[6] https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/Baltics
[7] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/are-czechia-and-slovakia-eus-new-radical-centrehttps://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/state-ready-acquire-paldiski-lng-quay-earlier-agreed